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One thing I'm still not clear about is how much the ground crew knew about the damage. Did they have any idea there was a serious problem? Did the crew know t

One thing I'm still not clear about is how much the ground crew knew about the damage. Did they have any idea there was a serious problem? Did the crew know that the ship was compromised? Was this ever seriously considered? Or is this all just hindsight?

Pinckney 11y ago
Long but worth reading: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/11/columbias-last-flight/304204/?single_page=true http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/11/columbia...
gizmo686 11y ago
From the official investigation [0, page 38]: "Without on-orbit pictures of Columbia, the Debris Assessment Team was restricted to using a mathematical modeling tool called Crater to assess damage, although it had not been designed with this type of impact in mind. Team members concluded over the next six days that some localized heating damage would most likely occur during re-entry, but they could not definitively state that structural damage would result. On January 24, the Debris Assessment Team made a presentation of these results to the Mission Evaluation Room, whose manager gave a verbal summary (with no data) of that presentation to the Mission Management Team the same day. The Mission Management Team declared the debris strike a “turnaround” issue and did not pursue a request for imagery. Even after the Debris Assessment Teamʼs conclusion had been reported to the Mission Management Team, engineers throughout NASA and Mission Control continued to ex- change e-mails and discuss possible damage. These messages and discussions were generally sent only to people within the sendersʼ area of expertise and level of seniority. At 2:30 a.m. EST on February 1, 2003, the Entry Flight Control Team began duty in the Mission Control Center. The Flight Control Team was not working any issues or problems related to the planned de-orbit and re-entry of Columbia. In particular, the team indicated no concerns about the debris impact to the left wing during ascent, and treated the re-entry like any other." TLDR. "They" knew that their was a potential problem, but the bureaucracy didn't. The decision making process was described in far more detail in the linked report. [0] http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html

Pinckney 11y ago

Long but worth reading: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/11/columbias-last-flight/304204/?single_page=true http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/11/columbia...

gizmo686 11y ago

From the official investigation [0, page 38]: "Without on-orbit pictures of Columbia, the Debris Assessment Team was restricted to using a mathematical modeling tool called Crater to assess damage, although it had not been designed with this type of impact in mind. Team members concluded over the next six days that some localized heating damage would most likely occur during re-entry, but they could not definitively state that structural damage would result. On January 24, the Debris Assessment Team made a presentation of these results to the Mission Evaluation Room, whose manager gave a verbal summary (with no data) of that presentation to the Mission Management Team the same day. The Mission Management Team declared the debris strike a “turnaround” issue and did not pursue a request for imagery. Even after the Debris Assessment Teamʼs conclusion had been reported to the Mission Management Team, engineers throughout NASA and Mission Control continued to ex- change e-mails and discuss possible damage. These messages and discussions were generally sent only to people within the sendersʼ area of expertise and level of seniority. At 2:30 a.m. EST on February 1, 2003, the Entry Flight Control Team began duty in the Mission Control Center. The Flight Control Team was not working any issues or problems related to the planned de-orbit and re-entry of Columbia. In particular, the team indicated no concerns about the debris impact to the left wing during ascent, and treated the re-entry like any other." TLDR. "They" knew that their was a potential problem, but the bureaucracy didn't. The decision making process was described in far more detail in the linked report. [0] http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html