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Don't you see the slippery slope here? Next, the German or French police will knock on Apple's door. When they get access, China, Russia, and others will line u

Don't you see the slippery slope here? Next, the German or French police will knock on Apple's door. When they get access, China, Russia, and others will line up next. Moreover, who says that the FBI or some other agency will stop after this iPhone, or the next 12 iPhones. Why not push to get their own signing key after they succeed in this case? They will try to get as far as possible. We live in 2016. many of our devices with our private data are directly addressable from anywhere in the world. Intentionally weakening encryption and security in any way is a dangerous proposition. It's good that Apple fights this tooth and nail. Sure, it may align up with their PR. I don't care, it benefits every citizen of the net who wants privacy and security.

amatix 11y ago
worse. If this becomes "normal", then rather than the CTO or CSO or VP iOS Engineering having to unlock the code-signing keys to sign releases (presumably via N of M), it'll have to be automated so that "oh, the FBI needs another custom build for the 4th time this week, just do the build and click here to sign it". At that point the security of the master code-signing keys has evaporated to nothing and we're all sunk.
- rhizome 11y ago
  I think the precedent that emerges could be that law enforcement can force companies to sign specific functionality. This access-to-data power would be in line with their access to telephone and telegraph copper in centuries past.
plorg 11y ago
People keep suggesting that on the slippery slope of Apple complying with cases of limited scope the next logical step is compelling the production of a signing key. This is the very essence of why a slippery slope is often a logical fallacy, because one does not necessarily follow from the other, and no supporting evidence is given that it would. There are plenty of things that would keep this step from occurring, primary among them that there would be no legal justification - in the context of the All Writs Act, there would already be a solution available to law enforcement that was less burdensome to Apple than providing the keys to the kingdom. I, too, think it is laudable that Apple would fight for privacy, but I also think that a lot of the argumentation around this case is soft and ideological.

amatix 11y ago

worse. If this becomes "normal", then rather than the CTO or CSO or VP iOS Engineering having to unlock the code-signing keys to sign releases (presumably via N of M), it'll have to be automated so that "oh, the FBI needs another custom build for the 4th time this week, just do the build and click here to sign it". At that point the security of the master code-signing keys has evaporated to nothing and we're all sunk.

rhizome 11y ago
I think the precedent that emerges could be that law enforcement can force companies to sign specific functionality. This access-to-data power would be in line with their access to telephone and telegraph copper in centuries past.

plorg 11y ago

People keep suggesting that on the slippery slope of Apple complying with cases of limited scope the next logical step is compelling the production of a signing key. This is the very essence of why a slippery slope is often a logical fallacy, because one does not necessarily follow from the other, and no supporting evidence is given that it would. There are plenty of things that would keep this step from occurring, primary among them that there would be no legal justification - in the context of the All Writs Act, there would already be a solution available to law enforcement that was less burdensome to Apple than providing the keys to the kingdom. I, too, think it is laudable that Apple would fight for privacy, but I also think that a lot of the argumentation around this case is soft and ideological.