Not definitive proof, but a former Apple security engineer suggests it is: https://twitter.com/JohnHedge/status/699882614212075520 https://twitter.com/JohnHedge

Not definitive proof, but a former Apple security engineer suggests it is: https://twitter.com/JohnHedge/status/699882614212075520 https://twitter.com/JohnHedge/status/699882614212075520 A possible mitigation against the "FBI attack" (which I don't know if Apple has implemented), while still allowing SEP firmware updates, would be to have a simple routine in ROM that the SEP always runs upon boot (before running the SEP firmware blob) to verify that as hash of the firmware blob matches the one previously recorded by the SEP. If it doesn't, it could either wipe and update the hash, or refuse to boot until the previous blob is restored. When updating the firmware normally, the SEP would simply verify the user enters their pin before updating the hash. Or simply require pin entry (or wipe) for all DFU firmware updates, which seems like a much safer option.