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You're arguing that we shouldn't do anything, instead of taking a step in the right direction. Email is an old ecosystem, so it's not possible to make big impro
by skybrian 11y ago
You're arguing that we shouldn't do anything, instead of taking a step in the right direction. Email is an old ecosystem, so it's not possible to make big improvements all at once.
- infogulch 11y agoAnother case where The Perfect is the enemy of The Good. Baby steps, people.
- Zigurd 11y agoIt's a good step, but a very small step. It's been a long time since the Snowden leaks. You're pretty much naked to state surveillance without: a) An open source client that encrypts your mail b) A public key resource with a web-of-trust All the major Web portals/ecosystems could lock the spooks out of email payloads very effectively. That would still leave other issues to solve, but securing payload in flight and at rest seems like the first real milestone that makes a difference.
- jcranmer 11y agoI'm not arguing that we shouldn't do anything. I'm arguing that the presentation of the data is at best meaningless and at worst downright harmful. DKIM authentication is in no way an attestation that it was sent by its sender. Furthermore, from what I can tell, more damage is caused by spoofing that works on the "I use a very similar name which is hard to see the difference" level (e.g., animenewsnetwork.com versus animenewssnetwork.com). Finding and testing solutions to that problem is something that doesn't require changing or deploying anything to new to the ecosystem, and it would arguably bring more benefit than deploying end-to-end encryption.
- jcrites 11y ago> I'm not arguing that we shouldn't do anything. I'm arguing that the presentation of the data is at best meaningless and at worst downright harmful. What do you think should be done to make progress that's better than Google's proposal? Personally I think encouraging all senders to adopt DKIM, transport layer TLS, DMARC, SPF, etc. by displaying auth results from those protocols in the UI is a good first step. It's similar to the push for HTTPS on the web. > DKIM authentication is in no way an attestation that it was sent by its sender. Google didn't mention DKIM in the blog post we're discussing. Are you referring to a related effort? The blog post was about encryption in transit with TLS. > I'm arguing that the presentation of the data is at best meaningless and at worst downright harmful. Google's DKIM solution is as close as one can reasonably get given modern technology. If I send a DKIM-signed email from example.com that passes validation, then it means the following is true: I sent an email through a server managed by the domain owner, that had access to the DKIM key and chose to sign my email. It's not authenticating a person, but it's authenticating that the domain's mail servers sent the message. The attestation is at the domain level, not the sender level. This attestation is still useful though: if the domain owner did not want to allow you to send email from jcranmer@example.com, then it would not accept that email from you or DKIM sign it.