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To be fair, userspace access to these variables is required in order to manage EFI boot. Having them there to be deleted (by root!) accidentally is probably ba
by ajross 11y ago
To be fair, userspace access to these variables is required in order to manage EFI boot. Having them there to be deleted (by root!) accidentally is probably bad, but this isn't a meaningful security fix.
The real crisis here is that modern firmware is developed in an environment so fragile and isolated that it's simply unable to recover from configuration that is "wrong".
I had a laptop that I bricked about two years ago by accidentally wiping out the partition table on the soldered-down storage.
- fweespeech 11y agoYes but almost all use cases allow you to set them immutable or remount by default. The management of them can be done with a couple commands.
- Sanddancer 11y agoUserspace access. Not access via yet another pseudo-filesystem. Especially not access via yet another pseudo-filesystem automatically mounted read/write at boot time. GRUB works just fine on other systems that don't have a pseudo-filesystem for EFI access.
- mikeash 11y agoI don't think this is meant to be a security fix, it's just meant to make it so you can't accidentally break your hardware with what seems like an unrelated filesystem command. I agree that the stupid firmware is ultimately to blame, and mounting this stuff read-write is a fairly reasonable initial decision. But given the existence of this stupid firmware, the resistance to implementing an easy mitigation by mounting it read-only is insane. I can't understand why there are any responses besides "oh shit, we'd better change this."
- snuxoll 11y agoTechnically, denial of service is a security issue - I have modern servers that boot via UEFI (since GPT is required to support large disks), hopefully with less buggy implementations but if someone manages to get root on a server they could totally kill the hardware. Having to reinstall an OS because some script kiddie decided to `rm -rf --no-preserve-root /` your server bites, but actually bricking the system requiring a board replacement is scary. (Of course, they could technically be a jerk and flash your UEFI EEPROM, but most servers have a backup they will restore from in case the primary has been corrupted). EDIT: Though, now that I think about it, this is still only going to stop users from hosing their systems. A malicious user could still run an arbitrary binary or kernel module that hoses the UEFI variables as well. Or by modifying the UEFI boot config to load some other custom UEFI binary to hose it... firmware vendors really just need to get their crap in gear, software (even running in UEFI boot services mode shouldn't be able to hose it).
- mikeash 11y agoRegarding your edit, exactly. The issue could be considered a security issue, but this fix is not a security fix. A security fix would be something like only allowing touching EFI during startup and then somehow securely and permanently disabling that ability until the next reboot, or a physical write-protect switch on the computer. Or EFI firmware not being so stupid, but we know that's not going to happen.
- snuxoll 11y agoMaybe if there was some awful Windows virus that nuked boards with bad implementations they would fix their crap.
- yrro 11y agoBingo. You're only a call to SetFirmwareEnvironmentVariable away from having your Windows system hosed.
- yuhong 11y agoMore precisely, every EFI firmware not being so stupid. BTW, you will see that a "high quality UEFI BIOS" is part of my wishlist for an Intel/AMD branded laptop: https://www.reddit.com/r/hardware/comments/42cnbq/would_intelamd_branded_laptops_be_a_good_idea/ https://www.reddit.com/r/hardware/comments/42cnbq/would_inte...