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Actually - it seems to me that "won't do it" - when based on principle, is a much better defense.
by gmoore 11y ago
Actually - it seems to me that "won't do it" - when based on principle, is a much better defense.
- teacup50 11y agoNot when it comes to transparent, limited scope, reasonable writs. This isn't some NSA mass surveillance program, or clipper chip reloaded(TM). This is an active murder (and terrorism) investigation in which Apple's privileged position -- one they assumed by choice and to their own benefit -- already exists. It is not unusual, unethical, or establishing any new precedent for them to be compelled to use keys they already have to open this single device. Apple does not need to, nor are they being asked to, provide a backdoor that can be used elsewhere, and any further demands of Apple will require the same judicial oversight as this one. If Apple doesn't want to be in this position in the future, they can avoid the potential liability by not holding master signing keys that can be easily used to circumvent the security of an owner-locked device.
- rqebmm 11y ago> Apple does not need to, nor are they being asked to, provide a backdoor that can be used elsewhere. They are, however, being asked to _create_ a backdoor that can be used anywhere. The specific request is to remove the limits on guessing passcodes so that the FBI can brute force it.
- teacup50 11y agoThe backdoor already exists, in cryptographic terms. All they're being asked to do is to use it, entirely under their own control, for this one phone. Tim Cook is trying to pretend that commenting out a few if statements in the key derivation code path is what creates the backdoor.