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I don't think this is a fair assessment. Apple is being asked to create a firmware version without brute force rate-limiting. With a sufficiently complex passph

by pfg 11y ago

I don't think this is a fair assessment. Apple is being asked to create a firmware version without brute force rate-limiting. With a sufficiently complex passphrase, the FBI is still SOL. They're not being asked to create a firmware version that would decrypt the disk - which would be impossible due to the iPhone's security architecture. The fact that only Apple is in a position to sign firmware that could do this is a positive thing in this context. The only alternatives are no firmware signing at all (so everyone could run this attack), no updates at all, or enforcing the rate-limiting in a HSM (which is what they're doing on the latest generation iPhones).

saurik 11y ago
> Apple is being asked to create a firmware version without brute force rate-limiting. This is a one line of code change for Apple and would take them a few minutes. FWIW, there are people in the iOS jailbreaking community who could do this without the source code rather quickly. I'll even go so far as to say that we actually already have all the tools for this lying around for the iPhone 4, and with only minimal changes made by even less qualified engineers they would probably work on the iPhone 5C. > With a sufficiently complex passphrase, the FBI is still SOL. Most people use the 4- or 6- digit PIN number. One presumes that in this case the user did so (and you can tell, as the UI is different depending on the kind of passphrase used), or the FBI wouldn't be quite so excited to bother here. It takes mere minutes to crack a 4- digit PIN code on the iPhone 4. > The fact that only Apple is in a position to sign firmware that could do this is a positive thing in this context. The only alternatives are no firmware signing at all (so everyone could run this attack), no updates at all, or enforcing the rate-limiting in a HSM (which is what they're doing on the latest generation iPhones). You have conveniently removed "allow the user to lock everyone out from firmware updates except themselves" from the list of possible options :/. While I am perfectly happy with the idea that some people might want to allow Apple to update the firmware on their device, I would much rather no one be able to do that unless they go through me, and as I own the hardware and it is my data that is on the line, I should have the right to make that decision. Apple is selling locks, claiming them to be secure, while not only sitting on a master key but now claiming that it isn't really a master key, which is not just disingenuous but outright dishonest at this point.
- acqq 11y ago
  > I'll even go so far as to say that we actually already have all the tools for this lying around for the iPhone 4, and with only minimal changes made by even less qualified engineers they would probably work on the iPhone 5C. Then there's even less reason to use All Writs to make Apple do it, unless it's to make the precedent to force the device makers to backdoor their products. Just do it, for all of us, make that tool for 5C. But don't support FBI using this case to make "All Writs able to change products" precedent.
  - saurik 11y ago
    You seem to still fundamentally misunderstand the situation, as you seem to be challenging me to build the tool today and get Apple off the hook, as if that was all that mattered. I can build the tool. What I can't do is sign the result. The only thing any of us are missing is the 4096-bit RSA encryption key used to sign the firmware. The way we load this tool onto the iPhone 4 is using a vulnerability in their bootloader that lets us bypass the signature check. There is only 512 bytes of data at question here, not some insurmountable amount of work.
    - acqq 11y ago
      > he only thing any of us are missing is the 4096-bit RSA encryption key used to sign the firmware. Ah, so Apple's encryption does actually work. That's the essence of the good encryption: everything is known, except the key. You are not supposed to have it. FBI, hopefully, isn't supposed to have it too. That's why we have laws. Checks and balances and stuff. Laws made for specific cases, not "we can do anything."
      - saurik 11y ago
        If this were a normal door lock that someone possessed the master key to, the FBI would have just requested access to the master key temporarily. The FBI is not operating outside the law here: they have a court order. While in some ways it would be more horrific, I'd almost rather see them ask the more analogous question "we would like a copy of your master key" to see how Apple responds, as they'd no longer be able to pretend like it would take them a lot of time to build what the FBI wants: the FBI would just be asking for literally 512 bytes of data that Apple has that stands between them and their goal.

by pfg 11y ago

saurik 11y ago

> Apple is being asked to create a firmware version without brute force rate-limiting. This is a one line of code change for Apple and would take them a few minutes. FWIW, there are people in the iOS jailbreaking community who could do this without the source code rather quickly. I'll even go so far as to say that we actually already have all the tools for this lying around for the iPhone 4, and with only minimal changes made by even less qualified engineers they would probably work on the iPhone 5C. > With a sufficiently complex passphrase, the FBI is still SOL. Most people use the 4- or 6- digit PIN number. One presumes that in this case the user did so (and you can tell, as the UI is different depending on the kind of passphrase used), or the FBI wouldn't be quite so excited to bother here. It takes mere minutes to crack a 4- digit PIN code on the iPhone 4. > The fact that only Apple is in a position to sign firmware that could do this is a positive thing in this context. The only alternatives are no firmware signing at all (so everyone could run this attack), no updates at all, or enforcing the rate-limiting in a HSM (which is what they're doing on the latest generation iPhones). You have conveniently removed "allow the user to lock everyone out from firmware updates except themselves" from the list of possible options :/. While I am perfectly happy with the idea that some people might want to allow Apple to update the firmware on their device, I would much rather no one be able to do that unless they go through me, and as I own the hardware and it is my data that is on the line, I should have the right to make that decision. Apple is selling locks, claiming them to be secure, while not only sitting on a master key but now claiming that it isn't really a master key, which is not just disingenuous but outright dishonest at this point.

acqq 11y ago
> I'll even go so far as to say that we actually already have all the tools for this lying around for the iPhone 4, and with only minimal changes made by even less qualified engineers they would probably work on the iPhone 5C. Then there's even less reason to use All Writs to make Apple do it, unless it's to make the precedent to force the device makers to backdoor their products. Just do it, for all of us, make that tool for 5C. But don't support FBI using this case to make "All Writs able to change products" precedent.
- saurik 11y ago
  You seem to still fundamentally misunderstand the situation, as you seem to be challenging me to build the tool today and get Apple off the hook, as if that was all that mattered. I can build the tool. What I can't do is sign the result. The only thing any of us are missing is the 4096-bit RSA encryption key used to sign the firmware. The way we load this tool onto the iPhone 4 is using a vulnerability in their bootloader that lets us bypass the signature check. There is only 512 bytes of data at question here, not some insurmountable amount of work.
  - acqq 11y ago
    > he only thing any of us are missing is the 4096-bit RSA encryption key used to sign the firmware. Ah, so Apple's encryption does actually work. That's the essence of the good encryption: everything is known, except the key. You are not supposed to have it. FBI, hopefully, isn't supposed to have it too. That's why we have laws. Checks and balances and stuff. Laws made for specific cases, not "we can do anything."
    - saurik 11y ago
      If this were a normal door lock that someone possessed the master key to, the FBI would have just requested access to the master key temporarily. The FBI is not operating outside the law here: they have a court order. While in some ways it would be more horrific, I'd almost rather see them ask the more analogous question "we would like a copy of your master key" to see how Apple responds, as they'd no longer be able to pretend like it would take them a lot of time to build what the FBI wants: the FBI would just be asking for literally 512 bytes of data that Apple has that stands between them and their goal.