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That's not the case – if Apple produce a signed iOS version that allows the passcode retry limit to be bypassed on a single device, then in what meaningful sens

That's not the case – if Apple produce a signed iOS version that allows the passcode retry limit to be bypassed on a single device, then in what meaningful sense does it operate on another device?

JoeAltmaier 11y ago
I guess when the FBI compels them again. Or once they have a foot in the door, compels them to remove the signing requirement, or wants their own ability to sign. This is not mysterious. Can the FBI require a software company to subvert their own security guarantees? Should they? Do bank vaults have back doors for the FBI?
- matthewmacleod 11y ago
  I guess when the FBI compels them again That's a bit of a specious argument though – of course, if they produce different software in the future, it could be used again! If the FBI want their own ability to sign Apple updates, then that's obviously a different situation. But the point you were making – that it's not possible to write software that will run on only one device – is not true in this case. This is not mysterious. Can the FBI require a software company to subvert their own security guarantees? Should they? Do bank vaults have back doors for the FBI? I don't really know the right answer.
msbarnett 11y ago
> if Apple produce a signed iOS version that allows the passcode retry limit to be bypassed on a single device, then in what meaningful sense does it operate on another device? What prevents the iOS image from being loaded onto another device? Apple isn't magic; the code they write to verify device identity isn't going to be the first perfect, unbuggy, unexploitable code written in human history. if(device_udid == terrorist_id) {...} might seem infallible, to you, but the reality is that the device_udid is just SHA1(Wifi MAC + Bluetooth MAC + ECID + Serial). All of those are writable, some via the Baseband and some via physical access. Generating SHA1 collisions is completely feasible for ~$1,000,000 of computing time, which is chump change to nation states. There is no infallible way for Apple to make an iOS version for one single device. Edit: And stories like http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/york-da-access-175-iphones-criminal-cases-due/story?id=37029693 http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/york-da-access-175-iphones-... make it absolutely clear that this is not stoping at a single device.

That's not the case – if Apple produce a signed iOS version that allows the passcode retry limit to be bypassed on a single device, then in what meaningful sense does it operate on another device?

JoeAltmaier 11y ago

I guess when the FBI compels them again. Or once they have a foot in the door, compels them to remove the signing requirement, or wants their own ability to sign. This is not mysterious. Can the FBI require a software company to subvert their own security guarantees? Should they? Do bank vaults have back doors for the FBI?

matthewmacleod 11y ago
I guess when the FBI compels them again That's a bit of a specious argument though – of course, if they produce different software in the future, it could be used again! If the FBI want their own ability to sign Apple updates, then that's obviously a different situation. But the point you were making – that it's not possible to write software that will run on only one device – is not true in this case. This is not mysterious. Can the FBI require a software company to subvert their own security guarantees? Should they? Do bank vaults have back doors for the FBI? I don't really know the right answer.

msbarnett 11y ago

> if Apple produce a signed iOS version that allows the passcode retry limit to be bypassed on a single device, then in what meaningful sense does it operate on another device? What prevents the iOS image from being loaded onto another device? Apple isn't magic; the code they write to verify device identity isn't going to be the first perfect, unbuggy, unexploitable code written in human history. if(device_udid == terrorist_id) {...} might seem infallible, to you, but the reality is that the device_udid is just SHA1(Wifi MAC + Bluetooth MAC + ECID + Serial). All of those are writable, some via the Baseband and some via physical access. Generating SHA1 collisions is completely feasible for ~$1,000,000 of computing time, which is chump change to nation states. There is no infallible way for Apple to make an iOS version for one single device. Edit: And stories like http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/york-da-access-175-iphones-criminal-cases-due/story?id=37029693 http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/york-da-access-175-iphones-... make it absolutely clear that this is not stoping at a single device.