> D-wave claims 512 qubits today. I don't think it's out of the question that NSA is far ahead of both of them. I don't doubt that NSA have some techniques tha

> D-wave claims 512 qubits today. I don't think it's out of the question that NSA is far ahead of both of them. I don't doubt that NSA have some techniques that are not public knowledge, but is it feasible that they are that far ahead of academia/industry? (IIRC, D-Wave cannot run Shor's algorithm, so is not particularly useful in breaking cryptography). Even if they are, I would expect them to be having these legal battles hoping to win - if there is a plausible, non-classified, way to access the data, maintaining secrecy of these techniques is much easier. > that something as inevitable as letsencrypt and an iPhone passcode could make it all useless. Widespread, well-implemented crypto is probably less inevitable than this makes it sound. letsencrypt etc. probably make the surveillance dragnet less useful, but sloppy implementations and unforeseen weaknesses (e.g. Heartbleed) probably render it still rather useful.[1] Encryption usage, through increasing, is also not a given for people who may be targeted by NSA et al.[2] [1] In terms that it can be used to gather information. Whether it is actually useful from a security standpoint, and if it is price worth paying, is something I strongly doubt. [2] See, e.g., https://theintercept.com/2015/11/18/signs-point-to-unencrypted-communications-between-terror-suspects/ https://theintercept.com/2015/11/18/signs-point-to-unencrypt...