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He's misdirecting people. Sure this is good advice. The problem is they only protect upper layers of the stack. NSA TAO hits the lower ones, too. Some NSA tooli
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
He's misdirecting people. Sure this is good advice. The problem is they only protect upper layers of the stack. NSA TAO hits the lower ones, too. Some NSA tooling even attacks in ways that require TEMPEST-style shielding. An old enumeration of issues I put together shows more of the places they're hitting plus assurance activities that stopped their hackers in the past:
http://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V http://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V
Suffice it to say, the TAO is going to breach most of what people use. What people in high-assurance security usually did was a combination of airgaps, embedded hardware, micro/separation kernels, things like serial ports to avoid DMA risk, and so on. You have to get all the attack surface out of the equation. Then, you make the TCB simple and strong for the rest.
It's more work than most will do. It also counters the mainstream favorites like Linux/BSD, at least usual usage. So, uptake of high-security methods stayed low enough for TAO to have an easy job. Snowden leaks haven't changed that: economic and social factors remain for proprietary and FOSS. So, follow this advice or not, they'll still probably get in because root problems are still there. Might stop others, though.
- sandworm101 11y agoI agree. None of what he suggests will help avoid TAO spying. I laughed at his insistence re off-site backups. But I wouldn't call this guy the NSA's chief hacker. He only took over that department in 2013, after more than two decades at NSA. He is a manager, not an agent. His practical knowledge is limited to what he has been told and has bothered to read. You don't get to be head of a department in a spy agency by helping the public avoid spies.
- nickpsecurity 11y ago" I laughed at his insistence re off-site backups." Was that because you knew about interdiction or the fact that a 3rd party might have no security? ;) "He only took over that department in 2013, after more than two decades at NSA. He is a manager, not an agent. His practical knowledge is limited to what he has been told and has bothered to read. " That's probably true. In that case, though, he'd still know they attacked stuff lower in the stack, did implants, used radar, etc. It's in the basic catalog. How much he'd understand I don't know. That he neglects their methods of hitting hardware or getting physical access suggest he's misleading intentionally. "ou don't get to be head of a department in a spy agency by helping the public avoid spies." And that's why. I thought at headline that the guy would have to be a defector or new whistleblower if we were going to get anything out of this. He still works there? And is helping us stop TAO? Who buys this kind of BS...?
- sandworm101 11y ago>>> Was that because you knew about interdiction or the fact that a 3rd party might have no security? ;) Because the interception of data flowing between data centres was/is the backbone of the prism program. NSA has access to he fibre over which those backups will travel.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoYeah, that too. Good news is that CompSci and OSS have given us many ways to protect confidentiality and integrity of that data. Off-site backups are fine if one is doing that. I usually recommend a data diode or guard between the storage/crypto and transport parts of that use case, though. That's because just trying to do the off-site, online backups opens one's endpoints up to attack. One-way flows with error correction built-in or limited back-channels guaranteed with custom HW are traditional way to do it.
- kbenson 11y agoNot too long ago, "off-site backups" did not mean you used an internet connection, and in many instances, it still doesn't. Tape is still in use. Along with that, off-site doesn't necessarily mean "another company". It can be a separate office at the same org.
- sandworm101 11y ago>>off-site doesn't necessarily mean "another company" That is part of what prism was tapping, data moving between google-owned data centers. Tape comes with its own set of problems. "A contractor working for the US Secret Service walked onto a Washington, DC Metro train carrying two tapes full of extremely sensitive data. He got off at his stop carrying neither. " https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/12/10/secret-service-sensitive-files-metro-train/ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/12/10/secret-service-s...
- nostrademons 11y agoTechnically, it was MUSCULAR tapping the fiber of Google-owned datacenters. PRISM was another name for FISA court requests.
- petra 11y agoGreat in depth post. One question: What's your opinion on Qubes , or it's windows brethren Bromium[2] and blueridge Appguard[1] ? Not against TAO , like you said it won't work, but maybe it's the best a regular person or small company can do ? [1]http://www.blueridge.com/index.php/products/appguard/consumer http://www.blueridge.com/index.php/products/appguard/consume... [2]http://www.bromium.com/ http://www.bromium.com/
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThose kind of tricks are basically risk mitigation against untargeted attacks or attacks targeted against components that can be damage limited. They're fine for that. They fall short when attackers start aiming for the hypervisor, firmware, etc or can do damage within the compromised VM/partition (app-layer attack). Security against those attackers has to somehow isolate the effects of their data or code from those things. In other words, you need it at every layer with each component assured and the integration done safely. None of those meet that. Only one's that come close are commercial and might not even serve a small business. :( My old strategy was several cheap computers hooked up with a KVM switch and a guard to assess data moving between them. Basic airgapping w/ trusted transfer. The simplest scenario splits confidential and untrusted (esp Internet). Wasn't that hard to use: just inconvenient on occasion. Setting up guard and software properly is tricky to say the least. A specialist is necessary although an OpenBSD or Linux box well-configured can work out for common attackers. On Windows, I used AV for reaction, Defensewall/AppGuard/SandboxIE (varied) for prevention, did backups/restores with a boot CD, write-protect BIOS if available, regular patching, and Linux Live CD (kept up to date) for stuff like banking. Regular restores from backups, too, with patches applied to clean copies. I used RAMdrives for temporary storage so it autodeleted upon shutdown. I used write-protect HD's to prevent corruption of OS partition but not available now that I know of. Physical wire, not wireless, for Internet disconnected in old school fashion when not in use to deny bot bandwidth if nothing else. :) Non-traditional router made from non x86 or ARM box running a Linux or BSD firewall distro. Sparcstations with OpenBSD were popular among paranoids. Can't remember mine as it was one time. Just a few things I remember. Had I stayed on Windows, I was going to next explore using Windows Embedded to strip out more attack surface. A friend named tommy, smart but not IT guy, systematically backed up, deleted, tested, and restored on failure his Windows XP box in iterations until he found how little code & data it needed to still function. He got a WinXP system with Office, Firefox, AV, etc down to 650MB total backed up on a CD. Unreal. I figured, as I had stripped 'NIX's, I could apply that strategy to Windows with more ease if I let Embedded's tools safely do first stage for me. Good head start cuz I don't have years of obsession for one hardening. ;) Also, on lighter side, I put some people with extremely minimal needs on hardened Mac's with PPC processors. I knew malware authors would exclusively target Intel's upon the transition with replacement hardware cheap on eBay. Strategy still works for those using it. One of my air-gapped backups is a PPC laptop I got for $80. What do RaspPi and accessories cost again to deliver what? ;) Otherwise, hardened Mac's on Intel might be a safe strategy for average business due to rare targeting. Even Krebs endorsed that strategy at one point. Still with backups to read-only media and such. So, there's that.
- meowface 11y agoAbsolutely. His advice is accurate and something everyone should follow, but it really only scratches the surface. Presenting it as "follow these 6 weird tips to keep TAO out!" is an attempt to give a false sense of security. That said, the NSA is technically in charge of defensive information security for the country, so he can't be dismissed as wholly disingenuous, either.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThat's a common misconception. The law/directives required them to do COMSEC for US govt. Later expanded to offer protection for defense contractors. They still do both. See Type 1 certified gear, NSA inline media encryptor, TEMPEST, etc. Defense use only. ;)
- meowface 11y agoTrue.
- zipwitch 11y agoWhen it comes to securing ourselves, anything coming from the NSA should be treated as some form of disinformation. The NSA betrayed its "information security" brief long ago and can never be trusted on that front again. We are all better off keeping up with and following consensus best practices and ignoring the NSA, rather than trying to out-think their latest bit of disinformation.
- nickpsecurity 11y ago"When it comes to securing ourselves, anything coming from the NSA should be treated as some form of disinformation." "The NSA betrayed its "information security" brief long ago and can never be trusted on that front again." Err, sort of. They were a valuable part of the field in the 80's and 90's, esp for evaluations. Their own stuff that's actually designed for security is done well and has some things to teach us. These are often called Type 1 products, GOTS high-security, and so on. They're not available to the general public because they work. ;) Here's an accurate picture of DOD/NSA's involvement in creating INFOSEC in business and destroying it later for politics/legal/business/intel reasons from one of old guard: http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-Back-Addendum.pdf http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-B... The reasons they stopped pushing it aren't even clear to me at this point. Individuals and businesses rejected almost all high-security products in favor of maximal features, backward compatibility w/ insecure stuff, integration with insecure stuff, faster even if unsafe (eg C lang), cheaper even if less safe, and smaller even if forcing insecure integrations. This was true before, during, and after Walker's CSI. Still is post-Snowden as real security cost money and has tradeoffs that most users refuse. So, the reason we're getting hacked all the time & NSA's IAD is doing little isn't really NSA: it's demand side where people refuse to do anything secure and use insecure stuff en masse. This is true even with usable alternatives: Facebook Messenger vs Threema or whatever; no disk protection vs Truecrypt full disk; no backups vs automated backups to USB; paid, non-snooping, $5/month email vs free, sell-you-out email. Convenience or price almost always win out. So, NSA could disappear entirely and our situation would still be the same. Plus, they deserve credit for their participation in high assurance stuff that stops even them, which is published in enough detail to copy, and which continues to this day. Example on CPU side: http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/pete/acl206/slides/hardin.pdf http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/pete/acl206/slides/hardin.pdf https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/inline_media_encryptor/ https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/inline_media_encryptor/ https://www.nsa.gov/applications/ia/tempest/index.cfm https://www.nsa.gov/applications/ia/tempest/index.cfm So, no, you're best off learning what CompSci, DOD, NSA, and INFOSEC's founders taught us under the banner of high assurance security. Ignore whatever they teach general public or business unless trustworthy pro's will peer review it. Best practices are insufficient as they don't address lifecycle assurance of computer hardware or software. They leave in the vulnerabilities NSA and black hats will continue to hit. So, one must from bottom to top apply high-security techniques to make a better stack. Even post-Snowden, that activity is pretty much non-existent enough that I can count the projects on one or both hands. I rest my case about the problem being on demand and supply sides.
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- jhanschoo 11y agoI won't say that he's misdirecting people. It should be obvious enough that NSA relies on vectors this does not cover as well, and can adapt by finding new vectors. But this is presumably bread-and-butter stuff, and I won't be surprised that the vectors covered in the talk are the most common, cheap and reliable ones that his team most commonly uses.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoHe's talking about TAO and nation state attackers. He knows what both use. His recommendations ignore entire categories of risk and assurance activities TAO relies upon per their catalog. That's misleading.