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>The backdoor does not currently exist. This is pretty much semantics. Apple can load a modified firmware without the password. That is a backdoor. >Creating

>The backdoor does not currently exist. This is pretty much semantics. Apple can load a modified firmware without the password. That is a backdoor. >Creating it leads to a slippery slope because the FBI will not only ask Apple to unlock phones from known dead terrorists who killed multiple people, but it will cascade to suspected terrorists, and then families of suspected terrorists, and then drug dealers and drug users and then speeders and loiterers and people of the wrong color, just like every other police abuse of power. The fact is that each time this tool would be used would require a federal district court to specifically order it. That eliminates the slippery slope risk. The courts would absolutely allow it for murder cases. In fact, any federal crime. But that's what is supposed to happen. And if you really think that a district court would let the FBI search a phone because they are the wrong color (or any other blatantly illegal purpose), well that court would also force apple to help them. So it ordering this now doesn't increase the likelihood of it happening. >And then if Apple gives into the FBI, it'll have to give into the UK and France and Germany and China and Russia and anywhere else they want to sell their phones. I am not arguing that Apple should give the FBI the power to do it independently. The FBI isn't asking for it. And the court didn't order Apple to do that. Apple already has the capability to do this.

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oldmanjay 11y ago
That you consider it a fact that law enforcement obeys its judicial constraints undercuts any argument you might make
- rhino369 11y ago
  I'm not considering it a fact. I consider it a fact that the FBI would not physically be able to use this tactic without an explicit court order. You don't have to trust the FBI at all.
  - oldmanjay 11y ago
    I'm not sure what physical restraints you believe would be in place. Please explain that.
    - rhino369 11y ago
      They ask apple to code the firmware so it only works on that specific iphone. And it would be signed so they cannot edit the firmware. Finally, the FBI even said they'd agree to do this on Apple campus and then actually give the iphone to apple after they copied data off it. There is zero chance they could reuse it.
VikingCoder 11y ago
Would you agree that having a device to torture someone, and using a device to torture someone are different things? Apple doesn't want to build a device to torture people. They're worried that if they build a device to torture people, that they will be told to torture people all the time, and will be barred from disclosing the fact that they're torturing people. > The fact is that each time this tool would be used would require a federal district court to specifically order it. That eliminates the slippery slope risk. I can't imagine why you think this. Getting a wire tap used to take a warrant. Then it took a warrant in a secret court. Then it took a warrant in a secret court, which could be granted after the fact. Then blanket permission to wire tap every overseas phone call was taken. Then blanket permission to wire tap every domestic email. I just don't see how you think you've ELIMINATED a slippery slope, by starting at requiring a federal district court order. Congressmen are already gearing up to write laws. McAfee is already volunteering to do it for free. > or any other blatantly illegal purpose Torture is blatantly illegal. Waterboarding is torture. So is forced anal feeding. I haven't seen any prosecutions, under military code, or otherwise, of people who admit to authorizing torture. If the courts aren't punishing blatantly illegal government action, what's to stop the government from more blatantly illegal actions? > Apple already has the capability to do this. I have the capability to torture someone. I don't care if the courts order me to do it.
millstone 11y ago
Sorry, but you greatly overestimate the ability of the courts to restrain the FBI. There are many examples of the FBI submitting false declarations to the courts, accessing password-protected files without a warrant, using improperly obtained evidence, and more. [1] Intelligence tools are pitched as counter-terrorism, and then used in whatever cases they feel like it. For example, the Stingray phone surveillance device, which the FBI loans out to be used by local police departments, without warrants. [2]. Or pretty much the entire Patriot Act. Of course the FBI wants the power to do this independently. And this is exactly how they go about obtaining this power. [1] https://www.eff.org/wp/patterns-misconduct-fbi-intelligence-violations https://www.eff.org/wp/patterns-misconduct-fbi-intelligence-... [2] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/secretive-stingray-surveillance-tool-becomes-more-pervasive-questions-over-its https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/secretive-stingray-sur...

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oldmanjay 11y ago

That you consider it a fact that law enforcement obeys its judicial constraints undercuts any argument you might make

rhino369 11y ago
I'm not considering it a fact. I consider it a fact that the FBI would not physically be able to use this tactic without an explicit court order. You don't have to trust the FBI at all.
- oldmanjay 11y ago
  I'm not sure what physical restraints you believe would be in place. Please explain that.
  - rhino369 11y ago
    They ask apple to code the firmware so it only works on that specific iphone. And it would be signed so they cannot edit the firmware. Finally, the FBI even said they'd agree to do this on Apple campus and then actually give the iphone to apple after they copied data off it. There is zero chance they could reuse it.

VikingCoder 11y ago

Would you agree that having a device to torture someone, and using a device to torture someone are different things? Apple doesn't want to build a device to torture people. They're worried that if they build a device to torture people, that they will be told to torture people all the time, and will be barred from disclosing the fact that they're torturing people. > The fact is that each time this tool would be used would require a federal district court to specifically order it. That eliminates the slippery slope risk. I can't imagine why you think this. Getting a wire tap used to take a warrant. Then it took a warrant in a secret court. Then it took a warrant in a secret court, which could be granted after the fact. Then blanket permission to wire tap every overseas phone call was taken. Then blanket permission to wire tap every domestic email. I just don't see how you think you've ELIMINATED a slippery slope, by starting at requiring a federal district court order. Congressmen are already gearing up to write laws. McAfee is already volunteering to do it for free. > or any other blatantly illegal purpose Torture is blatantly illegal. Waterboarding is torture. So is forced anal feeding. I haven't seen any prosecutions, under military code, or otherwise, of people who admit to authorizing torture. If the courts aren't punishing blatantly illegal government action, what's to stop the government from more blatantly illegal actions? > Apple already has the capability to do this. I have the capability to torture someone. I don't care if the courts order me to do it.

millstone 11y ago

Sorry, but you greatly overestimate the ability of the courts to restrain the FBI. There are many examples of the FBI submitting false declarations to the courts, accessing password-protected files without a warrant, using improperly obtained evidence, and more. [1] Intelligence tools are pitched as counter-terrorism, and then used in whatever cases they feel like it. For example, the Stingray phone surveillance device, which the FBI loans out to be used by local police departments, without warrants. [2]. Or pretty much the entire Patriot Act. Of course the FBI wants the power to do this independently. And this is exactly how they go about obtaining this power. [1] https://www.eff.org/wp/patterns-misconduct-fbi-intelligence-violations https://www.eff.org/wp/patterns-misconduct-fbi-intelligence-... [2] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/secretive-stingray-surveillance-tool-becomes-more-pervasive-questions-over-its https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/secretive-stingray-sur...