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Presumably any "backdoor" is a security hole that can be accessed on any phone. So far, this request asks that Apple remove only the part of one phone's securi

Presumably any "backdoor" is a security hole that can be accessed on any phone. So far, this request asks that Apple remove only the part of one phone's security that 1) destroyes that phone's data after 10 failed tries, and 2) slows the automated entry of passcodes into that phone. So far, this case is specific to one phone and thus not about a general backdoor. As the case stands, unless Apple can show how compliance weakens security on other phones, I don't see how they can refuse to comply, unless it's technically impossible for them to do. If it is impossible, their refusal in this case may lead to a ruling that requires them to change iOS to comply with such requests in the future. But if they can comply now, only the security on one phone will be diminished. It's strongly in the company's interest to comply. If Apple does not (cannot) comply, and subsequently they are ordered to change iOS to comply with future requests, would this be a "backdoor"? Yes. I don't see how Apple can add this "feature" to iOS and assure that only authorized legal authorities could activate it in the future. Is this case about changing iOS to comply with future requests of this kind? Not yet.

sandiegodave 11y ago
If Apple creates new software that removes a part of one iPhone's securty, that software can potentially be used on all iPhones. It's no different from what you said: " I don't see how Apple can add this "feature" to iOS [or in this case, create a tool to use on the current version of iOS] and assure that only authorized legal authorities could activate it in the future."
- ikeboy 11y ago
  How is that different from "If I hand over this iCloud data, I'll need to create software to download iCloud data from a specific user, and that software can potentially be used on any iCloud account"? How is this not applicable to any warrant that requires technical ability to comply?
  - sandiegodave 11y ago
    Apple doesn't make the same promises about encryption and privacy on their iCloud service that they do their iPhones, that's the only difference. If you store information in iCloud and the FBI comes asking for it, Apple will hand it over. By the very nature of iCloud, Apple has access to your data. Not so with your iPhone. Apple says your device is encrypted and they cannot access it without your consent, end of story. Forcing them to create tools that invalidate this promise on one iPhone means creating tools that can invalidate the promise on any iPhone.
    - ikeboy 11y ago
      Saying you'll break the law before you do it does not make it legal. "We told our customers we won't do something" is not a legal defense. By the very nature of iPhone 5C, Apple can put whatever software they want on it with physical access. Also, note that the phone is owned by the government. They provided it to the terrorist, who worked for the government. So there's no promise broken to customers, because it's the customer themself who's asking for this.
      - 15155 11y ago
        > Also, note that the phone is owned by the government. There's the irony in this situation. The reason nation states actually purchase iPhones is BECAUSE of the security they provide.
        ikeboy 11y ago
        He wasn't working in a security role, so that would not have been a concern for whoever made that decision.
        15155 11y ago
        Other government agencies that do actually have people in security roles will be less inclined to issue iPhones. This case sets precedent, that's the whole point.
  - deleted 11y ago
    [deleted]
murjinsee 11y ago
Precedence is a serious issue in the U.S. While the end result of this case might not be an immediate, radical policy shift, it would certainly lay the groundwork for that in the future. You give the devil an inch... As others have said, this is an attempt to demonize encryption in the eyes of the public. I truly do not know what to think of the matter, since Apple seems to enjoy a suspicious amount of support from the judicial branch. Tim's letter does seem to fly in the face of our government's desired narrative. Hopefully he gets his vehicle inspected frequently and keeps his closet free of skeletons.
zaroth 11y ago
I really don't understand how anyone can claim "this case is specific to this phone" like that means anything at all. Of course the case is specific to this phone. And the next case will be specific to the next phone. How could any case not be "specific" to the case at hand? It's just a tautology. Can the government compel Apple to create new functionality to enable cracking their own phones' security? Any reasonable discussion on the topic must consider if the answer is "yes", then why is the answer yes in this case, and perhaps no in any other case. What (if any) are the specific conditions under which they can be forced to assist? What is the legal precedence that is being set, and is there anything that makes this case special? Is the answer "yes, Apple must assist" because the subject of the investigation is a mass murderer? As far as I know, there is no such law. As I understand it, the specific crime or facts of the case are completely irrelevant to the legal argument the FBI is presenting. There is encrypted data on a phone that they think could be useful in investigating a federal crime of some kind. Nothing more. The legal justification is crucially important. The FBI is arguing Apple must comply as a matter of "All Writs" and if they succeed in this line of argument, then from what I understand it clearly follows that any time the government wants access to encrypted data, and has either permission of the device owner or a warrant, then they can compel Apple to assist in recovering that data. So I'm fairly convinced this case is absolutely not specific to "one phone". At most this case is "specific" to compelling the development of custom software and firmware after-the-fact in order to bypass the existing security measures of a device in order to access otherwise encrypted data. If they are forced to comply in this case, either explain why they can't be forced to comply in the next federal case, or stop claiming that the security on only "one phone" will be diminished. This is no better than the word wrangling the NSA does around "collecting" data. The idea that it's not a "backdoor" just because it is deployed in real-time on a per-phone basis versus being pre-deployed across all phones is balderdash. This is a distinction without a difference. How the backdoor is deployed doesn't make it any less of a backdoor to the person who has the capability. And of course iPhones clearly have the capability of deploying said backdoor over-the-air just as easily as over the lightning cable. That the firmware image might have to be re-signed by Apple's code-signing key because it includes a hard-coded identifier for a specific device is equally irrelevant, unless you can explain why the government can't compel Apple to generate these firmware builds on-demand whenever they want them.

sandiegodave 11y ago

If Apple creates new software that removes a part of one iPhone's securty, that software can potentially be used on all iPhones. It's no different from what you said: " I don't see how Apple can add this "feature" to iOS [or in this case, create a tool to use on the current version of iOS] and assure that only authorized legal authorities could activate it in the future."

ikeboy 11y ago
How is that different from "If I hand over this iCloud data, I'll need to create software to download iCloud data from a specific user, and that software can potentially be used on any iCloud account"? How is this not applicable to any warrant that requires technical ability to comply?
- sandiegodave 11y ago
  Apple doesn't make the same promises about encryption and privacy on their iCloud service that they do their iPhones, that's the only difference. If you store information in iCloud and the FBI comes asking for it, Apple will hand it over. By the very nature of iCloud, Apple has access to your data. Not so with your iPhone. Apple says your device is encrypted and they cannot access it without your consent, end of story. Forcing them to create tools that invalidate this promise on one iPhone means creating tools that can invalidate the promise on any iPhone.
  - ikeboy 11y ago
    Saying you'll break the law before you do it does not make it legal. "We told our customers we won't do something" is not a legal defense. By the very nature of iPhone 5C, Apple can put whatever software they want on it with physical access. Also, note that the phone is owned by the government. They provided it to the terrorist, who worked for the government. So there's no promise broken to customers, because it's the customer themself who's asking for this.
    - 15155 11y ago
      > Also, note that the phone is owned by the government. There's the irony in this situation. The reason nation states actually purchase iPhones is BECAUSE of the security they provide.
      - ikeboy 11y ago
        He wasn't working in a security role, so that would not have been a concern for whoever made that decision.
        15155 11y ago
        Other government agencies that do actually have people in security roles will be less inclined to issue iPhones. This case sets precedent, that's the whole point.
- deleted 11y ago
  [deleted]

murjinsee 11y ago

Precedence is a serious issue in the U.S. While the end result of this case might not be an immediate, radical policy shift, it would certainly lay the groundwork for that in the future. You give the devil an inch... As others have said, this is an attempt to demonize encryption in the eyes of the public. I truly do not know what to think of the matter, since Apple seems to enjoy a suspicious amount of support from the judicial branch. Tim's letter does seem to fly in the face of our government's desired narrative. Hopefully he gets his vehicle inspected frequently and keeps his closet free of skeletons.

zaroth 11y ago

I really don't understand how anyone can claim "this case is specific to this phone" like that means anything at all. Of course the case is specific to this phone. And the next case will be specific to the next phone. How could any case not be "specific" to the case at hand? It's just a tautology. Can the government compel Apple to create new functionality to enable cracking their own phones' security? Any reasonable discussion on the topic must consider if the answer is "yes", then why is the answer yes in this case, and perhaps no in any other case. What (if any) are the specific conditions under which they can be forced to assist? What is the legal precedence that is being set, and is there anything that makes this case special? Is the answer "yes, Apple must assist" because the subject of the investigation is a mass murderer? As far as I know, there is no such law. As I understand it, the specific crime or facts of the case are completely irrelevant to the legal argument the FBI is presenting. There is encrypted data on a phone that they think could be useful in investigating a federal crime of some kind. Nothing more. The legal justification is crucially important. The FBI is arguing Apple must comply as a matter of "All Writs" and if they succeed in this line of argument, then from what I understand it clearly follows that any time the government wants access to encrypted data, and has either permission of the device owner or a warrant, then they can compel Apple to assist in recovering that data. So I'm fairly convinced this case is absolutely not specific to "one phone". At most this case is "specific" to compelling the development of custom software and firmware after-the-fact in order to bypass the existing security measures of a device in order to access otherwise encrypted data. If they are forced to comply in this case, either explain why they can't be forced to comply in the next federal case, or stop claiming that the security on only "one phone" will be diminished. This is no better than the word wrangling the NSA does around "collecting" data. The idea that it's not a "backdoor" just because it is deployed in real-time on a per-phone basis versus being pre-deployed across all phones is balderdash. This is a distinction without a difference. How the backdoor is deployed doesn't make it any less of a backdoor to the person who has the capability. And of course iPhones clearly have the capability of deploying said backdoor over-the-air just as easily as over the lightning cable. That the firmware image might have to be re-signed by Apple's code-signing key because it includes a hard-coded identifier for a specific device is equally irrelevant, unless you can explain why the government can't compel Apple to generate these firmware builds on-demand whenever they want them.