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What we really need is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption with key pinning as a fallback between CA-signed https and plain http. Beating mass passive sno
by nitrogen 11y ago
What we really need is opportunistic unauthenticated encryption with key pinning as a fallback between CA-signed https and plain http. Beating mass passive snooping is worthwhile even if MITM is still a risk.
- lambau 11y agoI agree! There is TCPCrypt, for example: http://www.tcpcrypt.org/ http://www.tcpcrypt.org/
- nickik 11y agoThe Fenrir project does something like this. They first establish a encrypted connection and then you can authenticate, or not. The authentication can also be federated. Its pretty cool, but its not production ready. The GNUNet has multible layers and do bottum up encryption on the lower levels.