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Yeah, I think if the attacker getting a valid certificate for subdomain.victim.com is a serious possibility, you've already lost long ago. If an attacker If yo
by geofft 11y ago
Yeah, I think if the attacker getting a valid certificate for subdomain.victim.com is a serious possibility, you've already lost long ago. If an attacker
If you're worried about the attacker getting DNS (e.g. by spoofing DNS) and running a webserver at subdomain.victim.com, the user has to click through a certificate warning. I can see why the HSTS preload list would want to worry about making it hard for user error to compromise security, but I don't think it's a very sensible part of a threat model for HSTS as a whole..
(For those cases where you explicitly permit people to register websites at a subdomain of their choosing, e.g. stuff like username.github.io, you need to register github.io in the Public Suffix List. This prohibits github.io from having any cookies set on it.)