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> This paves the way for legislation that forces technology companies to install backdoors in software/hardware But... the fact that Apple can do anything is

by rtpg 11y ago

> This paves the way for legislation that forces technology companies to install backdoors in software/hardware But... the fact that Apple can do anything is a result of the OS update backdoor in the first place in this case! If this were a 5S this entire court case wouldn't be possible. This court ruling is not "Apple needs to install a backdoor". It's "Apple needs to exploit the backdoor they have a key to".

nickysielicki 11y ago
Bingo. Not enough people in here are understanding the legal side of this. Someone in this community could quite reasonably root against apple, on the basis that a DOJ loss would give the DOJ a lot of fuel to push for legislation mandating backdoors. It's a very different situation when Apple can reasonably do something to undermine encryption and when there's nothing they can do, and the precedent going forward from this case is negligible considering that the 5C is the last holdout of an enclave-less iPhone. What we should fear is legislation that bars the creation of truly secure phones. A ruling for Apple might aid in the creation and passing of such legislation.
- citizensixteen 11y ago
  >Not enough people in here are understanding the legal side of this. This is just one more step towards winning the Crypto Wars- The Crypto Wars is an unofficial name for the U.S. government's attempts to limit the public's and foreign nations' access to cryptography strong enough to resist decryption by national intelligence agencies (especially USA's NSA) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars
pja 11y ago
The argument is that once they have this precedent in hand, they can then use it to force Apple to alter the code in the secure enclave of all current Apple devices so that the security services can gain access to them on demand. Or else, even if this case doesn’t give them sufficient precedent to force that kind of access, it’s certainly a legal stepping stone along that route, which is precisely why the FBI is taking the case all the way even though it’s clearly not necessary in this specific case - the NSA is perfectly capable of gaining access to the phone in question if they want to & according to Snowden they even have the legal right to do so since it was a work-issued phone where the issuee had signed over the right to scrutinise it at any time.
- rtpg 11y ago
  >The argument is that once they have this precedent in hand, they can then use it to force Apple to alter the code in the secure enclave of all current Apple devices so that the security services can gain access to them on demand. Sure... if there's a warrant for a specific phone, and that Apple even has a way to update the Secure Enclave (my understanding is that updating the Secure Enclave wipes the contents). One overreach I could see happening from this precedent is getting Apple to participate in a targeted wiretap: Target brings phone to iStore, Apple "accidentally" wipes Secure Enclave (installing backdoor), and target could now have phone hacked later. Contrived, but I think this would be precedent. But in no way is this ruling a precedent to push out a backdoor to every iPhone ever made. And the precedent that Apple must help unlock an iPhone has existed for over 100 years I think. Based off of the whole "digital key" == "Physical key" logic of the courts, if Apple didn't want to help exploit the backdoor, a judge could probably rule to force Apple to hand over its actual signing keys for updates. Awful, but the precedent is totally there
  - pja 11y ago
    In the medium term, my guess is that they want to force Apple to alter the code in the secure enclave of all iPhones manufactured so that in the future the phones can be backdoored on demand either by Apple under warrant or the FBI themselves. In the former case the NSA would of simply acquire the necessary keys by whatever means they preferred. At the moment, for phones with a secure enclave, this isn’t possible: Apple intention was to create a system that they themselves can’t crack precisely in order to prevent anyone else from being able to crack their phones. It’s possible that the NSA has physical attacks that can work around the secure encalve now, but these are always vulnerable to future improvements in the devices - the government would vastly prefer to have some kind of mandated access. Winning this case is a step along the path of building up the legal precedent for them to be able to do this. Sure, by itself it won’t be sufficient, but they don’t expect it to be - it’s a stepping stone along the route.

by rtpg 11y ago

nickysielicki 11y ago

Bingo. Not enough people in here are understanding the legal side of this. Someone in this community could quite reasonably root against apple, on the basis that a DOJ loss would give the DOJ a lot of fuel to push for legislation mandating backdoors. It's a very different situation when Apple can reasonably do something to undermine encryption and when there's nothing they can do, and the precedent going forward from this case is negligible considering that the 5C is the last holdout of an enclave-less iPhone. What we should fear is legislation that bars the creation of truly secure phones. A ruling for Apple might aid in the creation and passing of such legislation.

citizensixteen 11y ago
>Not enough people in here are understanding the legal side of this. This is just one more step towards winning the Crypto Wars- The Crypto Wars is an unofficial name for the U.S. government's attempts to limit the public's and foreign nations' access to cryptography strong enough to resist decryption by national intelligence agencies (especially USA's NSA) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars

pja 11y ago

The argument is that once they have this precedent in hand, they can then use it to force Apple to alter the code in the secure enclave of all current Apple devices so that the security services can gain access to them on demand. Or else, even if this case doesn’t give them sufficient precedent to force that kind of access, it’s certainly a legal stepping stone along that route, which is precisely why the FBI is taking the case all the way even though it’s clearly not necessary in this specific case - the NSA is perfectly capable of gaining access to the phone in question if they want to & according to Snowden they even have the legal right to do so since it was a work-issued phone where the issuee had signed over the right to scrutinise it at any time.

rtpg 11y ago
>The argument is that once they have this precedent in hand, they can then use it to force Apple to alter the code in the secure enclave of all current Apple devices so that the security services can gain access to them on demand. Sure... if there's a warrant for a specific phone, and that Apple even has a way to update the Secure Enclave (my understanding is that updating the Secure Enclave wipes the contents). One overreach I could see happening from this precedent is getting Apple to participate in a targeted wiretap: Target brings phone to iStore, Apple "accidentally" wipes Secure Enclave (installing backdoor), and target could now have phone hacked later. Contrived, but I think this would be precedent. But in no way is this ruling a precedent to push out a backdoor to every iPhone ever made. And the precedent that Apple must help unlock an iPhone has existed for over 100 years I think. Based off of the whole "digital key" == "Physical key" logic of the courts, if Apple didn't want to help exploit the backdoor, a judge could probably rule to force Apple to hand over its actual signing keys for updates. Awful, but the precedent is totally there
- pja 11y ago
  In the medium term, my guess is that they want to force Apple to alter the code in the secure enclave of all iPhones manufactured so that in the future the phones can be backdoored on demand either by Apple under warrant or the FBI themselves. In the former case the NSA would of simply acquire the necessary keys by whatever means they preferred. At the moment, for phones with a secure enclave, this isn’t possible: Apple intention was to create a system that they themselves can’t crack precisely in order to prevent anyone else from being able to crack their phones. It’s possible that the NSA has physical attacks that can work around the secure encalve now, but these are always vulnerable to future improvements in the devices - the government would vastly prefer to have some kind of mandated access. Winning this case is a step along the path of building up the legal precedent for them to be able to do this. Sure, by itself it won’t be sufficient, but they don’t expect it to be - it’s a stepping stone along the route.