4 ms·

I think I need someone to explain this to me because none of this hype makes any sense. I am usually wary of oversimplifying these sorts of controversies, but

by jMyles 11y ago

I think I need someone to explain this to me because none of this hype makes any sense. I am usually wary of oversimplifying these sorts of controversies, but this one does seem exceedingly simple to me. It goes like this: Is it possible, even with Apple's help, to break the encryption of <insert device model here> without knowing the encryption key, given that the passphrase provides reasonable entropy? If the answer is other than a flat, unambiguous "no," enjoying the consensus of the scientific and security communities, then that device is simply not secure, right? ...and, to extrapolate just a bit: when device that are secure by this definition are in the mainstream (and my understanding is that even current iPhones, unlike the one at issue in this case, are) then this is entirely moot, right?

mrdrozdov 11y ago
Apple can hypothetically upload an OS update enabling unlimited password attempts, so that the encryption key can be brute forced.
- jMyles 11y ago
  Right - so that means that the iPhone is already broken, no? ...and, more to the point: when phones come out that don't have this vulnerability, none of this will matter, right?
  - zaroth 11y ago
    The specific technique/functionality they are asking for in this case most likely only works on the 5c, but there are also reports that the auto-wipe on the 6s which is handled by the secure enclave could also be disabled on a locked phone. Even if both of these particular vulnerabilities are closed, it's almost a guarantee that additional vulnerabilities exist which Apple could be forced to exploit. The next best example is perhaps police forcing Apple to wiretap iMessages in real-time. They have tried countless times and Apple has said they do not have the capability and refused to create it. But it is clearly technically possible from the design. Closing that vulnerability would require significant changes to the iMessage UX. Some people argue we can't trust Apple and they should make those changes in any case, but obviously Apple is willing to impose some level of trust in their own infra in order to gain UX advantages.

by jMyles 11y ago

mrdrozdov 11y ago

Apple can hypothetically upload an OS update enabling unlimited password attempts, so that the encryption key can be brute forced.

jMyles 11y ago
Right - so that means that the iPhone is already broken, no? ...and, more to the point: when phones come out that don't have this vulnerability, none of this will matter, right?
- zaroth 11y ago
  The specific technique/functionality they are asking for in this case most likely only works on the 5c, but there are also reports that the auto-wipe on the 6s which is handled by the secure enclave could also be disabled on a locked phone. Even if both of these particular vulnerabilities are closed, it's almost a guarantee that additional vulnerabilities exist which Apple could be forced to exploit. The next best example is perhaps police forcing Apple to wiretap iMessages in real-time. They have tried countless times and Apple has said they do not have the capability and refused to create it. But it is clearly technically possible from the design. Closing that vulnerability would require significant changes to the iMessage UX. Some people argue we can't trust Apple and they should make those changes in any case, but obviously Apple is willing to impose some level of trust in their own infra in order to gain UX advantages.