3 ms·
Why wouldn't the FBI just clone the phone disk contents and crack the encryption on more dedicated systems?
by kevinastone 11y ago
Why wouldn't the FBI just clone the phone disk contents and crack the encryption on more dedicated systems?
- Mandatum 11y agoAre there tools to dump and resume iPhone/Android states? Could easily dump state, null "tryCounter++", and resume cracking?
- yarou 11y agoYou'd probably need a kernel mode debugger.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- superuser2 11y agoThe PIN is an input to the HSM, where the key actually lives. HSMs are designed from the silicon up to resist inspection or modification of internal state. There are certainly no baked-in debugging/JTAG interfaces, and the hardware is designed to blow away the key if the chip is under physical or logical attack.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]
- X-Istence 11y agoBecause AES is still secure unless the NSA knows something and is not sharing...
- manicdee 11y agoIf I was the NSA, I certainly wouldn't be exposing the fact that I could crack AES for the sake of a trivial (to the NSA) crime like this. What I would do, however, is engineer a situation where the FBI could believably brute force the password, then let them have at it for a few days until I supply them with the actual password. Then the FBI tells the public that the passphrase on the phone was actually something trivially guessable lime 000000.
- xenadu02 11y agoNo. The keys are stored in the secure enclave. Only the AES engine in the secure enclave can see them. Apple has gone so far as to disable JTAG access so they can't read the keys even with a hardware debugger.