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If the contents are none of Apple's business, why did Apple give themselves (via their signing keys) a backdoor that allows them to replace the firmware out fro

If the contents are none of Apple's business, why did Apple give themselves (via their signing keys) a backdoor that allows them to replace the firmware out from under the owner of an ostensibly locked device? If Apple couldn't do an end-run on the key derivation protection mechanisms, then they couldn't use that backdoor to aid the FBI. "Can't do it" is a strong defense. "Won't do it" isn't.

unfunco 11y ago
You'll have to excuse any naivety on my part, but is that for all devices or for <= 5C? I was under the impression that was not possible for the 6 and 6S because of the secure enclave, and that the device had to be unlocked for a firmware update to occur.
- teacup50 11y ago
  The weight of evidence is that they can update the secure enclave firmware in place, too, without losing keying material.
- thinkling 11y ago
  People are disputing that now; apparently Apple has hinted that they could defeat the Secure Enclave on the newer phones. e.g.: http://daringfireball.net/linked/2016/02/17/panzarino-apple-fbi http://daringfireball.net/linked/2016/02/17/panzarino-apple-...
gmoore 11y ago
Actually - it seems to me that "won't do it" - when based on principle, is a much better defense.
- teacup50 11y ago
  Not when it comes to transparent, limited scope, reasonable writs. This isn't some NSA mass surveillance program, or clipper chip reloaded(TM). This is an active murder (and terrorism) investigation in which Apple's privileged position -- one they assumed by choice and to their own benefit -- already exists. It is not unusual, unethical, or establishing any new precedent for them to be compelled to use keys they already have to open this single device. Apple does not need to, nor are they being asked to, provide a backdoor that can be used elsewhere, and any further demands of Apple will require the same judicial oversight as this one. If Apple doesn't want to be in this position in the future, they can avoid the potential liability by not holding master signing keys that can be easily used to circumvent the security of an owner-locked device.
  - rqebmm 11y ago
    > Apple does not need to, nor are they being asked to, provide a backdoor that can be used elsewhere. They are, however, being asked to _create_ a backdoor that can be used anywhere. The specific request is to remove the limits on guessing passcodes so that the FBI can brute force it.
    - teacup50 11y ago
      The backdoor already exists, in cryptographic terms. All they're being asked to do is to use it, entirely under their own control, for this one phone. Tim Cook is trying to pretend that commenting out a few if statements in the key derivation code path is what creates the backdoor.
simonh 11y ago
If Appke weren't able to update the software on your device, they really wouldn't be able to give you software updates. Since it's the software that enforces security, well you can sees where this is going. It's not as easy as you imply. Denying themselves the ability to end run your security might well require them to not be able to upgrade or recover user devices. At all.
- teacup50 11y ago
  It's not as hard as you're implying; A locked device could support re-imaging by expunging all existing key material. In general, Apple's guarantees about anonymity and security all assume that there is no risk to Apple sitting in a trust position. This case demonstrates why that's a bad idea.

unfunco 11y ago

You'll have to excuse any naivety on my part, but is that for all devices or for <= 5C? I was under the impression that was not possible for the 6 and 6S because of the secure enclave, and that the device had to be unlocked for a firmware update to occur.

teacup50 11y ago
The weight of evidence is that they can update the secure enclave firmware in place, too, without losing keying material.
thinkling 11y ago
People are disputing that now; apparently Apple has hinted that they could defeat the Secure Enclave on the newer phones. e.g.: http://daringfireball.net/linked/2016/02/17/panzarino-apple-fbi http://daringfireball.net/linked/2016/02/17/panzarino-apple-...

gmoore 11y ago

Actually - it seems to me that "won't do it" - when based on principle, is a much better defense.

teacup50 11y ago
Not when it comes to transparent, limited scope, reasonable writs. This isn't some NSA mass surveillance program, or clipper chip reloaded(TM). This is an active murder (and terrorism) investigation in which Apple's privileged position -- one they assumed by choice and to their own benefit -- already exists. It is not unusual, unethical, or establishing any new precedent for them to be compelled to use keys they already have to open this single device. Apple does not need to, nor are they being asked to, provide a backdoor that can be used elsewhere, and any further demands of Apple will require the same judicial oversight as this one. If Apple doesn't want to be in this position in the future, they can avoid the potential liability by not holding master signing keys that can be easily used to circumvent the security of an owner-locked device.
- rqebmm 11y ago
  > Apple does not need to, nor are they being asked to, provide a backdoor that can be used elsewhere. They are, however, being asked to _create_ a backdoor that can be used anywhere. The specific request is to remove the limits on guessing passcodes so that the FBI can brute force it.
  - teacup50 11y ago
    The backdoor already exists, in cryptographic terms. All they're being asked to do is to use it, entirely under their own control, for this one phone. Tim Cook is trying to pretend that commenting out a few if statements in the key derivation code path is what creates the backdoor.

simonh 11y ago

If Appke weren't able to update the software on your device, they really wouldn't be able to give you software updates. Since it's the software that enforces security, well you can sees where this is going. It's not as easy as you imply. Denying themselves the ability to end run your security might well require them to not be able to upgrade or recover user devices. At all.

teacup50 11y ago
It's not as hard as you're implying; A locked device could support re-imaging by expunging all existing key material. In general, Apple's guarantees about anonymity and security all assume that there is no risk to Apple sitting in a trust position. This case demonstrates why that's a bad idea.