4 ms·

> voters are morons who will be swayed by easily purchased propaganda. I don't think that's the sentiment Citizens United opposition boils down to. Instead, I

> voters are morons who will be swayed by easily purchased propaganda. I don't think that's the sentiment Citizens United opposition boils down to. Instead, I think a more accurate sentiment is that easily purchased propaganda sets the tone and content of available political discourse, severely limiting what narratives and ideas reach the eyes, ears, and minds of the citizenry to only those which are best-funded. That people are then swayed to certain positions, especially when they are in opposition to people's own best interests but couched in manipulative terms that hide this fact, is not a product of people being morons, but of there being no viable alternatives in political discourse as a product of being silenced by lack of money to pose them before citizens. By allowing unlimited spending, the playing field for the hearts and minds of citizens is inherently unbalanced in the favor of moneyed interests.

SilasX 11y ago
Obviously, no one says voters are morons, they just don't recognize the implications of the assumptions that justify campaign finance law. Doesn't matter whether someone says it explicitly, or couches it in the language of being duped by "the general tone of the discussion". You're still saying that most people aren't qualified to rationally process ideas because of the biases that propaganda exploits. And you'd be correct! But wealthy donors aren't the only ones who can propagandize. To truly guide policy from the implications of the above, you need far reaching reform, like sortition or (heaven forbid) a strongly restricted franchise.
- dragonwriter 11y ago
  > You're still saying that most people aren't qualified to rationally process ideas because of the biases that propaganda exploits. No, actually, I think the one of the major points made by proponents of campaign finance laws is that wild imbalances in spending prevents less well-funded ideas from being heard at all, and that, while people may be perfectly well equipped to process ideas that they are exposed to, they can't process ideas that are completely drowned out of discussion. You don't need to assume that voters are morons to justify campaign spending limits.
  - SilasX 11y ago
    You do -- if people really are rationally processing ideas, then, so long as someone is exposed to good, not-socially-destructive ideas, they will propagate more successfully than those that aren't. Again, that assumption has a lot of far reaching implications that aren't appreciated. In fairness, there's some wiggle room between ideal rational agent and moron, but not that allows money to turn bad ideas into ones accepted by people whom we consider qualified to vote. Or do we really consider them qualified?
    - dragonwriter 11y ago
      > You do -- if people really are rationally processing ideas, then, so long as someone is exposed to good, not-socially-destructive ideas, they will propagate more successfully than those that aren't. Actually, expending effort to propagate even subjectively good political ideas (that is, ideas that would benefit the person involved if they were widely held) is usually irrational for most people, because the expected marginal utility is low compared to the cost to spread them. Its useful to the individual if other people spread the ideas, but its often a classic tragedy of the common situation. Now, for wealthy people (or people with otherwise disproportionate media reach and impact), the utility cost of propagating useful ideas to those who might be receptive is lower compared to the benefit, so its more likely to be rational to do it. Further, with unconstrained spending, the spending of the rich bids up the market cost of reach for ideas, making it less rational for the less rich to expend resources propagating the ideas they favor. You are invoking rationality, but doing so with an argument that ignores market conditions, opportunity costs, and relative payoffs. (Also, rational agents -- by the definition of rationality -- don't act on the social consequences of options, but on their personal costs and benefits.)
      - SilasX 11y ago
        >Its useful to the individual if other people spread the ideas, but its often a classic tragedy of the common situation. Not at all -- tragedy-of-the-commons situations depend on freeloaders being able use that freeloading to further amplify their ability to freeload -- e.g. the guy that overgrazes the field produces more sheep than the restrainers, leading to further overgrazing (until collapse). Under the assumption (again, with non-obvious implications) that voters intelligently reject bad ideas within the marketplace thereof, there is no such self-reinforcement -- they reject the bad ideas in favor of better ones. It would be like a magical commons that poisons any sheep whenever the blade of grass it eats is beyond its quota. Or, more realistically, like a commons whose polity has set up rules with punishments for those who defect from the solution to such a collective action problem. >(Also, rational agents -- by the definition of rationality -- don't act on the social consequences of options, but on their personal costs and benefits.) That's not the definition of rationality, but of rational agents with a particular set of preferences (i.e. of caring only about themselves). You can be rational and still care about starving kids in Africa. But irrespective of semantic games, the relevant distinction for this issue is whether the voters are rational in the sense of identifying and rejecting bad ideas. To the extent you claim they meet this definition then (irrespective of how much altruism you want to insist is "rational"), the destructive propaganda of the wealthy would be stopped dead in its tracks by intelligent voters, rendering campaign finance moot -- but that obviously is not true, so it's hard to come up with a model that has it both ways. (Of course, FWIW, the intelligent-but-dont-call-it-rational voter has to have some altruism in order to vote in the first place.)

SilasX 11y ago

Obviously, no one says voters are morons, they just don't recognize the implications of the assumptions that justify campaign finance law. Doesn't matter whether someone says it explicitly, or couches it in the language of being duped by "the general tone of the discussion". You're still saying that most people aren't qualified to rationally process ideas because of the biases that propaganda exploits. And you'd be correct! But wealthy donors aren't the only ones who can propagandize. To truly guide policy from the implications of the above, you need far reaching reform, like sortition or (heaven forbid) a strongly restricted franchise.

dragonwriter 11y ago
> You're still saying that most people aren't qualified to rationally process ideas because of the biases that propaganda exploits. No, actually, I think the one of the major points made by proponents of campaign finance laws is that wild imbalances in spending prevents less well-funded ideas from being heard at all, and that, while people may be perfectly well equipped to process ideas that they are exposed to, they can't process ideas that are completely drowned out of discussion. You don't need to assume that voters are morons to justify campaign spending limits.
- SilasX 11y ago
  You do -- if people really are rationally processing ideas, then, so long as someone is exposed to good, not-socially-destructive ideas, they will propagate more successfully than those that aren't. Again, that assumption has a lot of far reaching implications that aren't appreciated. In fairness, there's some wiggle room between ideal rational agent and moron, but not that allows money to turn bad ideas into ones accepted by people whom we consider qualified to vote. Or do we really consider them qualified?
  - dragonwriter 11y ago
    > You do -- if people really are rationally processing ideas, then, so long as someone is exposed to good, not-socially-destructive ideas, they will propagate more successfully than those that aren't. Actually, expending effort to propagate even subjectively good political ideas (that is, ideas that would benefit the person involved if they were widely held) is usually irrational for most people, because the expected marginal utility is low compared to the cost to spread them. Its useful to the individual if other people spread the ideas, but its often a classic tragedy of the common situation. Now, for wealthy people (or people with otherwise disproportionate media reach and impact), the utility cost of propagating useful ideas to those who might be receptive is lower compared to the benefit, so its more likely to be rational to do it. Further, with unconstrained spending, the spending of the rich bids up the market cost of reach for ideas, making it less rational for the less rich to expend resources propagating the ideas they favor. You are invoking rationality, but doing so with an argument that ignores market conditions, opportunity costs, and relative payoffs. (Also, rational agents -- by the definition of rationality -- don't act on the social consequences of options, but on their personal costs and benefits.)
    - SilasX 11y ago
      >Its useful to the individual if other people spread the ideas, but its often a classic tragedy of the common situation. Not at all -- tragedy-of-the-commons situations depend on freeloaders being able use that freeloading to further amplify their ability to freeload -- e.g. the guy that overgrazes the field produces more sheep than the restrainers, leading to further overgrazing (until collapse). Under the assumption (again, with non-obvious implications) that voters intelligently reject bad ideas within the marketplace thereof, there is no such self-reinforcement -- they reject the bad ideas in favor of better ones. It would be like a magical commons that poisons any sheep whenever the blade of grass it eats is beyond its quota. Or, more realistically, like a commons whose polity has set up rules with punishments for those who defect from the solution to such a collective action problem. >(Also, rational agents -- by the definition of rationality -- don't act on the social consequences of options, but on their personal costs and benefits.) That's not the definition of rationality, but of rational agents with a particular set of preferences (i.e. of caring only about themselves). You can be rational and still care about starving kids in Africa. But irrespective of semantic games, the relevant distinction for this issue is whether the voters are rational in the sense of identifying and rejecting bad ideas. To the extent you claim they meet this definition then (irrespective of how much altruism you want to insist is "rational"), the destructive propaganda of the wealthy would be stopped dead in its tracks by intelligent voters, rendering campaign finance moot -- but that obviously is not true, so it's hard to come up with a model that has it both ways. (Of course, FWIW, the intelligent-but-dont-call-it-rational voter has to have some altruism in order to vote in the first place.)