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It isn't. the FBI asked for a specialised OS image that would have a check so that it could only work on this specific phone. Combined with Apple's encryption/

by rtpg 11y ago

It isn't. the FBI asked for a specialised OS image that would have a check so that it could only work on this specific phone. Combined with Apple's encryption/signing of the update, this image could not be applied to any other device. So the "work" asked of Apple would produce something that would only work on the phone with the warrant

symlinkk 11y ago
So Tim Cook was wrong? Look at what he wrote: "Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession. The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such control."
- tempestn 11y ago
  Can an analogy be "wrong"? It's certainly a stretch to call it a master key. I'd call it more of a bump key. :P But discussing the rightness or wrongness of an analogy is probably beside the point.
- rtpg 11y ago
  Yes, Tim Cook is lying (EDIT: perhaps not lying, but being creative with the meaning of "potential"). The software asked for by the FBI would only work on one phone because it would both have a check for the specific phone, and be signed by Apple (so can't be modified). The software would need to be modified and resigned by Apple to be used on another phone.
  - taneq 11y ago
    This is true but, in terms of security, is meaningless. If they can order Apple to unlock one device this way, they can do it again, and once they've got a precedent, the next time won't be national news, it'll just be routine.
  - ubernostrum 11y ago
    Really? You really, honestly, truly and genuinely believe that if Apple just does this for them, just this one time, just for this one phone, then that's the end of it? That the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies would never, not once, not for the rest of the lifetime of the universe (and certainly not, say, about 24 hours later) come back and say "Well, we're glad you helped us with that case, now here's this list of other cases we'd like help with, and now you've proven that you can do this we're going to be bringing you a lot of these"? That's what Tim Cook is worried about: it won't stop with this one phone unless it's stopped before that one phone gets unlocked and becomes the precedent that makes this just another routine thing. Every now-routine violation of privacy and security was originally marketed as "just this one case, this one's unique and special and sensitive and we absolutely have to get it done, just this one, trust us" and eventually morphed into "eh, it's Tuesday, time to ship off another truckload of requests to have this done to people".
    - rtpg 11y ago
      Of course the FBI will ask again and again. And Apple could be compelled to comply each and every time. The slippery slope argument being applied here is that FBI search warrants will now work on phones less than the iPhone 5S from now on (until Apple closes the iOS update backdoor I guess). This is far from "China will be able to mass-hack into iPhones from now on"-style comments I've seen from others. The fact is that Apple left a backdoor in their phones and are now being told to exploit it. An argument against having the backdoor in the first place.
      - schismsubv 11y ago
        Apple _will_ be compelled. You either don't understand the US legal doctrine of stare decisis or are being intentionally obtuse. Furthermore, the US legal system encourages elaboration on stare decisis, applying prior case law to novel cases rather than hashing out new decisions. This means that creative applications of this ruling ("give me an uncontrolled backdoor") are simply a question of time once the landmark case is made.
        11y ago
ikeboy 11y ago
Plus, even if it didn't have that check, every iOS update is signed by Apple specifically to the device being updated at the time it's being updated, so even if the image was released publically with no restrictions, nobody could install it.
- zymhan 11y ago
  But they could reverse engineer it and reimplement it without the device-specific restriction.
  - ikeboy 11y ago
    Even if it was open source, they couldn't install it on any iOS device without a signature from Apple, tailored specifically to the device being updated and the software version being signed. You can't even downgrade to an old iOS version, because Apple won't sign them anymore.
koenigdavidmj 11y ago
And next week they ask for them to sign the next thing to work on the next phone. At this point, the only valid answer from Apple is that any future devices (if they aren't this way already) should either require the password to do a software update, or wipe the phone.
- rtpg 11y ago
  Right, if the FBI has a search warrant for a phone, Apple can be compelled to comply. The core thing that makes this not a master key is that Apple has to make the decision to comply on each phone (and warrant). Which gives them the opportunity to push back if it chooses to. If the FBI has somebody's phone and secretly wants to unlock it, it can't without going through the courts and Apple.
  - brians 11y ago
    What makes you think the US Gov't can't break in and take this, once Apple has built it? They'll have to QA it, it'll be on at least a handful of machines---and the order requires it be network connected. At that point we should expect more world governments to get the key. Where does that end? Maybe with more companies having to demonstrate that they defend against their own subversion.
    - ikeboy 11y ago
      It can't be installed on any iOS device without Apple signing it at the time of installation. The software is useless without Apple's signing keys. Apple could sign it offline when installing to the device. The signature is customised to each device it's installed on, and has a nonce so it can't be saved.
      - schismsubv 11y ago
        I'm pretty certain you and rtpg don't understand stare decisis. This isn't about this specific phone, or even the methodology. This is about the FBI cherry-picking a nearly throwaway (in terms of probable data value) case to set precedent in what is obvious to practitioners as a continuation of their War on Cryptography. The US legal system and education pertaining to it is largely composed of studying prior case law and its applications. Few cases (including this one) involve truly new decisions, and even those are usually novel applications of former decisions. That is what those who can see past their nose are concerned about. There is every probability that, in the near future, one or both of Apple or the judicial system will tire of the farce of one-phone-per-case firmware and request a new application of the law (because there would now be precedent). To take any laywer-moderated statement (including Apple's) at face value belies credulity that does not become the HN audience. As others have pointed out, Comey's appeals to emotion and terrorism should be enough, but the idea that an FBI lawyer would advise pursuing this particular case in this particular manner without expecting to set precedent? Positively silly. This is what they do.
plorg 11y ago
Similarly, you could reasonably argue that if there is a master key in this situation, it is Apple's firmware signing key, which the company already possess and has been using as a consequence of its inadequately examined security model. Edit: LOL, downvotes because you don't like it. Apple made a bad design decision, and it's coming to bite them in the ass. Yeah, it sucks, but I'm not the one who designed the backdoor. Blame the corporate culture, not the messenger. Fix the problem and tell your customers about it. Don't pretend it doesn't exist.
- rtpg 11y ago
  Yes, Apple's signing key + the lack of user confirmation for OS updates is the master key + backdoor here. User confirmation has come in later OS updates it seems, so the actual backdoor has been closed.
  - plorg 11y ago
    That's good to hear.
- mindslight 11y ago
  There's nothing to argue. Apple's key is a designed-in backdoor, and this case is about whether they can be compelled to use it. The right thing would have been for Apple to unlock the phone in question, and issue a security advisory for the longstanding but newly-relevant vulnerability. Then, if they want their devices to be secure against USG, actually fix their security model to remove their own privilege. Instead, they walked right into the FBI's trap on a completely unsympathetic case. They're setting us up for a horrible precedent simply to continue pretending they can provide a level of security that they didn't actually build.
rando289 11y ago
This comment will never be a reply to any other comment. However, if I wrote it because the fbi told me to, why wouldn't I reply to absolutely any other comment the fbi told me to?
blendo 11y ago
I'm sure the FBI would like to minimize the "work asked of Apple". Ideally, they'd have a system to: 1) Identify target phone and obtain warrant to search. 2) Invoke Apple<-->FBI-specific api to initiate OS image generation to the specified target phone. OS image would be automatically downloaded to target phone. 3) Once downloaded, OS image would present FBI-specific API to allow exfiltration of any desired data. This might not violate the 4th Amendment ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ...") because they'll have a warrant, but IMHO it's a clear violation of the 5th ("... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...").
brians 11y ago
Reasonable engineering practice requires that that software be tested before it is used. If it is handed over untested, and bricks the unique device, Tim Cook is going to get found in contempt. The order as written says to only make one specialized version, but also requires delivery of a working version---and that means a general purpose version that can be tested.
eridius 11y ago
That's extremely disingenuous. Yes, the particular OS image they produce would only work on that phone. But all of the work they did to enable the hack would work on every iPhone in the world, and the work necessary to take this OS image and use it on another device is effectively zero. As such, you can be absolutely certain that the FBI would start demanding Apple do this for other phones. And it's not just the FBI, every repressive regime in the world would start demanding this same capability. And Apple would have no grounds to deny it at that point.
tracker1 11y ago
Until the next time the government asks apple to do it, with an attached gag order.

by rtpg 11y ago

symlinkk 11y ago

So Tim Cook was wrong? Look at what he wrote: "Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession. The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such control."

tempestn 11y ago
Can an analogy be "wrong"? It's certainly a stretch to call it a master key. I'd call it more of a bump key. :P But discussing the rightness or wrongness of an analogy is probably beside the point.
rtpg 11y ago
Yes, Tim Cook is lying (EDIT: perhaps not lying, but being creative with the meaning of "potential"). The software asked for by the FBI would only work on one phone because it would both have a check for the specific phone, and be signed by Apple (so can't be modified). The software would need to be modified and resigned by Apple to be used on another phone.
- taneq 11y ago
  This is true but, in terms of security, is meaningless. If they can order Apple to unlock one device this way, they can do it again, and once they've got a precedent, the next time won't be national news, it'll just be routine.
- ubernostrum 11y ago
  Really? You really, honestly, truly and genuinely believe that if Apple just does this for them, just this one time, just for this one phone, then that's the end of it? That the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies would never, not once, not for the rest of the lifetime of the universe (and certainly not, say, about 24 hours later) come back and say "Well, we're glad you helped us with that case, now here's this list of other cases we'd like help with, and now you've proven that you can do this we're going to be bringing you a lot of these"? That's what Tim Cook is worried about: it won't stop with this one phone unless it's stopped before that one phone gets unlocked and becomes the precedent that makes this just another routine thing. Every now-routine violation of privacy and security was originally marketed as "just this one case, this one's unique and special and sensitive and we absolutely have to get it done, just this one, trust us" and eventually morphed into "eh, it's Tuesday, time to ship off another truckload of requests to have this done to people".
  - rtpg 11y ago
    Of course the FBI will ask again and again. And Apple could be compelled to comply each and every time. The slippery slope argument being applied here is that FBI search warrants will now work on phones less than the iPhone 5S from now on (until Apple closes the iOS update backdoor I guess). This is far from "China will be able to mass-hack into iPhones from now on"-style comments I've seen from others. The fact is that Apple left a backdoor in their phones and are now being told to exploit it. An argument against having the backdoor in the first place.
    - schismsubv 11y ago
      Apple _will_ be compelled. You either don't understand the US legal doctrine of stare decisis or are being intentionally obtuse. Furthermore, the US legal system encourages elaboration on stare decisis, applying prior case law to novel cases rather than hashing out new decisions. This means that creative applications of this ruling ("give me an uncontrolled backdoor") are simply a question of time once the landmark case is made.
      - 11y ago

ikeboy 11y ago

Plus, even if it didn't have that check, every iOS update is signed by Apple specifically to the device being updated at the time it's being updated, so even if the image was released publically with no restrictions, nobody could install it.

zymhan 11y ago
But they could reverse engineer it and reimplement it without the device-specific restriction.
- ikeboy 11y ago
  Even if it was open source, they couldn't install it on any iOS device without a signature from Apple, tailored specifically to the device being updated and the software version being signed. You can't even downgrade to an old iOS version, because Apple won't sign them anymore.

koenigdavidmj 11y ago

And next week they ask for them to sign the next thing to work on the next phone. At this point, the only valid answer from Apple is that any future devices (if they aren't this way already) should either require the password to do a software update, or wipe the phone.

rtpg 11y ago
Right, if the FBI has a search warrant for a phone, Apple can be compelled to comply. The core thing that makes this not a master key is that Apple has to make the decision to comply on each phone (and warrant). Which gives them the opportunity to push back if it chooses to. If the FBI has somebody's phone and secretly wants to unlock it, it can't without going through the courts and Apple.
- brians 11y ago
  What makes you think the US Gov't can't break in and take this, once Apple has built it? They'll have to QA it, it'll be on at least a handful of machines---and the order requires it be network connected. At that point we should expect more world governments to get the key. Where does that end? Maybe with more companies having to demonstrate that they defend against their own subversion.
  - ikeboy 11y ago
    It can't be installed on any iOS device without Apple signing it at the time of installation. The software is useless without Apple's signing keys. Apple could sign it offline when installing to the device. The signature is customised to each device it's installed on, and has a nonce so it can't be saved.
    - schismsubv 11y ago
      I'm pretty certain you and rtpg don't understand stare decisis. This isn't about this specific phone, or even the methodology. This is about the FBI cherry-picking a nearly throwaway (in terms of probable data value) case to set precedent in what is obvious to practitioners as a continuation of their War on Cryptography. The US legal system and education pertaining to it is largely composed of studying prior case law and its applications. Few cases (including this one) involve truly new decisions, and even those are usually novel applications of former decisions. That is what those who can see past their nose are concerned about. There is every probability that, in the near future, one or both of Apple or the judicial system will tire of the farce of one-phone-per-case firmware and request a new application of the law (because there would now be precedent). To take any laywer-moderated statement (including Apple's) at face value belies credulity that does not become the HN audience. As others have pointed out, Comey's appeals to emotion and terrorism should be enough, but the idea that an FBI lawyer would advise pursuing this particular case in this particular manner without expecting to set precedent? Positively silly. This is what they do.

plorg 11y ago

Similarly, you could reasonably argue that if there is a master key in this situation, it is Apple's firmware signing key, which the company already possess and has been using as a consequence of its inadequately examined security model. Edit: LOL, downvotes because you don't like it. Apple made a bad design decision, and it's coming to bite them in the ass. Yeah, it sucks, but I'm not the one who designed the backdoor. Blame the corporate culture, not the messenger. Fix the problem and tell your customers about it. Don't pretend it doesn't exist.

rtpg 11y ago
Yes, Apple's signing key + the lack of user confirmation for OS updates is the master key + backdoor here. User confirmation has come in later OS updates it seems, so the actual backdoor has been closed.
- plorg 11y ago
  That's good to hear.
mindslight 11y ago
There's nothing to argue. Apple's key is a designed-in backdoor, and this case is about whether they can be compelled to use it. The right thing would have been for Apple to unlock the phone in question, and issue a security advisory for the longstanding but newly-relevant vulnerability. Then, if they want their devices to be secure against USG, actually fix their security model to remove their own privilege. Instead, they walked right into the FBI's trap on a completely unsympathetic case. They're setting us up for a horrible precedent simply to continue pretending they can provide a level of security that they didn't actually build.

rando289 11y ago

This comment will never be a reply to any other comment. However, if I wrote it because the fbi told me to, why wouldn't I reply to absolutely any other comment the fbi told me to?

blendo 11y ago

I'm sure the FBI would like to minimize the "work asked of Apple". Ideally, they'd have a system to: 1) Identify target phone and obtain warrant to search. 2) Invoke Apple<-->FBI-specific api to initiate OS image generation to the specified target phone. OS image would be automatically downloaded to target phone. 3) Once downloaded, OS image would present FBI-specific API to allow exfiltration of any desired data. This might not violate the 4th Amendment ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ...") because they'll have a warrant, but IMHO it's a clear violation of the 5th ("... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...").

brians 11y ago

Reasonable engineering practice requires that that software be tested before it is used. If it is handed over untested, and bricks the unique device, Tim Cook is going to get found in contempt. The order as written says to only make one specialized version, but also requires delivery of a working version---and that means a general purpose version that can be tested.

eridius 11y ago

That's extremely disingenuous. Yes, the particular OS image they produce would only work on that phone. But all of the work they did to enable the hack would work on every iPhone in the world, and the work necessary to take this OS image and use it on another device is effectively zero. As such, you can be absolutely certain that the FBI would start demanding Apple do this for other phones. And it's not just the FBI, every repressive regime in the world would start demanding this same capability. And Apple would have no grounds to deny it at that point.

tracker1 11y ago

Until the next time the government asks apple to do it, with an attached gag order.