4 ms·
The problem is, Apple designs the software, loads it onto the device, and gives it to the government so they can do their brute force on it. What's preventing
by 2bitencryption 11y ago
The problem is, Apple designs the software, loads it onto the device, and gives it to the government so they can do their brute force on it.
What's preventing the government from just copying the software off the device and keeping it for themselves? Obviously they'd have to do some work to make it universal, but do we really think an agency with pretty much unlimited budget, and brilliant mathematicians, couldn't get it done?
- haberman 11y agoInteresting question. I don't know the answer but would be interested to hear anyone with more information weigh in.
- eldavido 11y ago"To do some work to make it universal" = code change = thrown hash (the signature which requires the Apple key to create, and proves the software hasn't been tampered with, will be broken/no longer valid) Cryptographic hashes like SHA and AES are designed for "dispersion" meaning, in the idea case, flipping only one bit of the input leads to a 50% probability of every single bit in the hash flipping. So while it's theoretically possible to make a change to the code, and find a way to insert that change that both (1) does the same thing and (2) hashes the same way as the original build, it's probably beyond the realm of what even a motivated attacker could do today.
- plorg 11y agoThe warrant allows that the phone could be entirely in Apple's possession with the FBI having only programmatic access to the PIN input. Imagine, say, an isolated SSH server with serial access to a PIN input API.