4 ms·
As far as I'm aware, the most proper attacks here are, in order of cost: 0) Find some errata. Apple presumably knows as much as anyone except NSA. Have plaus
by rdl 11y ago
As far as I'm aware, the most proper attacks here are, in order of cost:
0) Find some errata. Apple presumably knows as much as anyone except NSA. Have plausible deniability/parallel construction.
1) OS level issues, glitching, etc. if the device is powered on (likely not the case). Power stuff seems like a particularly profitable attack on these devices.
2) Get Apple, using their special Apple key, to run a special ramdisk to run "decrypt" without the "10 tries" limit. Still limited by the ~80ms compute time in hardware for each try.
(vs. an iPhone 5S/6/6S with the Secure Enclave:)
3) Using fairly standard hardware QA/test things (at least chip-level shops; there are tens/hundreds in the world who can do this), extract the hardware key. Run a massively parallel cluster to brute force a bunch of passphrases and this hw key, in parallel. I'd bet the jihadizen is using a shortish weak passphrase, but we can do 8-10 character passphrases, too. They may have info about his other passphrases from other sources which could be useful.
While I'm morally against the existence of #3, I'm enough of a horrible person, as well as interested in the technical challenge of #3, that I'd be willing to do it for $25mm, as long as I got to do it openly and retained ownership. In secret one-off, $100mm. I'd then spend most of the profits on building a system which I couldn't break in this way.