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Jan Koum is a WhatsApp co-founder. WhatsApp is notable, I think, in this debate specifically because WhatsApp partnered with Moxie's Open Whisper Systems for en

by gry 11y ago

Jan Koum is a WhatsApp co-founder. WhatsApp is notable, I think, in this debate specifically because WhatsApp partnered with Moxie's Open Whisper Systems for end-to-end encryption. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8624212 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8624212

unfunco 11y ago
WhatsApp is still closed-source though, and I'm unsure as to the veracity of the claim of end-to-end encryption, I sure hope that's the case. In the Panorama documentary about Edward Snowden on the BBC, when discussing the death of Lee Rigby, a representative of Facebook says they're capable of decrypting messages (whether that applies to WhatsApp or just Facebook messenger is not clarified.) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjVxqlncS2I&t=46m15s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjVxqlncS2I&t=46m15s (also see 49:00+)
- envy2 11y ago
  You might be interested in this set of videos[1] of public testimony by WhatsApp's Deputy General Counsel at a hearing on cybercrime in Brazil in December 2015, where he explains in some detail the type of information they have and don't have. He explicitly notes that they are incapable of accessing message content for end-to-end encrypted messages, and also explains that they don't retain copies of any communications once they've been delivered to recipients. [1] http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-temporarias/parlamentar-de-inquerito/55a-legislatura/cpi-crimes-ciberneticos/videoArquivo?codSessao=55221&codReuniao=42467#videoTitulo http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/co...
  - davorb 11y ago
    I think that only messages sent between two android devices are encrypted using E2E. If you send a message to your mom (who uses a blackberry), the message won't be encrypted with that protocol.
    - dingo_bat 11y ago
      What about ios? And how does your device know whether to encrypt or not? It's useless talking about encryption if the code is hidden. What if tomorrow they turn off the encryption silently?
      - dc3k 11y ago
        They can turn off the encryption silently whether or not the code is hidden.
        dingo_bat 11y ago
        How so? You can compile yourself if you like.
        Ded7xSEoPKYNsDd 11y ago
        More importantly, you could change the client to show encryption status before a message is sent and add client-side key management.
        dc3k 11y ago
        Sorry, I meant for the pre-compiled versions on Google Play and the App Store. The vast, vast majority of Whatsapp users aren't going to want to or don't know how to compile the app for their phone.
  - crdoconnor 11y ago
    It's easier to say "no" to Brazil.
- chc 11y ago
  If they're partnered with Open Whisper Systems, it sounds like they're serious about end-to-end encryption.
  - dijit 11y ago
    They still keep a copy of all client encryption keys. :\
    - mike_hearn 11y ago
      They have to. A phone number is not a key, so there's no way to avoid that. However I've seen leaked screenshots that suggest at least the Android client is getting the ability to see what the keys are and pin them. Hence, TOFU encryption. It's about the best you can do in a consumer product.
venomsnake 11y ago
Last time I checked whats app didn't require any kind of OOB key exchange, or ability to set your own password. So any claims about having end to end encryption are misleading.
- simoncion 11y ago
  > Last time I checked whats app didn't require any kind of OOB key exchange, or ability to set your own password. Neither does Signal/TextSecure. Signal most definitely has E2E encryption. However, when your primary device is wiped (or changed)[0] your Signal crypto keys are changed and your conversation partners are alerted to this fact. Do you know what happens when the same thing happens to a WhatsApp user? (I don't. :( ) [0] Or -yanno- one just clears all Signal app data
  - venomsnake 11y ago
    If someone generates the keys, same someone can decrypt. You cannot establish secure connection without someone's trusted server. By that definition same server could MITM you.
    - simoncion 11y ago
      > If someone generates the keys, same someone can decrypt. You cannot establish secure connection without someone's trusted server. By that definition same server could MITM you. Every word in your first and third sentences are true. As written, your second sentence is iffy at best. [0][1] However, the situation that those sentences describes does not apply to end-to-end encryption in Signal. Signal's crypto keys are generated on the end-user's device and never leave that device. Signal neither requires OOB key exchange, nor does it require that you set a password to encrypt Signal data while on disk. Because Signal has the same properties that you claim are indicators of a lack of E2E encryption, but actually is E2E encrypted, it's clear that these properties are not proof positive of a lack of E2E encryption. So, I reword my previous question, which you failed to address: What happens when a WhatsApp user gets a new phone, wipes his existing phone, or simply clears all locally stored WhatsApp app data? Does he get a new set of crypto keys, and are his conversation partners alerted of this fact as happens in Signal? I ask because I don't use WhatsApp and don't know the answer to the question. [0] Consider Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This is a method whereby two parties who wish to communicate securely over a hostile channel can do so without divulging any key material to eavesdroppers listening in on the exchange. [1] To address the possibility that you're talking about key verification, rather than secure peer-to-peer session creation: if you like, Signal will show you the fingerprint of your encryption key. You can use that fingerprint to perform any OOB key verification that you want.

by gry 11y ago

unfunco 11y ago

WhatsApp is still closed-source though, and I'm unsure as to the veracity of the claim of end-to-end encryption, I sure hope that's the case. In the Panorama documentary about Edward Snowden on the BBC, when discussing the death of Lee Rigby, a representative of Facebook says they're capable of decrypting messages (whether that applies to WhatsApp or just Facebook messenger is not clarified.) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjVxqlncS2I&t=46m15s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjVxqlncS2I&t=46m15s (also see 49:00+)

envy2 11y ago
You might be interested in this set of videos[1] of public testimony by WhatsApp's Deputy General Counsel at a hearing on cybercrime in Brazil in December 2015, where he explains in some detail the type of information they have and don't have. He explicitly notes that they are incapable of accessing message content for end-to-end encrypted messages, and also explains that they don't retain copies of any communications once they've been delivered to recipients. [1] http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-temporarias/parlamentar-de-inquerito/55a-legislatura/cpi-crimes-ciberneticos/videoArquivo?codSessao=55221&codReuniao=42467#videoTitulo http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/co...
- davorb 11y ago
  I think that only messages sent between two android devices are encrypted using E2E. If you send a message to your mom (who uses a blackberry), the message won't be encrypted with that protocol.
  - dingo_bat 11y ago
    What about ios? And how does your device know whether to encrypt or not? It's useless talking about encryption if the code is hidden. What if tomorrow they turn off the encryption silently?
    - dc3k 11y ago
      They can turn off the encryption silently whether or not the code is hidden.
      - dingo_bat 11y ago
        How so? You can compile yourself if you like.
        Ded7xSEoPKYNsDd 11y ago
        More importantly, you could change the client to show encryption status before a message is sent and add client-side key management.
        dc3k 11y ago
        Sorry, I meant for the pre-compiled versions on Google Play and the App Store. The vast, vast majority of Whatsapp users aren't going to want to or don't know how to compile the app for their phone.
- crdoconnor 11y ago
  It's easier to say "no" to Brazil.
chc 11y ago
If they're partnered with Open Whisper Systems, it sounds like they're serious about end-to-end encryption.
- dijit 11y ago
  They still keep a copy of all client encryption keys. :\
  - mike_hearn 11y ago
    They have to. A phone number is not a key, so there's no way to avoid that. However I've seen leaked screenshots that suggest at least the Android client is getting the ability to see what the keys are and pin them. Hence, TOFU encryption. It's about the best you can do in a consumer product.

venomsnake 11y ago

Last time I checked whats app didn't require any kind of OOB key exchange, or ability to set your own password. So any claims about having end to end encryption are misleading.

simoncion 11y ago
> Last time I checked whats app didn't require any kind of OOB key exchange, or ability to set your own password. Neither does Signal/TextSecure. Signal most definitely has E2E encryption. However, when your primary device is wiped (or changed)[0] your Signal crypto keys are changed and your conversation partners are alerted to this fact. Do you know what happens when the same thing happens to a WhatsApp user? (I don't. :( ) [0] Or -yanno- one just clears all Signal app data
- venomsnake 11y ago
  If someone generates the keys, same someone can decrypt. You cannot establish secure connection without someone's trusted server. By that definition same server could MITM you.
  - simoncion 11y ago
    > If someone generates the keys, same someone can decrypt. You cannot establish secure connection without someone's trusted server. By that definition same server could MITM you. Every word in your first and third sentences are true. As written, your second sentence is iffy at best. [0][1] However, the situation that those sentences describes does not apply to end-to-end encryption in Signal. Signal's crypto keys are generated on the end-user's device and never leave that device. Signal neither requires OOB key exchange, nor does it require that you set a password to encrypt Signal data while on disk. Because Signal has the same properties that you claim are indicators of a lack of E2E encryption, but actually is E2E encrypted, it's clear that these properties are not proof positive of a lack of E2E encryption. So, I reword my previous question, which you failed to address: What happens when a WhatsApp user gets a new phone, wipes his existing phone, or simply clears all locally stored WhatsApp app data? Does he get a new set of crypto keys, and are his conversation partners alerted of this fact as happens in Signal? I ask because I don't use WhatsApp and don't know the answer to the question. [0] Consider Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This is a method whereby two parties who wish to communicate securely over a hostile channel can do so without divulging any key material to eavesdroppers listening in on the exchange. [1] To address the possibility that you're talking about key verification, rather than secure peer-to-peer session creation: if you like, Signal will show you the fingerprint of your encryption key. You can use that fingerprint to perform any OOB key verification that you want.