4 ms·

I don't understand the whole debate about Apple security: - Apple is required to have backdoors, at least on iPhones sold in foreign countries, isn't it? - Ev

by tajen 11y ago

I don't understand the whole debate about Apple security: - Apple is required to have backdoors, at least on iPhones sold in foreign countries, isn't it? - Even if the SE were completely secure, a rogue update of iOS could intercept the fingerprint or passcode whenever it is typed, and replay it to unlock the SE when spies ask for it. As far as I know, the on-screen keyboard is controlled by software which isn't in the SE. - Even if iCloud is supposed to be encrypted, they didn't open up that part to public scutinity. - Therefore a perfect security around the SE only solves the problem of accessing a phone that wasn't backdoored yet. There are all reasons for, say, Europe and CIA, to require phones to be backdoored by default for LE and economic intelligence purposes.

lololomg 11y ago
Apple is not required by any country to have a backdoor and I am not aware of any agreement from Apple to install such a back door for anyone
- deleted 11y ago
  [deleted]
simonh 11y ago
If the person knowing the passcode is around and you can fool them into using their passcode then yes, you could capture their passcode. Touch ID is even less of a problem because taking someone's fingerprints is a lot easier than taking a passcode out of their head. But in both those situations the weakness is in the person, not the device. Apple devices still potentially have security weaknesses which the FBI is asking Apple to exploit for them. Apple wants to fix these weaknesses, to stop Apple being forced to exploit them.
po 11y ago
Apple is required to have backdoors, at least on iPhones sold in foreign countries, isn't it? I don't believe this is the case. Even if the SE were completely secure, a rogue update of iOS could intercept the fingerprint or passcode whenever it is typed, and replay it to unlock the SE when spies ask for it. As far as I know, the on-screen keyboard is controlled by software which isn't in the SE. What you say about an on-screen passcode is likely true but the architecture of the secure enclave is such that the touch ID sensor is communicating over an encrypted serial bus directly with the SE and not iOS itself. It assumes that the iOS image is not trustworthy. From the white paper [1]: It provides all cryptographic operations for Data Protection key management and maintains the integrity of Data Protection even if the kernel has been compromised. ... The Secure Enclave is responsible for processing fingerprint data from the Touch ID sensor, determining if there is a match against registered fingerprints, and then enabling access or purchases on behalf of the user. Communication between the processor and the Touch ID sensor takes place over a serial peripheral interface bus. The processor forwards the data to the Secure Enclave but cannot read it. It’s encrypted and authenticated with a session key that is negotiated using the device’s shared key that is provisioned for the Touch ID sensor and the Secure Enclave. The session key exchange uses AES key wrapping with both sides providing a random key that establishes the session key and uses AES-CCM transport encryption. [1]: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf

by tajen 11y ago

lololomg 11y ago

Apple is not required by any country to have a backdoor and I am not aware of any agreement from Apple to install such a back door for anyone

deleted 11y ago
[deleted]

simonh 11y ago

If the person knowing the passcode is around and you can fool them into using their passcode then yes, you could capture their passcode. Touch ID is even less of a problem because taking someone's fingerprints is a lot easier than taking a passcode out of their head. But in both those situations the weakness is in the person, not the device. Apple devices still potentially have security weaknesses which the FBI is asking Apple to exploit for them. Apple wants to fix these weaknesses, to stop Apple being forced to exploit them.

po 11y ago

Apple is required to have backdoors, at least on iPhones sold in foreign countries, isn't it? I don't believe this is the case. Even if the SE were completely secure, a rogue update of iOS could intercept the fingerprint or passcode whenever it is typed, and replay it to unlock the SE when spies ask for it. As far as I know, the on-screen keyboard is controlled by software which isn't in the SE. What you say about an on-screen passcode is likely true but the architecture of the secure enclave is such that the touch ID sensor is communicating over an encrypted serial bus directly with the SE and not iOS itself. It assumes that the iOS image is not trustworthy. From the white paper [1]: It provides all cryptographic operations for Data Protection key management and maintains the integrity of Data Protection even if the kernel has been compromised. ... The Secure Enclave is responsible for processing fingerprint data from the Touch ID sensor, determining if there is a match against registered fingerprints, and then enabling access or purchases on behalf of the user. Communication between the processor and the Touch ID sensor takes place over a serial peripheral interface bus. The processor forwards the data to the Secure Enclave but cannot read it. It’s encrypted and authenticated with a session key that is negotiated using the device’s shared key that is provisioned for the Touch ID sensor and the Secure Enclave. The session key exchange uses AES key wrapping with both sides providing a random key that establishes the session key and uses AES-CCM transport encryption. [1]: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf