> If the manufacturer's ability to sign code is a backdoor, then so is absence of code signing. In that universe, you can run any encryption software of you're

> If the manufacturer's ability to sign code is a backdoor, then so is absence of code signing. In that universe, you can run any encryption software of you're choosing, and verify the software written by others. Nobody has more privileges over the device that exceed those of the device's owners. > You're assigning them the moral failure to perfectly secure the iPhone only because they have tried to secure it at all. Legally and ethically, it doesn't matter. Legally, cryptography is protected expression, and you can use cryptography to encrypt whatever you like -- including information that would otherwise be subject to a lawful search under the fourth amendment. However, the fourth amendment doesn't have a crypto "participation award" clause; if you left a backdoor in place, the government can compel you to use it. Ethically, if they chose to leave themselves this backdoor (and all the others), the system is weak. If it's not the FBI today, it's the NSA with a NSL tomorrow, or foreign espionage, or a disgruntled employee, or new corporate management.