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" I laughed at his insistence re off-site backups." Was that because you knew about interdiction or the fact that a 3rd party might have no security? ;) "He o
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
" I laughed at his insistence re off-site backups."
Was that because you knew about interdiction or the fact that a 3rd party might have no security? ;)
"He only took over that department in 2013, after more than two decades at NSA. He is a manager, not an agent. His practical knowledge is limited to what he has been told and has bothered to read. "
That's probably true. In that case, though, he'd still know they attacked stuff lower in the stack, did implants, used radar, etc. It's in the basic catalog. How much he'd understand I don't know. That he neglects their methods of hitting hardware or getting physical access suggest he's misleading intentionally.
"ou don't get to be head of a department in a spy agency by helping the public avoid spies."
And that's why. I thought at headline that the guy would have to be a defector or new whistleblower if we were going to get anything out of this. He still works there? And is helping us stop TAO? Who buys this kind of BS...?
- sandworm101 11y ago>>> Was that because you knew about interdiction or the fact that a 3rd party might have no security? ;) Because the interception of data flowing between data centres was/is the backbone of the prism program. NSA has access to he fibre over which those backups will travel.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoYeah, that too. Good news is that CompSci and OSS have given us many ways to protect confidentiality and integrity of that data. Off-site backups are fine if one is doing that. I usually recommend a data diode or guard between the storage/crypto and transport parts of that use case, though. That's because just trying to do the off-site, online backups opens one's endpoints up to attack. One-way flows with error correction built-in or limited back-channels guaranteed with custom HW are traditional way to do it.
- kbenson 11y agoNot too long ago, "off-site backups" did not mean you used an internet connection, and in many instances, it still doesn't. Tape is still in use. Along with that, off-site doesn't necessarily mean "another company". It can be a separate office at the same org.
- sandworm101 11y ago>>off-site doesn't necessarily mean "another company" That is part of what prism was tapping, data moving between google-owned data centers. Tape comes with its own set of problems. "A contractor working for the US Secret Service walked onto a Washington, DC Metro train carrying two tapes full of extremely sensitive data. He got off at his stop carrying neither. " https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/12/10/secret-service-sensitive-files-metro-train/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/12/10/secret-service-s...
- nostrademons 11y agoTechnically, it was MUSCULAR tapping the fiber of Google-owned datacenters. PRISM was another name for FISA court requests.
- EGreg 11y agoThe only thing I think this achieves is helping stop FOREIGN government agencies from getting the same data. US government agencies have access to interdiction, implanting backdoors in nearly all the electronics, and in networks. You'd have to build your own hardware from scratch to avoid getting spied on by USA based state actors and then you'd probably run afoul of the FCC.
- indians_pro 11y agoam i reading this right? is it illegal in the us to build ur own computer device from the most basic components?
- EGreg 11y agoAs far as I know, building it is fine but you can't network it without FCC licensed components.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoYou'll get patent suits for sure if you sell it. There's a patent on almost everything about making CPU's and networked devices. Also, anything that uses high-assurance security (EAL6/7) is still under old classification they used to reduce exports for crypto. They didn't mention the implications of that when they opened up crypto exports. ;) So, your best case is to build something that barely functions by modern standards but still usable. Here's you some inspiration: http://www.homebrewcpu.com/ http://www.homebrewcpu.com/ Good security model to start with to leverage existing code: https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/cheri/ https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/cheri/
- nickpsecurity 11y agoAnything NSA can do they can do if they know the method. 0-days in lower than app layers abound, esp for Chinese and Russians. Russians also mastered emanation attacks long ago. They and U.S. had a nice cat and mouse game on that. Chinese actively counterfeit our gear with who knows what added in there. So, my framework and counter to the NSA guy doesn't just apply to the NSA threat. It applies to foreign, nation-states too. The barrier to entry, esp for non-app attacks, is lower than ever with even hobbyists publishing attacks on the net due to seemingly no effort at device- or router-level security.