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Can anybody explain why unlocking just this specific phone is bad? Can't we decide on a case-by-case basis? It's not like Apple is being asked to backdoor all I
by dingo_bat 11y ago
Can anybody explain why unlocking just this specific phone is bad? Can't we decide on a case-by-case basis? It's not like Apple is being asked to backdoor all Iphones so FBI can read everyone's data. Just this specific one ordered by court. What am I missing?
- riffraff 11y agoApple's position is that if they provide the FBI with the software, then the FBI will effectively be able to use it in every other situation. And once the software leaks, which will eventually happen, everyone will be able to do it in every situation. Moreover, every other government will ask for it, and not all governments meet the same moral standards.
- hypron 11y agoThat's the entire point - if Apple designed a backdoor through their security into this specific iPhone, it could be used to backdoor into any iPhone.
- _ikke_ 11y agoIn order to do so, Apple has to make an update that loosens the restrictions the current version has. Once that update exists, it can be installed on any device because it has been signed by Apple.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- saiya-jin 11y agomy understanding - there is currently no software package created to allow this (ie modified kernel or whatever is necessary). government doesn't have resources/knowledge to do it on its own, otherwise they would already have it. once this is created, apple would pressed HARD by all authorities to re-use it for all iphones captured. these days we know damn too well that people in CIA, aNSA etc don't hold any reasonable moral values when it comes to privacy of about anybody on this planet. plus it could be taken from this specific phone and very probably copied anywhere, without any apple approval or court order. if government was playing mr nice guy till now, there would be at least some hope and faith. currently, there is simply none.
- pfg 11y agoFirst of all, it sets a precedent that companies can be forced to create software that willfully compromises their security mechanisms. This is very much different from your typical data dump ordered by a judge. It's quite likely that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies would use such a precedent in many future cases. Second, it's unclear how easy it would be to create firmware that only works on a specific device. What if there's a bug, or what if someone finds a way to spoof the device ID that would probably be checked? It could very well end up being a backdoor for all iPhones after all (or, at least, for all iPhones without a Secure Enclave). This EFF article has a couple more points[1]. [1]: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/technical-perspective-apple-iphone-case https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/technical-perspective-...
- mirimir 11y agoYes, the precedent is the key thing here. Let's say that Apple crafted an update that does what the FBI wants. That in itself wouldn't put other iPhones at risk, as long as a signed copy of that malicious update didn't leave Apple's custody. The FBI hasn't even asked for that. They say that Apple could do all the work in house. Furthermore, it's unlikely that this malicious update would work on newer iPhones. But the precedent would be established.