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> sent a second shuttle to retrieve them very easily Every report I've read this, the math doesn't check out here. It takes months at a minimum to get a shuttl

by deelowe 11y ago

> sent a second shuttle to retrieve them very easily Every report I've read this, the math doesn't check out here. It takes months at a minimum to get a shuttle ready for launch and there's no proven method for accelerating that time frame or keeping people alive in the shuttle for the extended periods of time required to prep another launch. It's not like they had a second one waiting on the pad ready to go. This isn't even taking into consideration the required engineering and logistics around moving people between shuttles, which there's no procedure for. These things aren't minor details. Source: I've played kerbal space program. :-)

DiabloD3 11y ago
They actually had a second shuttle already on the launch pad, ahead of schedule for prep for the next mission. Wikipedia quote time: "The CAIB [Columbia Accident Investigation Board] determined that a rescue mission, though risky, might have been possible provided NASA management had taken action soon enough.[56][57] They stated that, had NASA management acted in time, two possible contingency procedures were available: a rescue mission by shuttle Atlantis, and an emergency spacewalk to attempt repairs to the left wing thermal protection. Normally, a rescue mission is not possible, due to the time required to prepare a shuttle for launch, and the limited consumables (power, water, air) of an orbiting shuttle. However, Atlantis was well along in processing for a planned March 1 launch on STS-114, and Columbia carried an unusually large quantity of consumables due to an Extended Duration Orbiter package. The CAIB determined that this would have allowed Columbia to stay in orbit until flight day 30 (February 15). NASA investigators determined that Atlantis processing could have been expedited with no skipped safety checks for a February 10 launch." 56: Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003). "Decision Making at NASA" (PDF). CAIB Report, Volume I, chapter 6.4 "Possibility of Rescue or Repair". p. 173ff. Retrieved March 28, 2013. http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/C... 57: Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003). "STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment" (PDF). CAIB Report, Volume II, appendix D.13. p. 391ff. Retrieved January 30, 2006. http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL2/D13.PDF http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL2/D13.PDF

by deelowe 11y ago

DiabloD3 11y ago

They actually had a second shuttle already on the launch pad, ahead of schedule for prep for the next mission. Wikipedia quote time: "The CAIB [Columbia Accident Investigation Board] determined that a rescue mission, though risky, might have been possible provided NASA management had taken action soon enough.[56][57] They stated that, had NASA management acted in time, two possible contingency procedures were available: a rescue mission by shuttle Atlantis, and an emergency spacewalk to attempt repairs to the left wing thermal protection. Normally, a rescue mission is not possible, due to the time required to prepare a shuttle for launch, and the limited consumables (power, water, air) of an orbiting shuttle. However, Atlantis was well along in processing for a planned March 1 launch on STS-114, and Columbia carried an unusually large quantity of consumables due to an Extended Duration Orbiter package. The CAIB determined that this would have allowed Columbia to stay in orbit until flight day 30 (February 15). NASA investigators determined that Atlantis processing could have been expedited with no skipped safety checks for a February 10 launch." 56: Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003). "Decision Making at NASA" (PDF). CAIB Report, Volume I, chapter 6.4 "Possibility of Rescue or Repair". p. 173ff. Retrieved March 28, 2013. http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/C... 57: Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003). "STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment" (PDF). CAIB Report, Volume II, appendix D.13. p. 391ff. Retrieved January 30, 2006. http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL2/D13.PDF http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL2/D13.PDF