4 ms·

The fact that they can create this backdoor, doesn't that mean it already exists? What Apple needs to do then instead of writing this letter, is release an upd

The fact that they can create this backdoor, doesn't that mean it already exists? What Apple needs to do then instead of writing this letter, is release an update that closes this backdoor.

SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago
> The fact that they can create this backdoor, doesn't that mean it already exists? Quite likely. As I posted on the other discussion here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11116343 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11116343 > If it's possible to make such a "backdoored" build of iOS, then there are state actors who will be throwing $Millions at doing it already, with or without any willing help from Apple.
- danieldk 11y ago
  The security here is Apple's signing key that is used to sign updates. If you believe RSA is safe (which I assume is being used) and the key has a reasonable length, throwing a couple of millions at it won't bring you much. I guess what the FBI wants is a backdoored iOS version and to have Apple sign it with their signing key (which means that the FBI can use it over and over again).
  - SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago
    That is hard, we know. But it is not impossible for those with time, resources and willingness to think outside the box. For instance, signing keys can and have been stolen, on the principle of "if you can't brute-force it, hack in and take it". http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/02/cooks-steal-security-firms-crypto-key-use-it-to-sign-malware/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/02/cooks-steal-security... http://blogs.adobe.com/security/2012/09/inappropriate-use-of-adobe-code-signing-certificate.html http://blogs.adobe.com/security/2012/09/inappropriate-use-of... http://www.androidauthority.com/ssl-added-removed-google-mocks-nsa-crypto-code-easter-egg-390162/ http://www.androidauthority.com/ssl-added-removed-google-moc... http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/02/its-legal-for-gchq-to-break-into-computers-and-install-spyware-tribunal-rules/ http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/02/its-legal-for-g...
    - danieldk 11y ago
      That is hard, we know. But it is not impossible for those with time, resources and willingness to think outside the box. I assume that Apple has a hardware security module for key generation and storage, perhaps even custom-designed and built, to prevent key extraction/copying. Of course, in the end you have to trust Apple that only a limited number of employees have access to such hardware, that they have proper auditing procedures, etc. But the probability of a compromise can never be 0, unless you design and produce your hardware yourself, write all code that this hardware runs yourself, and never leave your computing device unattended. Since that is not practical for most people, you have to put trust in some third party.
      - SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago
        If there's one thing that we have learned over the last few years from Snowden et al, we have learned that it is safe to assume that these state actors will be trying all the avenues that you or I can think of, and spend years discovering new ones that we have not thought of.
        danieldk 11y ago
        I have trouble understanding your point. What's the alternative to trying to minimize the probability of crypto system compromises?
        SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago
        That is worth doing; but I still find it quite likely that such a backdoor is existent or doable.
        SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago
        You make a good case that Apple are far ahead as industry leaders here; that seems solid. It's less solid that this means they are impervious, or that the thinking "I can't see any holes in this process, therefore there are no holes in it" is sound.
deleted 11y ago
[deleted]
- rosser 11y ago
  So what would you call it, a back gate? It still loosens the extant security measures, facilitating compromise. That's pretty backdoor-y in my book.
- tomp 11y ago
  It's reducing the complexity of decryption (from O(∞) to O(2^n)), so it's clearly a backdoor.
- Trundle 11y ago
  I don't have an iPhone so correct me if I'm remembering correctly but aren't they by default protected by a 4 digit numeric pin? A 4 digit numeric pin that a brute force attack can be used on is effectively no security/a backdoor imo.
  - mynameisvlad 11y ago
    I believe the default on new installs is now 6, but options for a more complex PIN, either numeric or straight up alphanumeric, are available.
  - RobJDavey 11y ago
    There are escalating time limits on incorrect PIN attempts, which is also enforced in hardware by the Secure Enclave in A7 chips and above. This would mean even breaking a 4-digit pin code without that delay being removed would take a long time. Additionally the device may be set to wipe after 10 incorrect attempts. Attempts | Delay 1-4: none 5: 1 minute 6: 5 minutes 7-8: 15 minutes 9: 1 hour Source: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
    - andreyvit 11y ago
      Secure Enclave is _not_ hardware; despite being isolated from the main OS and CPU, it is still software-based and accepts software updates signed by Apple.
HappyTypist 11y ago
The letter describes it: "The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a modern computer."
tomaskafka 11y ago
This. Is Cook's letter an apology for what they already had to do (but could tell no one about)?

The fact that they can create this backdoor, doesn't that mean it already exists? What Apple needs to do then instead of writing this letter, is release an update that closes this backdoor.

SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago

> The fact that they can create this backdoor, doesn't that mean it already exists? Quite likely. As I posted on the other discussion here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11116343 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11116343 > If it's possible to make such a "backdoored" build of iOS, then there are state actors who will be throwing $Millions at doing it already, with or without any willing help from Apple.

danieldk 11y ago
The security here is Apple's signing key that is used to sign updates. If you believe RSA is safe (which I assume is being used) and the key has a reasonable length, throwing a couple of millions at it won't bring you much. I guess what the FBI wants is a backdoored iOS version and to have Apple sign it with their signing key (which means that the FBI can use it over and over again).
- SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago
  That is hard, we know. But it is not impossible for those with time, resources and willingness to think outside the box. For instance, signing keys can and have been stolen, on the principle of "if you can't brute-force it, hack in and take it". http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/02/cooks-steal-security-firms-crypto-key-use-it-to-sign-malware/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/02/cooks-steal-security... http://blogs.adobe.com/security/2012/09/inappropriate-use-of-adobe-code-signing-certificate.html http://blogs.adobe.com/security/2012/09/inappropriate-use-of... http://www.androidauthority.com/ssl-added-removed-google-mocks-nsa-crypto-code-easter-egg-390162/ http://www.androidauthority.com/ssl-added-removed-google-moc... http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/02/its-legal-for-gchq-to-break-into-computers-and-install-spyware-tribunal-rules/ http://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/02/its-legal-for-g...
  - danieldk 11y ago
    That is hard, we know. But it is not impossible for those with time, resources and willingness to think outside the box. I assume that Apple has a hardware security module for key generation and storage, perhaps even custom-designed and built, to prevent key extraction/copying. Of course, in the end you have to trust Apple that only a limited number of employees have access to such hardware, that they have proper auditing procedures, etc. But the probability of a compromise can never be 0, unless you design and produce your hardware yourself, write all code that this hardware runs yourself, and never leave your computing device unattended. Since that is not practical for most people, you have to put trust in some third party.
    - SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago
      If there's one thing that we have learned over the last few years from Snowden et al, we have learned that it is safe to assume that these state actors will be trying all the avenues that you or I can think of, and spend years discovering new ones that we have not thought of.
      - danieldk 11y ago
        I have trouble understanding your point. What's the alternative to trying to minimize the probability of crypto system compromises?
        SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago
        That is worth doing; but I still find it quite likely that such a backdoor is existent or doable.
        SideburnsOfDoom 11y ago
        You make a good case that Apple are far ahead as industry leaders here; that seems solid. It's less solid that this means they are impervious, or that the thinking "I can't see any holes in this process, therefore there are no holes in it" is sound.

deleted 11y ago

[deleted]

rosser 11y ago
So what would you call it, a back gate? It still loosens the extant security measures, facilitating compromise. That's pretty backdoor-y in my book.
tomp 11y ago
It's reducing the complexity of decryption (from O(∞) to O(2^n)), so it's clearly a backdoor.
Trundle 11y ago
I don't have an iPhone so correct me if I'm remembering correctly but aren't they by default protected by a 4 digit numeric pin? A 4 digit numeric pin that a brute force attack can be used on is effectively no security/a backdoor imo.
- mynameisvlad 11y ago
  I believe the default on new installs is now 6, but options for a more complex PIN, either numeric or straight up alphanumeric, are available.
- RobJDavey 11y ago
  There are escalating time limits on incorrect PIN attempts, which is also enforced in hardware by the Secure Enclave in A7 chips and above. This would mean even breaking a 4-digit pin code without that delay being removed would take a long time. Additionally the device may be set to wipe after 10 incorrect attempts. Attempts | Delay 1-4: none 5: 1 minute 6: 5 minutes 7-8: 15 minutes 9: 1 hour Source: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
  - andreyvit 11y ago
    Secure Enclave is _not_ hardware; despite being isolated from the main OS and CPU, it is still software-based and accepts software updates signed by Apple.

HappyTypist 11y ago

The letter describes it: "The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a modern computer."

tomaskafka 11y ago

This. Is Cook's letter an apology for what they already had to do (but could tell no one about)?