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Yes except the FBI wants to send the phone to Apple to do the hack and remotely access it so the firmware never leaves the building. Apple's claim is that this

by abalone 11y ago

Yes except the FBI wants to send the phone to Apple to do the hack and remotely access it so the firmware never leaves the building. Apple's claim is that this 1) may be abused by authorities through subsequent requests and 2) is too dangerous to create because "cyber criminals" will try to hack them and steal it. Abuse is definitely a concern, although one would hope that could be resolved through democratic oversight, rather than shutting down the ability of law enforcement to obtain digital records under most circumstances. But as for the concern about getting hacked, I wonder if Apple is being a bit coy. They already possess the private signing key. That's already a super valuable secret that would allow criminals to install their own malcode. That danger already exists. It would be harder if the hacker also had to hack the firmware, but probably not harder than hacking Apple to get the private key in the first place.

ryukafalz 11y ago
The private signing key can and should be stored only offline. It's presumably only used when new OS updates need to be signed, and as a result it's fine to require manual intervention during that process. By contrast, putting a device with the modified firmware on the network and allowing it to be accessed remotely makes it a much easier target than the private signing key. A compromise still isn't likely, mind you, but that's a pretty damn attractive target.
- abalone 11y ago
  That's a good point about the private key never even touching a network. Here's a thought: if the crack firmware does leak, and Apple becomes aware of it, could they just push out an OS update that rotates the signing key? That should effectively disable it, once updated. What I'm getting at is this seems more about resisting government abuse / repressive regimes than technical infeasibility of limiting it to authorized users.

by abalone 11y ago

ryukafalz 11y ago

The private signing key can and should be stored only offline. It's presumably only used when new OS updates need to be signed, and as a result it's fine to require manual intervention during that process. By contrast, putting a device with the modified firmware on the network and allowing it to be accessed remotely makes it a much easier target than the private signing key. A compromise still isn't likely, mind you, but that's a pretty damn attractive target.

abalone 11y ago
That's a good point about the private key never even touching a network. Here's a thought: if the crack firmware does leak, and Apple becomes aware of it, could they just push out an OS update that rotates the signing key? That should effectively disable it, once updated. What I'm getting at is this seems more about resisting government abuse / repressive regimes than technical infeasibility of limiting it to authorized users.