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Publicizing the case themselves in a very good move. However, the iPhone of the attacker is an iPhone 5C, which does not have Touch ID or a Secure Enclave. Thi
by Artemis2 11y ago
Publicizing the case themselves in a very good move.
However, the iPhone of the attacker is an iPhone 5C, which does not have Touch ID or a Secure Enclave. This means that the time between passcode unlock attempts is not enforced by the cryptographic coprocessor. More generally, there's no software integrity protection, and the encryption key is relatively weak (since it is only based on the user's passcode).
The amount of work needed to turn security into good user experience is phenomenal: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
- joeblau 11y agoYou can still enable full disk wipe after 10 failed password attempts[1]. That was available in iOS 7 I believe (but someone on here will correct me if I'm wrong). [1] - http://i2.wp.com/ioshacker.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Passcode-lock-erase-data.jpg http://i2.wp.com/ioshacker.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Pa...
- madeofpalk 11y agoIt's been available for quite a while, long before iOS 7. It was at least available in iOS 5, probably available before that.
- lern_too_spel 11y agoThe FBI's point is that Apple can update the software on the device to not honor that setting, which means it is not effective against a government attacker.
- heartbreak 11y agoAnd to think, just two weeks ago that same enforcement which prevents compromising the secure enclave was the target of vitriol right here on HN (Error 53).