4 ms·
> This key is generated by combining the user's passcode with a key baked in to the hardware in a way that is designed to be difficult to extract. Difficult do
by tzs 11y ago
> This key is generated by combining the user's passcode with a key baked in to the hardware in a way that is designed to be difficult to extract.
Difficult doesn't necessarily mean impossible: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/519201/tamper-proof-chips-with-some-work-might-give-up-their-secrets/ https://www.technologyreview.com/s/519201/tamper-proof-chips...
Is it publicly known how the key is physically stored in the chip and if there is active tamper resistance?
It might be a lot of work to break out the tiny probes and the tunneling microscopes or whatever and get the key that way, but at the current level of terrorist attacks in the US the FBI should be afford the resources for that.
- Zigurd 11y agoAFAIK having to grind off the chip package and probe the chip would apply to the iPhone 6, but the iPhone 5C does not have hardware protection for keys.
- Crito 11y agoThe 5C does not have a secure enclave, however the 5C still has the device UID burned into hardware. As I understand it, for an offline attack on the encrypted contents of the flash, you would need that UID.
- Zigurd 11y agoI should have been more specific: The iPhone 5C does require signed system software, and the system software enforces safeguards on key access. In contrast, on the iPhone 6, it may not be the case that an "evil update" of system software could be sufficient to subvert the ways keys that are already stored in the hardware secure enclave are protected, and you would have to try to probe the hardware.
- akiselev 11y agoMany (if not most) chips that need to be secure keep any secrets like private keys on a region of silicon that is tamper resistant. When you attempt to open the package, the region is destroyed beyond recovery.