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I'm afraid I'm too skeptical to get the same assurances as you. Apple accuses the FBI of playing language games with the term "backdoor", but I think Apple has
by threatofrain 11y ago
I'm afraid I'm too skeptical to get the same assurances as you.
Apple accuses the FBI of playing language games with the term "backdoor", but I think Apple has done the same. The fact that they can push weak OS updates to a locked phone is the backdoor. This means that they can already comply with the court order, and they likely will. This letter covers them from PR damage.
- hardlianotion 11y agoThis is not apparent from the article. Where could I find out about this ability?
- forgotpwtomain 11y agoIf such an ability doesn't exist than how does this potential threat follow? (article) > But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. I am also missing a key part of the technical details involved in this this situation.
- em3rgent0rdr 11y agoFreedom from forced update is one of Stallman's motivations for free software. Just one terrorist attack + PR letter to customer + forced update away from loosing encryption on your phone.
- kec 11y agoOn the other hand, if iOS were open source / the iPhone was able to run unsigned code there would be nothing stopping the FBI from just doing what they've asked apple to do themselves (assuming it's actually technically possible).
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- cmurf 11y agoOpen source doesn't preclude securing the boot chain. TianoCore implements UEFI Secure Boot, and it's BSD licensed. I think the bigger issue is the (unreasonably) low trust in things like secure elements and TPMs in open source, but that needs to change, and is rapidly off topic. More on topic is whether Apple or even Google get out from under this if their on disk encryption mechanism is open source. If everyone owns e.g. LUKS (in a sense no one company owns/controls it) then can any one company be burdened by a court to effectively break everyone else's software by being told to create a backdoor?
- jameshart 11y agoIn that case the FBI don't get a warrant and compel a company to comply, they put out an RFP and pay a contract company to comply.
- ascorbic 11y agoThis isn't the case with the newer devices though, where the delays and key destruction are enforced in hardware, and tampering would destroy the key.
- niersi 11y agoI'd also like to point out that Apple has a record of not practicing cautiously to security exposure, like _the inclusion of CNNIC root certificate despite the public exposure of security breach_. http://apple.slashdot.org/story/15/04/09/1531237/apple-leaves-chinese-cnnic-root-in-os-x-and-ios-trusted-stores http://apple.slashdot.org/story/15/04/09/1531237/apple-leave...
- taneq 11y ago>The fact that they can push weak OS updates to a locked phone is the backdoor. This times nine hundred and eleven thousand.
- pweissbrod 11y ago+1. If it is possible to push software updates to a "locked" phone then is this not tantamount to remote code execution with root privileges, and hence the BACKDOOR ALREADY EXISTS? "Locked" seems like an improper term for such a scenario. I applaud apple for appealing this case to the public however there is a HUGE HUGE difference between "we can't unlock" and "we shouldn't unlock". This distinction will likely be lost on the general public unfortunately.
- rhaps0dy 11y agoYou probably meant "this is tantamount". Otherwise, I don't understand what you're saying. Are you claiming the backdoor already exists, or that it does not?
- gnoway 11y agoParent was asking a question, "is this not tantamount to x?" With the expected answer being "no, this is not not tantamount to x" which reduces to "yes, this is tantamount to x." In this case, the intended answer/conclusion/implication is "yes, this is."
- germanier 11y agoNowhere in this letter they say that it's possible and it seems very carefully worded to avoid stating that. They say, if it were possible they wouldn't do it anyway. That's an important legal and moral distinction. To be fair, they could have stated it explicitly.
- hasenj 11y agoIt's stated very clearly that they can push an update to an already existing device that would make it possible to retrieve "encrypted" data from said device. If the data was truly encrypted, the concept of pushing an update or creating a master key would not be possible.
- germanier 11y ago
- makecheck 11y agoIt may be that only the 5C or older devices have the ability to push a custom OS update to a locked device. The real problem is that you don’t want to set any precedent at all. Once it’s possible to do something for the 5C, weasel words can be introduced to make claims like “well: now you must maintain the current level of access by law enforcement”. Next thing you know, that excuse can be used to interfere with all future hardware designs.
- MCRed 11y agoAnd my understanding is that everything after the 5C is less vulnerable to even this attack (Which itself may not be possible, even with a firmware update.)
- efaref 11y agoFrom what I heard later revisions won't accept a firmware update without either providing the passcode, or erasing the private key. Arguably, the fact that the 5C accepts a firmware update without the passcode is a security vulnerability and ought to be patched.
- leonatan 11y agoThe hardware required for enforcing this is not found on 5C or older devices.
- sametmax 11y agoExactly. Plus, all backups of the iphones on icloud are already unencrypted, so half of the phones are already indirectly unlocked. EDIT: backups are encrypted, but apple have the keys. See below.
- kimolas 11y agoiCloud backups are 100% encrypted. Only some iTunes backups are not, and only if the option to use encryption to protect the backup is not selected.
- sametmax 11y agoThey are, but apple have the keys : https://thehackernews.com/2016/01/apple-icloud-imessages.html https://thehackernews.com/2016/01/apple-icloud-imessages.htm... So basically, they could be in clear text, it's pretty much the same.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- niij 11y agoPlease see this link[1], Apple explains exactly how keys are stored in their datacenters (Hint: it is not in clear text). They use HSM's which destroy the user's key after 10 failed attempts. [1]: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
- snuxoll 11y agoThis is only for Keychain escrow, device backups are not protected by HSM's.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- coderjames 11y agoI'm not sure you can draw the conclusion that Apple can push OS updates to a locked phone. What Tim Cook wrote is that > "install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation." > "the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession." So the FBI has the physical phone already. They can deliver to Apple who can disassemble it and either use a JTAG/Flash programmer on an internal connector to manually write new software, or they could desolder the Flash holding the old OS and place a new one. Both of these techniques are common enough in the embedded industry that I expect this is what Apple means. They probably can't push an OTA software update and force the install on a locked device.
- mehrdada 11y agoThey need to break the boot trust chain to load unsigned code. Simply rewriting the flash isn't enough.
- DSingularity 11y agoHence the need for a validbOS from Apple.
- Someone1234 11y agoWhy would the code be unsigned? If Apple wrote the backdoor OS, they could presumably sign it.
- mehrdada 11y agoI incorrectly totally misread the OP and thought was talking about FBI flashing it themselves, without Apple help. Yes, of course Apple can sign it. I stand corrected but can't delete my comment. To clarify, I agree that nothing they ask of Apple is technically impossible or even that difficult for Apple to pull off, probably via simple DFU without touching the flash at all.
- knodi123 11y agowhy load unsigned code? can't apple sign it?
- intrasight 11y agoI'm afraid that I have to agree with you here. But Apple (and the FBI) recognize that this is the first salvo in a battle that will rage for MANY years. These early skirmishes could dis-proportionally affect the outcome - hence the ensuing PR battle.
- eric_h 11y agoI found this article about this [1] to be rather enlightening. 1) http://blog.trailofbits.com/2016/02/17/apple-can-comply-with-the-fbi-court-order/ http://blog.trailofbits.com/2016/02/17/apple-can-comply-with...
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- blazespin 11y agoIt's not just PR. It's actually really hurting their company. Weaker security means less data can be stored on the iPhone which means less need for it, which means fewer sales.
- digler999 11y agoThank you for answering one of my questions: "Why does a multi-billion-dollar company give one lick about personal freedom ?". Companies exist to make money, not to protect our rights. It even crossed my mind that the possibility that NSA et. al. rooted these devices long ago, and that this whole "debate" is just a staged thing to make it appear as though we had any privacy and feigned adherence to the democratic process. But your point that, as a matter of policy, many organizations will simply not use the product if they know it has backdoors, relates it back to their capitalist motivation and makes any conspiracy less likely.
- mineshaftgap 11y agoApple has to be bad, it just has to. It is part of my identity to believe that.
- Nutmog 11y agoI thought the same thing when I read it. If Apple can do this, then it's already a backdoor, and all the publicity of "Even Apple can't hack your phone" was false. But it turns out this is an older 5C, not the new 5S and up. So those old phones were effectively backdoored. I agree that Tim Cook has spun it as if it's not a backdoor when clearly it is. Still quite a hard-to-use one though. It seems like they need the physical phone and maybe Apple's private key for signing updates. The idea that the act of writing software makes it insecure is silly though. The security doesn't come from no-one having made the appropriate changes to iOS. If it was, that would be security through obscurity and any motivated hacker or the FBI could modify iOS themselves. It must be about signing the update so that it can actually be installed.