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They don't even have to do that. They wrote the OS, they have the signing key for OS updates. All they need to do is push an update to the device with a backd
by ajross 11y ago
They don't even have to do that. They wrote the OS, they have the signing key for OS updates. All they need to do is push an update to the device with a backdoor that allows reading off the unencrypted contents post-boot (possibly with the addition of a judicially compelled fingerprint scan or PIN brute force to get the encryption key out of whatever on-device escrow it's stored in).
The only way to secure the device against that would be to have the users manually memorize and key in a complete 128 bit encryption key, which they could then refuse to provide.
I think we tech folks were fooling ourselves with the idea that Apple had somehow delivered a "snoop-proof" device. They really didn't (no one can!) as long as they're subject to government or judicial control.
- d_theorist 11y agoThis is not really true. The secure enclave is a separate computer. It doesn't get software updates. > possibly with the addition of a judicially compelled fingerprint scan or PIN brute force to get the encryption key out of whatever on-device escrow it's stored in This is the whole problem. The keys are in the SE. You can't brute force the PIN because the SE rate-limits attempts (and that rate limiting cannot be overridden by an OS update because the SE is not run by the OS). If you can get a fingerprint scan then all bets are obviously off, but then you don't need Apple at all.
- ajross 11y agoIs that really true? The enclave's firmware is in ROM and non-upgradeable? I'd always assumed it got a signed blob like everything else does. Obviously it's possible to design a system like that, I just haven't seen it reported anywhere that it actually works like that. Edit just to be clear: the requirement really is that the firmware be stored in a ROM somewhere, probably on the SoC. That's a lot of die space (code storing a fully crypto engine isn't small) to dedicate to this feature. Almost certainly what they did is put a bootstrap security engine in place that can validate external code loaded from storage. And if they did, that code can be swapped by the owner of the validation keys at will, breaking the security metaphor in question.
- d_theorist 11y agoI'm not claiming it is in ROM or that it is not upgradeable if you are Apple and have physical access to the device. I'm not sure on that point. What I think must be the case is that Apple can't remotely upgrade the SE firmware as part of its iOS update mechanism. Although, to be perfectly honest, I have not seen this explicitly documented.
- ajross 11y agoSo... it sounds like you more or less agree with me. Apple can comply with this court order and open your secure device. We just differ as to whether they can do it over the air. (FWIW: OTA firmware updates are routine in the industry. I've worked on such systems professionally, though not for Apple.)
- hannibalhorn 11y agoAccording to a former apple engineer that worked on this stuff, the enclave's firmware is indeed a signed blob: https://twitter.com/JohnHedge/status/699882614212075520 https://twitter.com/JohnHedge/status/699882614212075520 The key thing would be for it to lose all stored keys on update when the current passphase has not been provided, and it sounds like that may not currently be the case. Maybe in this case, Apple could comply, but a simple tweak would make it impossible in the future?
- ajross 11y agoBut "on update" isn't really the issue. If the code can be swapped underneath it, how does it know an "update" took place? Again you're in the situation where all of that process would have to be managed by hardware, when what is really happening is that the enclave is a computer running signed software that can be replaced.
- andromeduck 11y agoHaving the hardware require both the signature to pass as well as a valid PIN/fingerprint can't be that difficult. Die space is cheap nowadays, especially stuff that doesn't need to be on all the time because of the death of Dennard scaling.
- zabuni 11y agoThe device in question does not have a secure enclave. It's a 5c.
- d_theorist 11y agoBut it's more interesting to think about the case where the phone does have a secure enclave.
- conradev 11y agoand yet it would be less interesting to consider if the password was a "six-character alphanumeric passcode with lowercase letters and numbers" because even if the software rate-limiting was disabled with a rogue firmware update, the PBKDF2 or similar iteration count makes brute-forcing impractical. > A large iteration count is used to make each attempt slower. The iteration count is calibrated so that one attempt takes approximately 80 milliseconds. This means it would take more than 51⁄2 years to try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode with lowercase letters and numbers (Page 12 of https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf).
- bluesaunders 11y agoIn that case, they could just bring the phone down to the morgue and unlock it with touch id.
- dntrkv 11y agoFingerprint scan really isn't enough though since after a restart, iPhones require the password to be entered.
- mentat 11y agoBecause fingerprints are not sufficient to generate / recover KEKs from.
- eridius 11y agoHow can they simply "push an update"? I've never seen iOS auto-update without first prompting the user, which I'm assuming is a very intentional limitation.