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> They don't overly care about access to this particular iPhone. They're taking this case through the courts so that they can establish a precedent that allows

> They don't overly care about access to this particular iPhone. They're taking this case through the courts so that they can establish a precedent that allows them to force manufacturer cooperation to unlock any phone. This is an analysis, not an objective and demonstrable fact. I could just as well argue that yes, the FBI really does care a lot about this particular iPhone, and that's why the asked-for update is to be keyed to this iPhone and only this iPhone. At the same time, even assuming that is true, we're talking about the FBI going through a legal process, reviewed by a judge, to get the data off one phone at a time. If that's how it works every time, I don't see a problem; that is how the system is supposed to work. I am kind of baffled as to why we're cheerleading the fact that Apple is refusing to perform what appears to be a perfectly reasonable request that is being made in accordance with the law. If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems. Also, apparently this 'precedent' has already been set; according to a link in the article, Apple had previously offered custom firmware images to law enforcement after a court order that bypassed the lock screen on earlier iPhones. http://www.cnet.com/news/how-apple-and-google-help-police-bypass-iphone-android-lock-screens/ http://www.cnet.com/news/how-apple-and-google-help-police-by...

chishaku 11y ago
> This is an analysis, not an objective and demonstrable fact. No. You don't have to assume that law enforcement or intelligence agencies are bad faith actors to see they are constantly seeking to expand their powers. http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/235910-fbis-hacking-request-gets-initial-approval http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/235910-fbis-hacking-... https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fbi-using-drones-2006-20130926-story.html http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fbi-using-d... https://epic.org/foia/fbi/lpr/ https://epic.org/foia/fbi/lpr/
- themartorana 11y ago
  Also we don't have to assume it because we know it for a fact - they are bad faith actors.
- scott_s 11y ago
  Amezarak is not (necessarily) assuming they are bad faith actors. Amezarak is pointing out, I think correctly, that the parent poster is inferring intent of an organization from its actions. Without specific documents from that organization spelling out that intent, I agree that such inference is analysis and not fact. It may be reasonable or even probable analysis, but that does not make it fact.
settsu 11y ago
> If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems. It needn't be "always", just (perceived as) too often. It seems fair to say the broad sentiment is that the national security arms of U.S. government have broached that barrier.
rconti 11y ago
Every comment I've read so far has said that Apple should help in this instance, so I don't see the cheerleading-- yet. Except now I may provide it. I just read Apple's letter to customers, and now I agree with them that the very creation of backdoor software -- even if it's only meant to help in specific instances -- is a dangerous thing. Applying specialized knowledge that Apple has about iOS and iPhones, plus Apple's engineers, to creating an innovative backdoor that does not exist today, means that it can never be un-designed. It will never have fewer people aware of it, unless you kill them after they create the software. The knowledge will only spread. The software can only leak. The engineers can only get conveniently hired by a competitor or foreign government or our own government. I agree, it is troubling.
- sliverstorm 11y ago
  The knowledge will only spread. The software can only leak. Then why don't we have Apple's private keys yet? Plenty of companies keep a lot of things very secret, including things like powerful debug modes, for a long time. At least long enough that everybody forgets the details and the software has long since rotted away.
  - dottedmag 11y ago
    Because it's Apple who keeps them, not FBI. Nobody in FBI would give a damn about leaking the patched OS image: it's Apple's reputation on stake, not FBI's.
    - pilif 11y ago
      But. The FBI doesn't want the keys in this case. They not even want a build that works for on any phone but the one in question. There is nothing of value for the FBI to leak. This is the huge difference between this order (which I can live with) and blanket encryption backdoors using key escrow or other crap (which I'm absolutely vehemently against and willing to fight to the teeth)
      - st3v3r 11y ago
oxymoron 11y ago
US law enforcement has an impressive track record of extending their authority through unilateral reinterpretation of the US code. Once it's been established that Apple are able to extract data, what's to prevent agencies from slapping Apple with gag orders and forcing them to comply under completely opaque proceedings, that may not even have a way of appeal? I think Apple is right in resisting while it's still in the open. For all we now, this might really be about forcing them to demonstrate the technical capability to cooperate for use with in one or several secret cases we do not now.
rfrank 11y ago
> If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems. Given what we know about government surveillance programs, why would one assume the government is a good faith actor when it comes to encryption?
gozur88 11y ago
>At the same time, even assuming that is true, we're talking about the FBI going through a legal process, reviewed by a judge, to get the data off one phone at a time. If that's how it works every time, I don't see a problem... And how will we ensure that's the case? Once they have the firmware they need they can install it on other phones.

chishaku 11y ago

> This is an analysis, not an objective and demonstrable fact. No. You don't have to assume that law enforcement or intelligence agencies are bad faith actors to see they are constantly seeking to expand their powers. http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/235910-fbis-hacking-request-gets-initial-approval http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/235910-fbis-hacking-... https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fbi-using-drones-2006-20130926-story.html http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-fbi-using-d... https://epic.org/foia/fbi/lpr/ https://epic.org/foia/fbi/lpr/

themartorana 11y ago
Also we don't have to assume it because we know it for a fact - they are bad faith actors.
scott_s 11y ago
Amezarak is not (necessarily) assuming they are bad faith actors. Amezarak is pointing out, I think correctly, that the parent poster is inferring intent of an organization from its actions. Without specific documents from that organization spelling out that intent, I agree that such inference is analysis and not fact. It may be reasonable or even probable analysis, but that does not make it fact.

settsu 11y ago

> If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems. It needn't be "always", just (perceived as) too often. It seems fair to say the broad sentiment is that the national security arms of U.S. government have broached that barrier.

rconti 11y ago

Every comment I've read so far has said that Apple should help in this instance, so I don't see the cheerleading-- yet. Except now I may provide it. I just read Apple's letter to customers, and now I agree with them that the very creation of backdoor software -- even if it's only meant to help in specific instances -- is a dangerous thing. Applying specialized knowledge that Apple has about iOS and iPhones, plus Apple's engineers, to creating an innovative backdoor that does not exist today, means that it can never be un-designed. It will never have fewer people aware of it, unless you kill them after they create the software. The knowledge will only spread. The software can only leak. The engineers can only get conveniently hired by a competitor or foreign government or our own government. I agree, it is troubling.

sliverstorm 11y ago
The knowledge will only spread. The software can only leak. Then why don't we have Apple's private keys yet? Plenty of companies keep a lot of things very secret, including things like powerful debug modes, for a long time. At least long enough that everybody forgets the details and the software has long since rotted away.
- dottedmag 11y ago
  Because it's Apple who keeps them, not FBI. Nobody in FBI would give a damn about leaking the patched OS image: it's Apple's reputation on stake, not FBI's.
  - pilif 11y ago
    But. The FBI doesn't want the keys in this case. They not even want a build that works for on any phone but the one in question. There is nothing of value for the FBI to leak. This is the huge difference between this order (which I can live with) and blanket encryption backdoors using key escrow or other crap (which I'm absolutely vehemently against and willing to fight to the teeth)
    - st3v3r 11y ago

oxymoron 11y ago

US law enforcement has an impressive track record of extending their authority through unilateral reinterpretation of the US code. Once it's been established that Apple are able to extract data, what's to prevent agencies from slapping Apple with gag orders and forcing them to comply under completely opaque proceedings, that may not even have a way of appeal? I think Apple is right in resisting while it's still in the open. For all we now, this might really be about forcing them to demonstrate the technical capability to cooperate for use with in one or several secret cases we do not now.

rfrank 11y ago

> If you are operating under the presumption that the government is always a bad-faith actor, then we have much, much bigger problems. Given what we know about government surveillance programs, why would one assume the government is a good faith actor when it comes to encryption?

gozur88 11y ago

>At the same time, even assuming that is true, we're talking about the FBI going through a legal process, reviewed by a judge, to get the data off one phone at a time. If that's how it works every time, I don't see a problem... And how will we ensure that's the case? Once they have the firmware they need they can install it on other phones.