From the couple of discussions I've had with Rogers, he seems like he's too grounded and aware of the world to actually pursue weakened encryption. Plus, it wou

From the couple of discussions I've had with Rogers, he seems like he's too grounded and aware of the world to actually pursue weakened encryption. Plus, it would make the IAD half of NSA's mission almost impossible. When I've heard him speak (to mostly non-technical audiences), the systemic issues he laments are not the state of encryption, but talent drain from NSA because of falling short in fulfillment/compensation, and that US companies aren't forthcoming enough about breaches to support quick/comprehensive response. From my impressions talking to various people who've worked within these sorts of organizations, NSA's two huge problems are loose interpretations of USSID 18 (how much collateral spying/passive collect is too much?) and partnership with organizations to whom USSID 18 does not apply.