5 ms·

Um, what? If they didn't take a stand all their claims would be worthless. Their new phones are vulnerable as well, though I would not be surprised for upcoming

by jonknee 11y ago

Um, what? If they didn't take a stand all their claims would be worthless. Their new phones are vulnerable as well, though I would not be surprised for upcoming products to make more use of private keys. (It's a tradeoff between usability and security.)

mindslight 11y ago
Their claims are worthless. In order to be secure against USG, Apple needed to eliminate the privilege of their own signing key, at least when the phone is locked. A vulnerability to Apple is a vulnerability to every country where Apple has a physical presence. It's hard, but you actually have to throw the ring into Mount Doom. You can't just put in your pocket and promise to never use it.
- leonatan 11y ago
  Good allegory at the end!
- zepto 11y ago
  Their claims are not worthless. Let's imagine that they plan on eliminating that privilege when the phone is locked. If the FBI establishes that it can force code to be written using the all writs act now, then it will also be able to prevent them from throwing away the key.
  - mindslight 11y ago
    There's a difference between writing code to open one specific device on a legitimate investigation, and restricting what type of security Apple can implement on all devices sold. But you're right, it's a similar activity. Which is why the ideal move this iteration would have been to nicely go along and avoid setting a precedent until Apple was actually shipping a secure phone.
    - zepto 11y ago
      The precedent is the use of the all writs act for this broader purpose. If it is not challenged now, then it will be established that Apple can be forced to create code to the design of the FBI. This is why it must be resisted now.
      - mindslight 11y ago
        All Writs is a red herring. Sure the right to not be forced to take on certain paid projects is important, but that isn't the main principle which Apple is defending. Even if Apple prevails, then the FBI subpoenas technical documentation and the signing key, and gets an independent party to write the code. The signing key would be another legal battle (and at least Apple is well funded unlike Lavabit), but that ultimately comes down to Apple having the only key to a container for which there is a warrant. Do you see this ever being decided in favor of the key holder's non-involvement, especially in such an unsympathetic case?
        zepto 11y ago
        That key is a key which unlocks every single iPhone. There would be an extremely strong case that revealing that key would be a threat to national security. I think you'd find the case would be harder than you think. That's precisely why all writs is not a red herring. If all writs is not limited at this stage, it will be used for exactly what you are most afraid of.
        mindslight 11y ago
        What I'm most worried about is a prohibition on software which implements government-unbreakable encryption, and after that, a prohibition on selling consumer devices with government-unbreakable encryption. This has nothing to do with All Writs, since 1. it wouldn't be forcing anyone to write backdoored software and 2. wouldn't involve a specific ongoing court case. If revealing Apple's key for the iPhone's backdoor is a national security threat, then Apple can avoid this by simply using the key to open the one specific door a court asks (that's how the argument would go).

by jonknee 11y ago

mindslight 11y ago

Their claims are worthless. In order to be secure against USG, Apple needed to eliminate the privilege of their own signing key, at least when the phone is locked. A vulnerability to Apple is a vulnerability to every country where Apple has a physical presence. It's hard, but you actually have to throw the ring into Mount Doom. You can't just put in your pocket and promise to never use it.

leonatan 11y ago
Good allegory at the end!
zepto 11y ago
Their claims are not worthless. Let's imagine that they plan on eliminating that privilege when the phone is locked. If the FBI establishes that it can force code to be written using the all writs act now, then it will also be able to prevent them from throwing away the key.
- mindslight 11y ago
  There's a difference between writing code to open one specific device on a legitimate investigation, and restricting what type of security Apple can implement on all devices sold. But you're right, it's a similar activity. Which is why the ideal move this iteration would have been to nicely go along and avoid setting a precedent until Apple was actually shipping a secure phone.
  - zepto 11y ago
    The precedent is the use of the all writs act for this broader purpose. If it is not challenged now, then it will be established that Apple can be forced to create code to the design of the FBI. This is why it must be resisted now.
    - mindslight 11y ago
      All Writs is a red herring. Sure the right to not be forced to take on certain paid projects is important, but that isn't the main principle which Apple is defending. Even if Apple prevails, then the FBI subpoenas technical documentation and the signing key, and gets an independent party to write the code. The signing key would be another legal battle (and at least Apple is well funded unlike Lavabit), but that ultimately comes down to Apple having the only key to a container for which there is a warrant. Do you see this ever being decided in favor of the key holder's non-involvement, especially in such an unsympathetic case?
      - zepto 11y ago
        That key is a key which unlocks every single iPhone. There would be an extremely strong case that revealing that key would be a threat to national security. I think you'd find the case would be harder than you think. That's precisely why all writs is not a red herring. If all writs is not limited at this stage, it will be used for exactly what you are most afraid of.
        mindslight 11y ago
        What I'm most worried about is a prohibition on software which implements government-unbreakable encryption, and after that, a prohibition on selling consumer devices with government-unbreakable encryption. This has nothing to do with All Writs, since 1. it wouldn't be forcing anyone to write backdoored software and 2. wouldn't involve a specific ongoing court case. If revealing Apple's key for the iPhone's backdoor is a national security threat, then Apple can avoid this by simply using the key to open the one specific door a court asks (that's how the argument would go).