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> You clearly can be compelled to produce private documents as evidence. You are correct - but only via due process (court order/warrant, etc..). What we have
by Alupis 11y ago
> You clearly can be compelled to produce private documents as evidence.
You are correct - but only via due process (court order/warrant, etc..).
What we have here is not due process - but rather systematic bulk collection and inspection of all electronic communications from every citizen. These private communications are then sifted through, looking for anything of interest... and if found, we then (sometimes) go get a warrant to retro-actively wiretap your communications. That's not legal, but it's what's going on.
Regarding full-device encryption - it's the same thing. You need a warrant to compel me to turn over my device. No law makes it legal for the government to "hack" into your device remotely and inspect it's contents (unless you have a specific warrant). If the individual refuses to turn over the device or decrypt it, it's no different than someone refusing to turn over a written letter... and we have punishments for these actions. We don't need to ban encryption for this, we already have mechanisms in place to handle these situations.
- tptacek 11y agoAgain, who are you arguing with? Abuses of systematic collection are a great reason to support universal encryption. Certainly, it's the primary reason I support it.
- Alupis 11y ago> Again, who are you arguing with? Why do you keep trying to shut this down? I'm clearly arguing against points you have made in the quotes cited in my post. > Abuses of systematic collection are a great reason to support universal encryption. Certainly, it's the primary reason I support it. I think we finally agree here. I just don't know why you appear to keep making counter arguments if this is how you truly feel.
- tptacek 11y agoBecause systematic collection isn't the only, or even the most important, issue at stake in the "going dark" debate.
- Alupis 11y agoThen what is at stake here? We have essentially a decade of evidence to show having access to electronic communications (both encrypted and not) has little to zero effect on law enforcement's ability to do their job. Just recently, the Paris attackers use unencrypted cell phone text messages to coordinate and plan their attack. Nobody detected it... Before that, the FBI successfully caught Ross Ulbricht, through good 'ol police work (because they couldn't beat his encryption and proxy usage). We don't need access to private communications (both encrypted and not) in order to conduct lawful law enforcement -- we just need better law enforcement practices. All this anti-encryption rederick put forth by the government is really just smoke and mirrors, covering up systematic failures of law enforcement.
- tptacek 11y agoThis seems far-fetched. Encryption has historically had zero effect on law enforcement, but collection of electronic evidence has made thousands of felony cases. Meanwhile, the issue isn't simply what criminals encrypt today, but the fact that everything they do will be encrypted in 15 years.
- dragonwriter 11y ago> Meanwhile, the issue isn't simply what criminals encrypt today, but the fact that everything they do will be encrypted in 15 years. No, everything they do will not be encrypted in 15 years. Most relevantly, except when the crime at issue itself is an act of communication, the crime won't be encrypted, or even subject to encryption, so all the usual police work that enables solving crime based on the actual criminal act and the evidence naturally attaching thereto will remain available.
- tptacek 11y agoI'm not sure what this has to do with my argument, which is that electronic evidence definitely plays a nonzero role in law enforcement today.