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So, interesting question that I don't have an answer to (or position on). Suppose we say, look: no surveillance of packets without a warrant or due process. Fi

by pnathan 11y ago

So, interesting question that I don't have an answer to (or position on). Suppose we say, look: no surveillance of packets without a warrant or due process. Fine and dandy. The FBI comes to a judge and says, hey - we have this major event which we consider to be a super high risk for an attack. We'd like to run a dragnet on the location for electronic surveillance for a month prior to try and detect attackers. No exemptions; they all go into a graph database and compared against known patterns and known malicious datapoints. After the event is over and the crowd has dispersed, we'll tear down the surveillance infrastructure and go home. What do you think the judge should say... (Let's say the tech is freaky effective: can isolate attackers 90% of the time. Does that change your answer? How come?) I don't have an answer to the above question. I can argue both sides of the debate, I think. :-)

omginternets 11y ago
>What do you think the judge should say... I think the judge should evaluate, with the best available knowledge, the degree to which this approach is likely to be effective, and weigh that against the invasion of privacy it entails. >Let's say the tech is freaky effective: can isolate attackers 90% of the time. Does that change your answer? How come? Clearly, he should say yes. My entire argument stems from the fact that the most credible sources place the probability in the neighborhood of zero. I'll leave it as an exercise to the reader to do this bit of research himself, but here's a starting point: http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/33264/snowden-frances-intrusive-surveillance-laws-failed-stop-paris-attacks http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/33264/snowden-frances-intru... The burden of proof is on the person claiming that the tech is effective, and so far we've only seen it fail.
- pnathan 11y ago
  Interesting. I would argue that from a civil liberties standpoint, the efficacy really doesn't matter, the intrusion onto privacy from such a technology is so great that it essentially grants a total awareness by the FBI into all the citizen's lives as they pursue their 'life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness'. And, if the surveillance is more effective, the ability to control harmless behaviour is more, and thus the infringement is worse.
  - omginternets 11y ago
    I think the counter-argument (in this specific case) is that it's geographically restricted, which I think is fair from the standpoint of civil liberties. Does your example posit global dragnet surveillance, or are we still working within the frame of the superbowl exemplar?
    - pnathan 11y ago
      In the superbowl exemplar, you've determined to have near-total visibility on a large (200K?) number of people (assuming 75K going to the stadium, roughly 3x that in the general region). Many of whom are not going to be involved; they are just passing by on their private business. Why should the government inquire deeply into their private lives without a specific warrant (as opposed to a general warrant)? It strains the bounds of credibility that a specific warrant can apply to hundreds of thousands of people. However, if we set aside the idea of privacy as a civil liberty to be protected, and assume that the greatest good would be to stop a terrorist attack, I think that we would be justified in

by pnathan 11y ago

omginternets 11y ago

>What do you think the judge should say... I think the judge should evaluate, with the best available knowledge, the degree to which this approach is likely to be effective, and weigh that against the invasion of privacy it entails. >Let's say the tech is freaky effective: can isolate attackers 90% of the time. Does that change your answer? How come? Clearly, he should say yes. My entire argument stems from the fact that the most credible sources place the probability in the neighborhood of zero. I'll leave it as an exercise to the reader to do this bit of research himself, but here's a starting point: http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/33264/snowden-frances-intrusive-surveillance-laws-failed-stop-paris-attacks http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/33264/snowden-frances-intru... The burden of proof is on the person claiming that the tech is effective, and so far we've only seen it fail.

pnathan 11y ago
Interesting. I would argue that from a civil liberties standpoint, the efficacy really doesn't matter, the intrusion onto privacy from such a technology is so great that it essentially grants a total awareness by the FBI into all the citizen's lives as they pursue their 'life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness'. And, if the surveillance is more effective, the ability to control harmless behaviour is more, and thus the infringement is worse.
- omginternets 11y ago
  I think the counter-argument (in this specific case) is that it's geographically restricted, which I think is fair from the standpoint of civil liberties. Does your example posit global dragnet surveillance, or are we still working within the frame of the superbowl exemplar?
  - pnathan 11y ago
    In the superbowl exemplar, you've determined to have near-total visibility on a large (200K?) number of people (assuming 75K going to the stadium, roughly 3x that in the general region). Many of whom are not going to be involved; they are just passing by on their private business. Why should the government inquire deeply into their private lives without a specific warrant (as opposed to a general warrant)? It strains the bounds of credibility that a specific warrant can apply to hundreds of thousands of people. However, if we set aside the idea of privacy as a civil liberty to be protected, and assume that the greatest good would be to stop a terrorist attack, I think that we would be justified in