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This is the most concise summary I have found on the legal issues/possible ramifications concerning this case. The worry in this case is the troubling precedent

This is the most concise summary I have found on the legal issues/possible ramifications concerning this case. The worry in this case is the troubling precedent it would set. https://lawfareblog.com/not-slippery-slope-jump-cliff https://lawfareblog.com/not-slippery-slope-jump-cliff Quotation from, Not a Slippery Slope, but a Jump off the Cliff By Nicholas Weaver. The request to Apple is accurately paraphrased as "Create malcode designed to subvert security protections, with additional forensic protections, customized for a particular target's phone, cryptographically sign that malcode so the target's phone accepts it as legitimate, and run that customized version through the update mechanism". (I speak of malcode in the technical sense of "code designed to subvert a security protection or compromise the device", not in intent.) The same logic behind what the FBI seeks could just as easily apply to a mandate forcing Microsoft, Google, Apple, and others to push malicious code to a device through automatic updates when the device isn't yet in law enforcement's hand. So the precedent the FBI seeks doesn't represent just "create and install malcode for this device in Law Enforcement possession" but rather "create and install malcode for this device". Let us assume that the FBI wins in court and gains this precedent. This does indeed solve the "going dark" problem as now the FBI can go to Apple, Cisco, Microsoft, or Google with a warrant and say "push out an update to this target". Once the target's device starts running the FBI's update then encryption no longer matters, even the much stronger security present in the latest Apple devices. So as long as the FBI identifies the target's devices before arrest there is no problem with any encryption. But at what cost?

bitJericho 11y ago
Stallman sounds less and less crazy every year.
- nickik 11y ago
  Nobody ever said the danger that he was talking about are not real. However his is still a very edge position.
  - fnordfnordfnord 11y ago
    RMS was openly ridiculed and scoffed at until the Snowden revelations.
nindalf 11y ago
This is precisely why I think the San Bernardino case is ideal for the FBI to establish this precedent. If they actually wanted access to the device they could have served Apple a National Security Letter and had it done on the sly. But they're taking the public route on this one because of how bad Apple would look if they refused to unlock the phone of a known terrorist. That's probably why Apple had to go out of their way in the letter to say that they don't want to aid or abet terrorists in any way (something that's fairly obvious to us).
- deleted 11y ago
  [deleted]
- nl 11y ago
  they could have served Apple a National Security Letter and had it done on the sly NSL's don't work like that. A national security letter (NSL) is an administrative subpoena issued by the United States federal government to gather information for national security purposes... By law, NSLs can request only non-content information, for example, transactional records and phone numbers dialed, but never the content of telephone calls or e-mails.[1] Apple would challenge a NSL on three grounds: 1) The subject of this investigation in this is dead. The secrecy requirements are unrequired. 2) What the FBI wants here is not information, it is to force Apple to do work. That's why they've had to try the Writs act - it's a pretty unprecedented thing to try 3) The information requested is not "non-content" I'd say Apple would have a good case on any of these grounds, and the FBI knows it. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter
DanBC 11y ago
It nearly happened with Hushmail, who say they would have been forced to serve a malformed Java app in order to comply with the warrant. The fact they didn't is only because they had access to the email without needing to do that. http://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai http://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai

bitJericho 11y ago

Stallman sounds less and less crazy every year.

nickik 11y ago
Nobody ever said the danger that he was talking about are not real. However his is still a very edge position.
- fnordfnordfnord 11y ago
  RMS was openly ridiculed and scoffed at until the Snowden revelations.

nindalf 11y ago

This is precisely why I think the San Bernardino case is ideal for the FBI to establish this precedent. If they actually wanted access to the device they could have served Apple a National Security Letter and had it done on the sly. But they're taking the public route on this one because of how bad Apple would look if they refused to unlock the phone of a known terrorist. That's probably why Apple had to go out of their way in the letter to say that they don't want to aid or abet terrorists in any way (something that's fairly obvious to us).

deleted 11y ago
[deleted]
nl 11y ago
they could have served Apple a National Security Letter and had it done on the sly NSL's don't work like that. A national security letter (NSL) is an administrative subpoena issued by the United States federal government to gather information for national security purposes... By law, NSLs can request only non-content information, for example, transactional records and phone numbers dialed, but never the content of telephone calls or e-mails.[1] Apple would challenge a NSL on three grounds: 1) The subject of this investigation in this is dead. The secrecy requirements are unrequired. 2) What the FBI wants here is not information, it is to force Apple to do work. That's why they've had to try the Writs act - it's a pretty unprecedented thing to try 3) The information requested is not "non-content" I'd say Apple would have a good case on any of these grounds, and the FBI knows it. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_letter

DanBC 11y ago

It nearly happened with Hushmail, who say they would have been forced to serve a malformed Java app in order to comply with the warrant. The fact they didn't is only because they had access to the email without needing to do that. http://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai http://www.wired.com/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai