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Snowden's analysis is rather lacking. He claims that the FBI already has all of the suspect's communication records as retrieved via service providers, but ign

Snowden's analysis is rather lacking. He claims that the FBI already has all of the suspect's communication records as retrieved via service providers, but ignores the important detail that iMessage uses end-to-end encryption, rendering any such records unobtainable by the service provider. Yes, the last backup was six weeks prior to the phone being seized, but this only means that the phone may well include six weeks' worth of pertinent evidence. And there is nothing to suggest that the FBI is only interested in messages between co-workers. Ultimately, the phone's data would need to be decrypted and analysed to see if the first four assumptions that Snowden makes are actually true. The final assumption is that there are other feasible technical measures that could be taken to crack this phone. This would perhaps be the most interesting point, but Snowden chose to not expand upon it at all.

ianhawes 11y ago
Normally I don't like Snowden, but in this case I think he raises great points all around, the biggest being that the non-work phone (Operational Phone) was completely destroyed. Do you think with that sort of OPSSEC that they slip up and use a work phone? Doubtful. But hey, the FBI exists to turn over every stone. The real story here is that they specifically chose this case to go after Apple because they suspected the backlash if Apple tried to fight it would be more than they could handle.
- geographomics 11y ago
  Even if there's less likelihood of useful evidence on the suspect's work phone, it's still worth checking. The FBI's request isn't too bad really. It's not like they are requesting Apple to build a new mass surveillance tool or anything similarly far-reaching. This is limited to the domain of digital forensics, and how best to extract data in a criminal investigation, against firmware that is hostile to cracking. Given that, by design, the phone has been locked down to only accept Apple-signed firmware, then Apple is really the most feasible choice to assist in bypassing this.
  - Consultant32452 11y ago
    Unless we believe that individuals and corporations are at least somewhat autonomous. If this were Apple's device then sure, I think they should be compelled to make an effort to unlock it, but it's NOT Apple's device, and it hasn't been since it left the warehouse. Apple, in this case, is just an industry expert that happens to know quite a bit about the device. If you couldn't compel MSFT to hack the phone, you shouldn't be able to compel Apple to hack the phone. If you get a warrant to open my safe you can compel me to give you the combination, you can HIRE a locksmith, but you can't compel the locksmith. Compelling the locksmith is a completely foreign legal precedent.
    - geographomics 11y ago
      I think you are rather downplaying Apple's capabilities here. Apple is the only entity who can reliably alter the firmware to remove the forensics-thwarting restrictions, due to updates requiring a chain of trust all the way up to Apple's root certificate. The physical device may not be owned by Apple, but the firmware installed upon it certainly is, both legally (due to copyright law) and cryptographically.
      - throwawayukcyb 11y ago
        > The physical device may not be owned by Apple, but the firmware installed upon it certainly is This is an interesting observation, actually. It suggests that there is a (legal) price to be paid for retaining tight control over firmware.
      - Consultant32452 11y ago
        I believe there is precedent for companies having to share/reveal their own encryption keys or in this case the certificate necessary to create a firmware update. The certificate is something Apple owns.
- throwawayukcyb 11y ago
  > Do you think with that sort of OPSSEC that they slip up and use a work phone? Doubtful. After 5 minutes of search I cannot find the story. But there was a super interesting story (in The Atlantic maybe?) about an investigation into an assassination plot where the major break was exactly this slip-up.

ianhawes 11y ago

Normally I don't like Snowden, but in this case I think he raises great points all around, the biggest being that the non-work phone (Operational Phone) was completely destroyed. Do you think with that sort of OPSSEC that they slip up and use a work phone? Doubtful. But hey, the FBI exists to turn over every stone. The real story here is that they specifically chose this case to go after Apple because they suspected the backlash if Apple tried to fight it would be more than they could handle.

geographomics 11y ago
Even if there's less likelihood of useful evidence on the suspect's work phone, it's still worth checking. The FBI's request isn't too bad really. It's not like they are requesting Apple to build a new mass surveillance tool or anything similarly far-reaching. This is limited to the domain of digital forensics, and how best to extract data in a criminal investigation, against firmware that is hostile to cracking. Given that, by design, the phone has been locked down to only accept Apple-signed firmware, then Apple is really the most feasible choice to assist in bypassing this.
- Consultant32452 11y ago
  Unless we believe that individuals and corporations are at least somewhat autonomous. If this were Apple's device then sure, I think they should be compelled to make an effort to unlock it, but it's NOT Apple's device, and it hasn't been since it left the warehouse. Apple, in this case, is just an industry expert that happens to know quite a bit about the device. If you couldn't compel MSFT to hack the phone, you shouldn't be able to compel Apple to hack the phone. If you get a warrant to open my safe you can compel me to give you the combination, you can HIRE a locksmith, but you can't compel the locksmith. Compelling the locksmith is a completely foreign legal precedent.
  - geographomics 11y ago
    I think you are rather downplaying Apple's capabilities here. Apple is the only entity who can reliably alter the firmware to remove the forensics-thwarting restrictions, due to updates requiring a chain of trust all the way up to Apple's root certificate. The physical device may not be owned by Apple, but the firmware installed upon it certainly is, both legally (due to copyright law) and cryptographically.
    - throwawayukcyb 11y ago
      > The physical device may not be owned by Apple, but the firmware installed upon it certainly is This is an interesting observation, actually. It suggests that there is a (legal) price to be paid for retaining tight control over firmware.
    - Consultant32452 11y ago
      I believe there is precedent for companies having to share/reveal their own encryption keys or in this case the certificate necessary to create a firmware update. The certificate is something Apple owns.
throwawayukcyb 11y ago
> Do you think with that sort of OPSSEC that they slip up and use a work phone? Doubtful. After 5 minutes of search I cannot find the story. But there was a super interesting story (in The Atlantic maybe?) about an investigation into an assassination plot where the major break was exactly this slip-up.