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>If it is incompetence then that bolsters the argument that any backdoor will lead to leaks and unauthorized access to the backdoor, causing more harm to everyo

>If it is incompetence then that bolsters the argument that any backdoor will lead to leaks and unauthorized access to the backdoor, causing more harm to everyone. The backdoor the FBI wants to exploit cannot be leaked. They are specifically requesting it be limited to the specific phone. If it were possible to take an apple update, edit it, and then apply to other phones, they wouldn't need Apple's help.

specialist 11y ago
You're describing a rootkit. What could possibly go wrong? No way that would ever get released into the wild. Once proven feasible, no way any one else would reverse engineer stuff and make their own.
- teacup50 11y ago
  Proven feasible? We already know it's feasible. It's dead simple to binary patch the code -- but you need Apple's signing key to make it work. If you're worried about Apple's signing key being released into the wild, this one-off backdoor ought to be the least of your concerns.
  - specialist 11y ago
    My metaphor is likely wrong. Like the apologists for the FBI (and other enablers of authoritarians), I'm trying to gleen the real technical story from the public misinformation. You may know about FileVault's password protected volumes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FileVault https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FileVault Does the (pre-Secure Enclave) iPhone 5C which the FBI borked store its data the same way? I now believe that by changing the password, the FBI also borked (lost) the recovery key, so now neither the iPhone nor its backups are readable. You and the FBI want Apple to create a one-off patch to better crack the keys of an encrypted file, presumably one of the iCloud backups. Um, good luck with that. If you know better, please clarify with your understanding of the actual systems in use, vs arm waving apologia.
    - teacup50 11y ago
      If you want to talk about "enablers of authoritarians", consider that Apple has built a system in which they are the sole authority, that is opaque to all introspection by third parties, and against which Apple -- and only Apple -- must protect their users against all comers, for all time. In addition to which, our security relies on Apple themselves never changing their business priorities and choosing to exploit their position of absolute authority. The fact that they have that authority is why the government can compel them to do anything in the first place. If you want to talk technical specifics, then no, your assessment is incorrect. The Apple ID password was changed, but that doesn't affect the on-device keying. PIN numbers are the weakest link in the iPhone crypto chain. Apple strengthened that link through non-cryptographic means: tamper-resistent key derivation software that either runs on the main CPU, or in later devices, on the secure enclave CPU. That software enforces a limited number of retries, essentially strengthening the PIN number. However, Apple also retained the ability to subvert the owner's lock on the device and install new key derivation code that does not include those security features; this applies to both the 5c and later devices with secure enclave. If Apple hadn't retained that backdoor, the FBI would have nothing to ask for. Apple has, however, and has consistently made themselves the sole authority and gatekeeper of these devices.
      - specialist 11y ago
        Thank you for explaining. I'm still not clear on what the FBI's major malfunction is. How would relaxing the tamper-resistent key protection help here? One needs the PIN to reimage the device. Chicken & egg. Creating a one-off OS image can't help without first having the PIN. And the goal is to get the data, not crack the phone. Why can't the FBI use the backups? And what do they hope to find that don't already know (by other means)? Just sounds like CYA to me. The more I learn about this silliness, the less plausible the FBI's narrative becomes. The FBI screwed up, is now just finding scape goat. --- Authoritarian already has a widely recognized definition. https://www.wordnik.com/words/authoritarian https://www.wordnik.com/words/authoritarian Playing Calvin Ball with vocabulary undermines your rhetoric. If you would like to repurpose the word "authoritarian", I encourage you to petition the dictionary gatekeepers.
pluckytree 11y ago
Why can’t it be leaked? The software needs to be created and installed on the device. Even if it’s entirely in Apple hands, there’s no guarantee it will ever be leaked. It wouldn’t need editing. It’s intended to disable the timeout when brute forcing passwords. It’s incredibly dangerous software to even exist. And also insanely valuable. Even more incentive for someone to leak it, even at Apple.
- tedhogan 11y ago
  The software would only disable those features on that specific device, which would be hard coded. Even if you moved the software to another device, it wouldn't work. Even if you had the source code, and modified to work on a different device or all devices, you wouldn't be able to do it unless Apple signed the modified software as well.
  - zaroth 11y ago
    It's not clear to me at least that the phone identifier they would be hard-coding into the build is actually designed to be a cryptographically secure and unalterable identifier protected by the secure enclave. Well the 5C has no secure enclave anyway so how is this ID secured? If you can reprogram or electronically intercept and alter the ID as it is read by the firmware, the backdoor build could be run on any phone. For example if it is tied to the UDID, the UDID = SHA1(serial + ECID + wifiMac + bluetoothMac). Here's an article where Apple says the ECID is alterable through the BPP (Baseband processor) [1] so perhaps exploitable by connecting to a BSE and hacking the BPP via LTE vulnerabilities. The serial number, WiFi and Bluetooth MACs can all be altered as well. So I'm not convinced UDID locked builds cannot be worked around by a motivated adversary. Heck, finding a SHA1 hash collision by altering only the most easily set MAC addresses is computationally feasible and costs less than $1 million! [1] - http://www.infoworld.com/article/2631100/mobile-security/apple--iphone-jailbreaking-could-knock-out-transmission-towers.html http://www.infoworld.com/article/2631100/mobile-security/app...
    - tedhogan 11y ago
      That's a good point. The unique device ID is baked into the hardware, but it doesn't look like it can be read directly, so it might not even be able to put in logic based on the ID into the firmware anyways.
tedhogan 11y ago
This is the technical aspect that I think isn't getting nearly enough attention. While I agree with Cook that this will set a precedence where governments, both the US and others, begin making these requests more frequently, it's not actually creating a master key in this case. Apple would have to be compliant in each individual case to apply this software to another device assuming they code in the specification that it's only applicable to this device. This still leaves them the ability to remove their ability to do so in the future, by requiring the passcode to update the firmware on both the hardware itself and the secure enclave.
- a3n 11y ago
  > it's not actually creating a master key in this case. The master key is the court order to make it happen, or the NSL that has been made worthwhile after the first existence proof.
  - deleted 11y ago
    [deleted]
  - a3n 11y ago
    Someone replied and then deleted (which is fine). IIRC they said something like "a/this court order isn't creating a master key." (my words, summarizing from memory). Which is technically true. But consider each event a black box, into which you throw a targeted phone, and it comes out unlocked. Whether that was through unique effort for each case, a general capability developed and archived by Apple, or even an actual backdoor/masterkey developed by Apple out of exasperation from the expense of being legally compelled in each individual case and others to come, the effect is the same, the phone is reliably opened.
- shkkmo 11y ago
  FTFY: "assuming they can code in the specification that it's only applicable to this device." I think that's a big assumption.

specialist 11y ago

You're describing a rootkit. What could possibly go wrong? No way that would ever get released into the wild. Once proven feasible, no way any one else would reverse engineer stuff and make their own.

teacup50 11y ago
Proven feasible? We already know it's feasible. It's dead simple to binary patch the code -- but you need Apple's signing key to make it work. If you're worried about Apple's signing key being released into the wild, this one-off backdoor ought to be the least of your concerns.
- specialist 11y ago
  My metaphor is likely wrong. Like the apologists for the FBI (and other enablers of authoritarians), I'm trying to gleen the real technical story from the public misinformation. You may know about FileVault's password protected volumes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FileVault https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FileVault Does the (pre-Secure Enclave) iPhone 5C which the FBI borked store its data the same way? I now believe that by changing the password, the FBI also borked (lost) the recovery key, so now neither the iPhone nor its backups are readable. You and the FBI want Apple to create a one-off patch to better crack the keys of an encrypted file, presumably one of the iCloud backups. Um, good luck with that. If you know better, please clarify with your understanding of the actual systems in use, vs arm waving apologia.
  - teacup50 11y ago
    If you want to talk about "enablers of authoritarians", consider that Apple has built a system in which they are the sole authority, that is opaque to all introspection by third parties, and against which Apple -- and only Apple -- must protect their users against all comers, for all time. In addition to which, our security relies on Apple themselves never changing their business priorities and choosing to exploit their position of absolute authority. The fact that they have that authority is why the government can compel them to do anything in the first place. If you want to talk technical specifics, then no, your assessment is incorrect. The Apple ID password was changed, but that doesn't affect the on-device keying. PIN numbers are the weakest link in the iPhone crypto chain. Apple strengthened that link through non-cryptographic means: tamper-resistent key derivation software that either runs on the main CPU, or in later devices, on the secure enclave CPU. That software enforces a limited number of retries, essentially strengthening the PIN number. However, Apple also retained the ability to subvert the owner's lock on the device and install new key derivation code that does not include those security features; this applies to both the 5c and later devices with secure enclave. If Apple hadn't retained that backdoor, the FBI would have nothing to ask for. Apple has, however, and has consistently made themselves the sole authority and gatekeeper of these devices.
    - specialist 11y ago
      Thank you for explaining. I'm still not clear on what the FBI's major malfunction is. How would relaxing the tamper-resistent key protection help here? One needs the PIN to reimage the device. Chicken & egg. Creating a one-off OS image can't help without first having the PIN. And the goal is to get the data, not crack the phone. Why can't the FBI use the backups? And what do they hope to find that don't already know (by other means)? Just sounds like CYA to me. The more I learn about this silliness, the less plausible the FBI's narrative becomes. The FBI screwed up, is now just finding scape goat. --- Authoritarian already has a widely recognized definition. https://www.wordnik.com/words/authoritarian https://www.wordnik.com/words/authoritarian Playing Calvin Ball with vocabulary undermines your rhetoric. If you would like to repurpose the word "authoritarian", I encourage you to petition the dictionary gatekeepers.

pluckytree 11y ago

Why can’t it be leaked? The software needs to be created and installed on the device. Even if it’s entirely in Apple hands, there’s no guarantee it will ever be leaked. It wouldn’t need editing. It’s intended to disable the timeout when brute forcing passwords. It’s incredibly dangerous software to even exist. And also insanely valuable. Even more incentive for someone to leak it, even at Apple.

tedhogan 11y ago
The software would only disable those features on that specific device, which would be hard coded. Even if you moved the software to another device, it wouldn't work. Even if you had the source code, and modified to work on a different device or all devices, you wouldn't be able to do it unless Apple signed the modified software as well.
- zaroth 11y ago
  It's not clear to me at least that the phone identifier they would be hard-coding into the build is actually designed to be a cryptographically secure and unalterable identifier protected by the secure enclave. Well the 5C has no secure enclave anyway so how is this ID secured? If you can reprogram or electronically intercept and alter the ID as it is read by the firmware, the backdoor build could be run on any phone. For example if it is tied to the UDID, the UDID = SHA1(serial + ECID + wifiMac + bluetoothMac). Here's an article where Apple says the ECID is alterable through the BPP (Baseband processor) [1] so perhaps exploitable by connecting to a BSE and hacking the BPP via LTE vulnerabilities. The serial number, WiFi and Bluetooth MACs can all be altered as well. So I'm not convinced UDID locked builds cannot be worked around by a motivated adversary. Heck, finding a SHA1 hash collision by altering only the most easily set MAC addresses is computationally feasible and costs less than $1 million! [1] - http://www.infoworld.com/article/2631100/mobile-security/apple--iphone-jailbreaking-could-knock-out-transmission-towers.html http://www.infoworld.com/article/2631100/mobile-security/app...
  - tedhogan 11y ago
    That's a good point. The unique device ID is baked into the hardware, but it doesn't look like it can be read directly, so it might not even be able to put in logic based on the ID into the firmware anyways.

tedhogan 11y ago

This is the technical aspect that I think isn't getting nearly enough attention. While I agree with Cook that this will set a precedence where governments, both the US and others, begin making these requests more frequently, it's not actually creating a master key in this case. Apple would have to be compliant in each individual case to apply this software to another device assuming they code in the specification that it's only applicable to this device. This still leaves them the ability to remove their ability to do so in the future, by requiring the passcode to update the firmware on both the hardware itself and the secure enclave.

a3n 11y ago
> it's not actually creating a master key in this case. The master key is the court order to make it happen, or the NSL that has been made worthwhile after the first existence proof.
- deleted 11y ago
  [deleted]
- a3n 11y ago
  Someone replied and then deleted (which is fine). IIRC they said something like "a/this court order isn't creating a master key." (my words, summarizing from memory). Which is technically true. But consider each event a black box, into which you throw a targeted phone, and it comes out unlocked. Whether that was through unique effort for each case, a general capability developed and archived by Apple, or even an actual backdoor/masterkey developed by Apple out of exasperation from the expense of being legally compelled in each individual case and others to come, the effect is the same, the phone is reliably opened.
shkkmo 11y ago
FTFY: "assuming they can code in the specification that it's only applicable to this device." I think that's a big assumption.