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> I'm having a hard time believing that you're commenting in good faith here. You can feel free to disengage from this conversation if you find it troubling. I

by jbapple 11y ago

> I'm having a hard time believing that you're commenting in good faith here. You can feel free to disengage from this conversation if you find it troubling. If you are incredulous that someone might be concerned with the privacy of these people (and their friends and family) in the particular way I am, then I'm not sure what I can do to make you believe. I am a person. These are my true thoughts. I actually and honestly believe them. > Yes, the police will easily get warrants to search whatever property of a mass murderer's they feel would be productive to search. As I said earlier to you in another branch of this discussion, I am not disagreeing that the police CAN get this warrant. They appear to HAVE gotten this warrant, so I guess that's a historical fact. I'm trying to have a discussion about what we think is just and fair and right, as well as trying to find out if there is any evidence of a conspiracy. I have not followed the news on this shooting, so I would not be shocked if the answer were "yes, there is some evidence of a conspiracy". This is why I asked the question, "Do we have reason to believe that there is evidence of any pending crimes or any old unsolved crimes on the phone?" > No, that does not mean they can randomly get warrants to search random houses in high-crime neighborhoods. I did not ask if police CAN randomly get warrants to search random houses in high-crime neighborhoods, I asked the commenter if he or she thought they ought to be able to do so. If the answer is "yes, they ought to", then we might have a different discussion than if the answer is "no, they should not". I have met people who would answer "yes" and I have met people who would answer "no". Neither answer will cause me to accuse the commenter of commenting in bad faith. > Privacy rights for mass murderers: not a high priority of US constitutional law. I'm not talking about what is and is not a high priority for the justice system. I'm trying to engage in a dialogue about what we think the requirements for a warrant SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE and whether or not there is any evidence that the phone will provide information that will help solve or prevent crimes. > Is there some other issue we're missing here, or does that pretty much wrap it up? I'm sorry if this conversation is upsetting or troubling to you.

BWStearns 11y ago
..... I currently have a lot of time on my hands, so sure, I'll bite.... > I did not ask if police CAN randomly get warrants to search random houses in high-crime neighborhoods, I asked the commenter if he or she thought they ought to be able to do so Given that the answer to CAN they is a solid no, and that random searches of homes is in no way related to searching devices used in a conspiracy to commit murder, what is the point of this? In one instance, someone has clearly committed a conspiratorial crime, in another instance, people are living in houses with low property value. > if there is any evidence of a conspiracy Conspiracy - a secret plan by a group to do something unlawful or harmful. Point 1: A conspiracy took place. A plan to kill people was kept secret between multiple people until it was executed. Point 2: Immediately prior to commission of the murders, one of the participants declared that they were part of a larger group, known for organized commission of murder and terrorist attacks. Given these points, what information is missing that would motivate you to think that a search of the attackers' phones should be conducted? Are you really asserting that there is no evidence of conspiracy that extends beyond the deceased, despite the fact that they said they were doing this under the flag of a larger organization? I don't see any room for a normative argument defending against a search. I don't imagine that you're arguing that the post-mortem privacy interests of the terrorists prohibit investigation. Are you suggesting that the risk from not knowing the contents of the phone are so low as to not rise to outweigh the privacy interests of anyone incidentally mentioned on the device? Sorry for all the questions, what I'm trying to get at is that from a normative perspective, societies generally allow investigators to search the shit of known participants of violent criminal conspiracies in order to detect previously unknown elements or plans of those conspiracies. What is the moral base from which you are arguing that this nearly universally accepted standard is somehow deficient?
- jbapple 11y ago
  > Given that the answer to CAN they is a solid no, and that random searches of homes is in no way related to searching devices used in a conspiracy to commit murder, what is the point of this? In one instance, someone has clearly committed a conspiratorial crime, in another instance, people are living in houses with low property value. You said that the state should be able to search the phone because it was likely to have evidence of crimes. I am arguing that higher than normal likelihood, as you might expect in a high-crime neighborhood, is not sufficient to justify a search. Instead, I am arguing that evidence (indicative of finding things that will help solve or prevent crimes), not likelihood of finding such things, should be the standard for a warrant. > A conspiracy took place. I should have said "a conspiracy beyond the two dead perpetrators". > one of the participants declared that they were part of a larger group Did she? I thought she said she "pledged allegiance" to a larger group, like one might do to a Pope you have never met or spoken with. > what information is missing that would motivate you to think that a search of the attackers' phones should be conducted? I discussed this elsewhere in the thread, but you may not have seen that post yet. Here is a link: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11115698 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11115698 > Are you really asserting that there is no evidence of conspiracy that extends beyond the deceased No, I am /asking/ if there is any such evidence. > I don't imagine that you're arguing that the post-mortem privacy interests of the terrorists prohibit investigation. No, I don't think it prohibits investigation, but I do think that state searches of their personal effects ought to require evidence that searching their personal effects would solve old crimes or prevent new ones. > Are you suggesting that the risk from not knowing the contents of the phone are so low as to not rise to outweigh the privacy interests of anyone incidentally mentioned on the device? I am suggesting that those privacy interests can be balanced against evidence that searching the phone would solve old crimes or prevent new ones. I do not believe that risk is the only question. That is what I was trying to get at with my distinction between "high likelihood of" and "evidence of", above. > What is the moral base from which you are arguing that this nearly universally accepted standard is somehow deficient? The reason I think that evidence of solving (or helping to solve) old crimes or preventing new ones should be required before searching the possessions of any person, living or dead, murderer or pacifist, is a traditional one about privacy, but it seems like the balance I use is different than your balance. That "societies generally allow" the state to do something, or that societies "nearly universally" do so, is not a big factor in my feelings on whether or not it is fair and just.

by jbapple 11y ago

BWStearns 11y ago

..... I currently have a lot of time on my hands, so sure, I'll bite.... > I did not ask if police CAN randomly get warrants to search random houses in high-crime neighborhoods, I asked the commenter if he or she thought they ought to be able to do so Given that the answer to CAN they is a solid no, and that random searches of homes is in no way related to searching devices used in a conspiracy to commit murder, what is the point of this? In one instance, someone has clearly committed a conspiratorial crime, in another instance, people are living in houses with low property value. > if there is any evidence of a conspiracy Conspiracy - a secret plan by a group to do something unlawful or harmful. Point 1: A conspiracy took place. A plan to kill people was kept secret between multiple people until it was executed. Point 2: Immediately prior to commission of the murders, one of the participants declared that they were part of a larger group, known for organized commission of murder and terrorist attacks. Given these points, what information is missing that would motivate you to think that a search of the attackers' phones should be conducted? Are you really asserting that there is no evidence of conspiracy that extends beyond the deceased, despite the fact that they said they were doing this under the flag of a larger organization? I don't see any room for a normative argument defending against a search. I don't imagine that you're arguing that the post-mortem privacy interests of the terrorists prohibit investigation. Are you suggesting that the risk from not knowing the contents of the phone are so low as to not rise to outweigh the privacy interests of anyone incidentally mentioned on the device? Sorry for all the questions, what I'm trying to get at is that from a normative perspective, societies generally allow investigators to search the shit of known participants of violent criminal conspiracies in order to detect previously unknown elements or plans of those conspiracies. What is the moral base from which you are arguing that this nearly universally accepted standard is somehow deficient?

jbapple 11y ago
> Given that the answer to CAN they is a solid no, and that random searches of homes is in no way related to searching devices used in a conspiracy to commit murder, what is the point of this? In one instance, someone has clearly committed a conspiratorial crime, in another instance, people are living in houses with low property value. You said that the state should be able to search the phone because it was likely to have evidence of crimes. I am arguing that higher than normal likelihood, as you might expect in a high-crime neighborhood, is not sufficient to justify a search. Instead, I am arguing that evidence (indicative of finding things that will help solve or prevent crimes), not likelihood of finding such things, should be the standard for a warrant. > A conspiracy took place. I should have said "a conspiracy beyond the two dead perpetrators". > one of the participants declared that they were part of a larger group Did she? I thought she said she "pledged allegiance" to a larger group, like one might do to a Pope you have never met or spoken with. > what information is missing that would motivate you to think that a search of the attackers' phones should be conducted? I discussed this elsewhere in the thread, but you may not have seen that post yet. Here is a link: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11115698 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11115698 > Are you really asserting that there is no evidence of conspiracy that extends beyond the deceased No, I am /asking/ if there is any such evidence. > I don't imagine that you're arguing that the post-mortem privacy interests of the terrorists prohibit investigation. No, I don't think it prohibits investigation, but I do think that state searches of their personal effects ought to require evidence that searching their personal effects would solve old crimes or prevent new ones. > Are you suggesting that the risk from not knowing the contents of the phone are so low as to not rise to outweigh the privacy interests of anyone incidentally mentioned on the device? I am suggesting that those privacy interests can be balanced against evidence that searching the phone would solve old crimes or prevent new ones. I do not believe that risk is the only question. That is what I was trying to get at with my distinction between "high likelihood of" and "evidence of", above. > What is the moral base from which you are arguing that this nearly universally accepted standard is somehow deficient? The reason I think that evidence of solving (or helping to solve) old crimes or preventing new ones should be required before searching the possessions of any person, living or dead, murderer or pacifist, is a traditional one about privacy, but it seems like the balance I use is different than your balance. That "societies generally allow" the state to do something, or that societies "nearly universally" do so, is not a big factor in my feelings on whether or not it is fair and just.