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I think their argument is fourfold: one, it provides precedent (which isn't a reason in itself, really) and two is that they fear this could be reverse engineer
by mc32 11y ago
I think their argument is fourfold: one, it provides precedent (which isn't a reason in itself, really) and two is that they fear this could be reverse engineered by baddies in order to make the phones of others' less secure, three it proves to third parties it can be done and so either someone will take it upon themselves to do or someone [Big market] will require Apple to do the same --which I think will happen regardless and four it's a good business tactic [strategically, it's tough to know what a big emerging market might demand from Apple]
- Crito 11y ago> they fear this could be reverse engineered by baddies in order to make the phones of others' less secure But isn't the procedure already pretty straightforward and well known? 1) Make a build of iOS which has the pin timeout feature disabled. 2) Sign that with Apple's private key. 3) Flash onto the iPhone. That's more or less it, right? What's keeping the general public safe isn't some sort of secret or obscure procedure. The general public's safety is in Apple keeping that private key private. And the FBI isn't asking for their private key, they're just asking that Apple use it in private, just like they normally do when they push out normal updates. Am I missing something?