> servers You're trusting the server too much. While TLS servers an important role, it is only protecting the link, not he data. End-to-end encryption (which

> servers You're trusting the server too much. While TLS servers an important role, it is only protecting the link, not he data. End-to-end encryption (which PGP/GPG provides) is important for the same reason bittorrent is so successful: it protects the data, not the host. When bittorrent was new, a common concern was that you might be getting the data form anybody, including people who are malicious. This concern was a product of traditional download methods where you had to trust the person sending the data ("only download from reputable sources"). Bittorrent bypassed that problem by providing hashes, so the data itself could be verified regardless of how you got it. Securing of a host or connection suffers from the same problem. Just like how reputable fileservers can still be hacked or strong-armed into serving incorrect data, the server at the end of the TLS connection can be compromised. > how That depends on the people at the TLS endpoints who see the plaintext. If they are collaborators, they simply build in access to the plaintext and we call it "Prism". If they are refuseniks, it might be necessary use a national security letter.