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What's it matter if it's secure but not usable? That problem, aside from demand, is why almost everyone uses insecure messengers. Usability is more important if
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
What's it matter if it's secure but not usable? That problem, aside from demand, is why almost everyone uses insecure messengers. Usability is more important if one is targeting the masses. Especially if the alternatives they find cool and usable are horribly insecure.
That leads to other side: what is a secure messenger? Secure against WHO? If it's hackers, then Cryptocat is entirely inappropriate as it will be smashed. Yet, average person's threat model includes all kinds of snoops that might not have hacking skill not to mention the service host. Especially in high school & college. Cryptocat would protect them from many of those while its own problems would be found and improved over time. Widespread adoption of Cryptocat over services like Facebook Messenger stashing & analyzing the messages would be a win in privacy.
So, the question is use case. I gave it a positive review for potential to get insecure crowd on something a little better. It was also fun thanks to good art. I just said they should clearly indicate it's not for stopping hackers, governments, etc. Plus keep links to good products that are. If people want those, they'll use them. If not, Cryptocat wasn't a bad fallback compared to straight-up invasive apps they were likely using.
- tptacek 11y agoPeople say things like this a lot. I understand why they say it. But, no. Emphatically, no. Let me put a bullet right in the head of this argument in favor of Cryptocat and things like it: In June 2013, Cryptocat was used by journalist Glenn Greenwald while in Hong Kong to meet NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden for the first time, after other encryption software failed to work. And, you know what else? Guess what happened right around June 2013? Decryptocat.
- sarciszewski 11y agoCryptocat was not secure. No argument there! Decryptocat was the proof in the pudding. If a secure product could be as user-friendly as Cryptocat was while still being secure, then most peoples' communications would be more secure. That's all I was saying. I'm not trying at all to hand-wave the proven insecurity. I'm saying that the only thing they got right was the one thing that secure products have consistently gotten wrong. (Barring Signal.)
- nickpsecurity 11y ago"That's all I was saying. I'm not trying at all to hand-wave the proven insecurity. I'm saying that the only thing they got right was the one thing that secure products have consistently gotten wrong. " That's my main claim. Usability and setup phase were between 90-100% of my positive remarks on it in my review. I just added it still has value for crowds without tech-savvy opponents if (a) they won't use truly secure stuff due to hassle and (b) they are clearly informed usable but weak tools can be breached. As one of a few interim solutions if nothing else.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoI specifically said it shouldn't be used to stop hackers. Let's continue anyway as there's a lesson here. "after other encryption software failed to work." Nothing else worked because all your recommendations were unusable. It was using Cryptocat because it might be private or doing open communications that wouldn't be private. There was also a time window. "Guess what happened right around June 2013?" They completed the meeting without the NSA getting shit. Greenwald got the data. Snowden escaped. Comms remained private until an NSA analyst discovered both the intercepted data and Decryptocat. It worked. Great story. Now, what app do you recommend for a future Greenwald that's so easy to correctly acquire and use that I could give my grandmother a 3-4 step flashcard and she get through it without help & minimum hassle? Cryptocat passed my granny test. Nothing else on a desktop did so far.
- simoncion 11y ago> I specifically said it shouldn't be used to stop hackers. Script kiddies get their name because they only make use of easy-to-use tools written by knowledgable "hackers" that perform tasks that are vastly beyond the understanding of the kiddie. If your "secure communications" software doesn't stop a sophisticated passive adversary, it doesn't stop anyone, because a sophisticated adversary will inevitably release a point and drool tool that anyone can use to unscramble your data. [0] > They completed the meeting without the NSA getting shit. ... Comms remained private until an NSA analyst discovered both the intercepted data and Decryptocat. So, then the NSA did "get shit". They may not have gotten it in a timely manner, but they did get the plaintext of the conversation. > Now, what app do you recommend for a future Greenwald... TextSecure/Signal has been around since 2010. It walks you through the setup process, so no need for flashcards. Unlike Cryptocat, its crypto has stood up to scrutiny. It doesn't currently meet your "on a desktop" search criteria but: 1) It seems reasonable to expect that most journalists possess either an iOS or Android smartphone. 2) There is a Signal desktop client in development that's currently in population-limited beta testing. From what people tell me about how WhatsApp handles the interaction between its mobile clients and desktop client, Signal's desktop client is every bit as easy to use as WhatsApp's. [0] Granted, Decryptocat likely has to be used by someone running code in the Cryptocat datacenters, but this does not invalidate my objection to your assertion.