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> Apple ... will probably have little time to debug or test it overall, meaning that this feature it is being ordered to build will almost certainly put more us
by ars 11y ago
> Apple ... will probably have little time to debug or test it overall, meaning that this feature it is being ordered to build will almost certainly put more users at risk.
Eh? They are not being asked to install it to the public at large, just one phone.
Of all reasons to object, this reason makes little sense.
- tptacek 11y agoThat's true. In fact, if it's possible for Apple to accomplish what DOJ is demanding of it, the best outcome would be for DOJ to succeed, and do so publicly: * There is an authentic need to get at the data on that phone * There's no likelihood at all that other users will be impacted by the backdoor * We'll all be on the same page about how secure these phones are versus the USG. It's possible that they can prevail against the 5C but not against the 5S or later, since the security architecture of the 5S is very different from that of the 5C.
- jbapple 11y ago> There is an authentic need to get at the data on that phone What is the authentic need? The shooters are dead. Do we have reason to believe that there is evidence of any pending crimes or any old unsolved crimes on the phone?
- tptacek 11y agoSure, of course that's a legitimate concern: they may have talked to other people planning attacks.
- jbapple 11y ago> they may have talked to other people planning attacks. I'm not particularly concerned with crimes that we believe "may have" occurred. Of course, they may have. Anything may have happened -- I'm asking for more than just correlation that criminals know criminals. Do we have any evidence, or even any hints or clues, that the phone contains evidence that would help solve or prevent any crimes?
- tptacek 11y agoI'm sorry, but I don't understand what you're getting at here. The legitimate concern is prevention of future attacks. They may have collaborated with people who were never apprehended on the attack that actually happened.
- jbapple 11y ago> They may have collaborated with people who were never apprehended on the attack that actually happened. Right, but we don't go searching everyone's papers just in case they are conspirators. If Alice punches Bob in the face, then is hit by a bus and dies, we don't go searching through all of Alice's stuff just in case there might have been someone else involved with the Bob-punching incident, right? Is there any evidence, any at all, that the shooters collaborated with anyone? > The legitimate concern is prevention of future attacks. I'm not questioning the "legitimate concern", but I don't think "legitimate concern" should be sufficient to get a warrant.
- tptacek 11y agoWell, it is.
- jbapple 11y ago> Well, it is. I didn't say it isn't; I said it shouldn't be.
- ars 11y ago> If Alice punches Bob in the face, then is hit by a bus and dies, we don't go searching through all of Alice's stuff just in case there might have been someone else involved with the Bob-punching incident, right? Wrong. If Alice announces that she's looking for people to attack then of course we go looking so see why she's doing that and if other are others involved. This wasn't some random emotional attack like a bar fight. Stop setting up nonsensical strawmen for your arguments, argue the hard cases not the easy ones. If your argument/objection can survive the hard cases then you have something, arguing the easy cases is meaningless.
- BWStearns 11y agoIf you shoot a bunch of people while declaring allegiance to an organized group known for shooting bunches of people then I think that pretty clearly demonstrates that reading your communications has a pretty high likelihood of turning up something useful in preventing future incidents. If this doesn't clear your hurdle for reasonable search then what would? To be clear, I don't think the order to Apple is necessarily altogether a good idea or is even going to produce the desired results, but your complaint seems to be with the fact that this data is being pursued at all. Edit to reply: > Evidence of a conspiracy would help. You said they declared allegiance to an organized group. When they did that, did they say or hint that they had been in contact with that group, other than, say, watching public YouTube videos? The woman in the couple declared it right before the shooting[0]. Do you want a notarized letter from the deceased? > Would you agree that "high likelihood" is too low a bar for justifying searching the phones of people who live in high-crime neighborhoods? I'm pretty sure neither "high likelihood" nor "authentic need" were being used as a term of art here, but I would bet that any judge would view the commission of murder declaredly for an organized militant group to be probable cause that there is information pertaining to more criminal activity by that group on these two's phones and in their communications. Do you really view this as a government overreach or are you just trolling? Under what circumstances, if any, would you see as justified a search of someone's email? phone? house? So far you've equivocated between living in a bad neighborhood and committing murder-suicide. [0] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html?_r=0 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-...
- jbapple 11y ago> reading your communications has a pretty high likelihood of turning up something useful in preventing future incidents Would you agree that "high likelihood" is too low a bar for justifying searching the phones of people who live in high-crime neighborhoods? > If this doesn't clear your hurdle for reasonable search then what would? Evidence of a conspiracy would help. You said they declared allegiance to an organized group. When they did that, did they say or hint that they had been in contact with that group, other than, say, watching public YouTube videos?
- 11y ago
- stevetrewick 11y ago>evidence 14 dead people and a stack of unused guns and bombs.
- tremon 11y agotwo dead attackers, stack confiscated. case closed.
- tptacek 11y agoExactly how do you know that the case is now "closed"? It sounds like you're just making an assumption. The state is too, but the cost of their assumption --- that there is valuable data to gather from the phone --- is very low, and the cost of your assumption, if you're wrong, is immense.
- tremon 11y agoPlease do keep up with the context :) I didn't feel the need to elaborate because my parent thought one word was sufficient, but let me state the full context to my thought process: > > > Do we have reason to believe that there is evidence of any pending crimes or any old unsolved crimes on the phone? > > 14 dead people and a stack of unused guns and bombs. > two dead attackers, stack confiscated. case closed. If the "evidence" for future crimes is merely some dead criminals and the ammunition they didn't get to use, there is no probable cause for further investigation. Hence, the case should be closed.
- tremon 11y agoNice. Next time I'll refrain from explaining myself.
- clay_to_n 11y agoApple will not do that. It's a slippery slope argument - yes, these shooters were very bad, but if Apple sets a precedent of breaking the backdoor for this crime, why can't other courts implore them to use the same technological means for lesser crimes?
- dcposch 11y ago> * There's no likelihood at all that other users will be impacted by the backdoor That could not be further from the truth. They are trying to set a precedent that endangers the future of consumer end-to-end encryption. They are trying to repurpose an 18th-century law (the All Writs law) to force Apple to help them break iPhone encryption. If this case creates precedent, what is to stop them from, say, forcing Signal and Google to work together to deliver a backdoored app update to a specific user? You are not a lawyer. Nate Cardozo, staff attorney at the EFF, had this to say: https://twitter.com/ncardozo/status/699964225737748481 https://twitter.com/ncardozo/status/699964225737748481
- tptacek 11y agoYou and Cardozo are hyperventilating. The DOJ can make this demand because Apple phones of this vintage are already breakable, and the DOJ is merely asking Apple to exercise a capability it already has. Apple knows this, better than most, and has for many years. They have done security design work with governments as an explicit adversary. The 5C was insecure. The 5S is not: it has an entire additional processor, running an incredibly secure OS, whose entire job is to make sure that the phone keeps promises like these even if the DOJ orders Apple to sign bogus updates. Apple is so committed to this that they've extended the "ten tries and you're out" promise all the way through their server infrastructure, so that if you escrow data into iCloud it will be nuked if someone tries to brute force it. Not only that, but after rigging their HSM cluster to operate that way, they burned the update keys, so that an attempt to change that rule will break all of iCloud.
- dcposch 11y agoYou haven't responded to my comment at all. You said: > There's no likelihood at all that other users will be impacted by the backdoor The backdoor, a "master key" as Tim Cook put it, that opens all pre-5S iPhones affects millions of other users. And that's not even the main issue. The issue is the precedent it sets, which endangers a lot more than just a few million users or a few specific models of iPhone.
- CaptSpify 11y agoIt's much more than tha. If they do it "just this once", that means they can allow others to get to encrypted data, despite what they've been claiming all along. It's a very binary situation.