5 ms·
What exactly is the back door that was left in place? Making the secure enclave firmware writable?
by criddell 11y ago
What exactly is the back door that was left in place? Making the secure enclave firmware writable?
- teacup50 11y agoCorrect; more specifically, leaving the KDF retry enforcement behavior writable on locked devices, and in the case of secure enclave, possibly exposing fingerprint-protected keys themselves to Apple-signed updated firmware.
- pcwalton 11y agoDo you have a source that confirms this? So far everything that I've seen, including the story on Hacker News [1], indicates that we don't know whether the Secure Enclave code can be updated without already knowing the key. [1]: https://www.mikeash.com/pyblog/friday-qa-2016-02-19-what-is-the-secure-enclave.html https://www.mikeash.com/pyblog/friday-qa-2016-02-19-what-is-...
- criddell 11y agoThis doesn't have a link to an Apple source, but it's a little more information: https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160218/10371233643/yes-backdoor-that-fbi-is-requesting-can-work-modern-iphones-too.shtml https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160218/10371233643/yes-b...
- 05 11y agoIf you can upgrade a Touch ID enabled iPhone from Recovery Mode (you can), then yes, you can upgrade SE fw without unlocking first.
- pweissbrod 11y agoI believe if you have apple's key you can use this to deploy "updates" to locked phones. If a locked phone is powered on and capable of reaching a network, it will automatically grab the signed updates and run whatever code contained therein. Now I'm not an iphone user and wondering if the auto-update feature can be disabled?
- Crito 11y agoIs there a secure enclave in the 5C? My understanding is that there is not, and that if there was, then what the FBI is requesting simply wouldn't be possible.
- criddell 11y agoYou're right, the 5C has no secure enclave. However, I believe the issue is that phones that do have a secure enclave are still vulnerable because the secure enclave firmware can be updated and basically neutered to the point where the same attack on the 5C works on those phones as well. I think the attack is just a brute force attack.
- Crito 11y agoThe attack is a brute force attack. My understanding is that if a secure enclave is present, then the PIN timeout feature which prevents brute force is implemented in the secure enclave. If the secure enclave did not permit updates, then this logic would be relatively unassailable. But since the 5C has no secure enclave, the PIN lockout logic can simply be overwritten by updating the OS.
- criddell 11y agoI think you and I have the same understanding. Even with no secure enclave, if a user picks a good password (which nobody does on a phone), the security is still unassailable.