5 ms·

I appreciate a lot of the work that the Tails guys do - but for a privacy and security focused distribution there are far too many included apps for my liking[1

by nikcub 11y ago

I appreciate a lot of the work that the Tails guys do - but for a privacy and security focused distribution there are far too many included apps for my liking[1], which increases the attack surface. LibreOffice, Gimp and Audacity are just some of the apps - and many have a horrible history of vulnerabilities[2]. When Tails has had vulnerabilities it is often with one of these included apps[6]. The browser isn't sanboxed (it's in progress[3]), and the machine is still directly connected to the internet, so you're a single Firefox vulnerability and a drive-by download away from being deanonymized. It is also a shame that both OS X and Windows make it difficult to write an OS to an USB stick and boot from it - the install requires an intermediary Linux OS either on DVD or USB, which a lot of users won't get by. For a different approach, see Whonix[4] - a virtual machine based approach with an isolating proxy (very popular setup amongst black hats) and Qubes OS[4] which is built on Xen and runs processes in separate VM's [1] https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/features/index.en.html https://tails.boum.org/doc/about/features/index.en.html [2] https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-11439/product_id-21008/Libreoffice-Libreoffice.html https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-1143... [3] https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Sandbox https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Sandbox [4] https://www.whonix.org/ https://www.whonix.org/ [5] https://www.qubes-os.org/ https://www.qubes-os.org/ [6] https://blog.exodusintel.com/2014/07/23/silverbullets_and_fairytails/ https://blog.exodusintel.com/2014/07/23/silverbullets_and_fa...

swinglock 11y ago
The Whonix approach is very reasonable. Tails must be considered inadequate when used as a complete solution as long as the browser isn't fully isolated from the Tor underlay.
- dublinben 11y ago
  >Tails must be considered inadequate Tails is significantly more secure than the common practice of running the Tor Browser Bundle on a Windows OS.
  - nikcub 11y ago
    I built a custom VMWare install of Windows Embedded (well, they're all custom) running just Chromium. I think it's pretty secure - the footprint is tiny, I was actually more concerned about switching off some of the fancier features of Chromium (such as Canvas and WebGL). In theory it would make an excellent thin client to use with an OpenBSD isolating proxy - i'm actually curious to hear what others would think about using embedded Windows (XP or 8 or 10) in this way.
    - bcook 11y ago
      A proxy cannot anonymize encrypted traffic.
      - nikcub 11y ago
        Isolating proxy: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO/IsolatingProxy https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWT... meaning the only way to route out is to proxy via Tor. IMO it's the only safe way to run Tor and remain anonymous.
        bcook 11y ago
        That only tunnels traffic through Tor, right? If the browser leaks identifying client information through HTTPS or other encrypted protocols, the proxy (torify) will not be able to help. That is why Tor Browser is important.
        nikcub 11y ago
        yep, the way it is setup is you create a private network in VMWare, the proxy/router box has a live IP address on one end and is running a DHCP server on the private network. The client VM's connect to the Tor daemon on the proxy/router using SOCKS or HTTP I don't use torify or anything else - if the app doesn't support SOCKS or HTTP then I don't use it. Any browser leaks will just hit a wall against the router VM. It's the whonix architecture - except I use my own router (wasn't comfortable with whonix's 1.6GB+ router) and client.
nix0n 11y ago
There's an easy way to write an OS to an USB stick and boot from it... if you're not paranoid. http://www.pendrivelinux.com/universal-usb-installer-easy-as-1-2-3/ http://www.pendrivelinux.com/universal-usb-installer-easy-as...
petra 11y ago
There's even Qubes-whonix: "Qubes-Whonix is the seamless combination of Qubes OS and Whonix for Security + Anonymity." https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes
lamby 11y ago
One "practical" reason is that its relatively easy to make a Debian-based derivative distribution due to the large amount of prior art, tools and manpower. Now, if we could integrate Qubes-style isolation with Debian then most of this could be ameliorated. :)

by nikcub 11y ago

swinglock 11y ago

The Whonix approach is very reasonable. Tails must be considered inadequate when used as a complete solution as long as the browser isn't fully isolated from the Tor underlay.

dublinben 11y ago
>Tails must be considered inadequate Tails is significantly more secure than the common practice of running the Tor Browser Bundle on a Windows OS.
- nikcub 11y ago
  I built a custom VMWare install of Windows Embedded (well, they're all custom) running just Chromium. I think it's pretty secure - the footprint is tiny, I was actually more concerned about switching off some of the fancier features of Chromium (such as Canvas and WebGL). In theory it would make an excellent thin client to use with an OpenBSD isolating proxy - i'm actually curious to hear what others would think about using embedded Windows (XP or 8 or 10) in this way.
  - bcook 11y ago
    A proxy cannot anonymize encrypted traffic.
    - nikcub 11y ago
      Isolating proxy: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO/IsolatingProxy https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWT... meaning the only way to route out is to proxy via Tor. IMO it's the only safe way to run Tor and remain anonymous.
      - bcook 11y ago
        That only tunnels traffic through Tor, right? If the browser leaks identifying client information through HTTPS or other encrypted protocols, the proxy (torify) will not be able to help. That is why Tor Browser is important.
        nikcub 11y ago
        yep, the way it is setup is you create a private network in VMWare, the proxy/router box has a live IP address on one end and is running a DHCP server on the private network. The client VM's connect to the Tor daemon on the proxy/router using SOCKS or HTTP I don't use torify or anything else - if the app doesn't support SOCKS or HTTP then I don't use it. Any browser leaks will just hit a wall against the router VM. It's the whonix architecture - except I use my own router (wasn't comfortable with whonix's 1.6GB+ router) and client.

nix0n 11y ago

There's an easy way to write an OS to an USB stick and boot from it... if you're not paranoid. http://www.pendrivelinux.com/universal-usb-installer-easy-as-1-2-3/ http://www.pendrivelinux.com/universal-usb-installer-easy-as...

petra 11y ago

There's even Qubes-whonix: "Qubes-Whonix is the seamless combination of Qubes OS and Whonix for Security + Anonymity." https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes

lamby 11y ago

One "practical" reason is that its relatively easy to make a Debian-based derivative distribution due to the large amount of prior art, tools and manpower. Now, if we could integrate Qubes-style isolation with Debian then most of this could be ameliorated. :)