5 ms·
Cell towers are fixed objects. Has any work been done in detecting these planes based on the fact they are the only cell towers around moving at 100+kph? Coul
by sandworm101 11y ago
Cell towers are fixed objects. Has any work been done in detecting these planes based on the fact they are the only cell towers around moving at 100+kph? Could standard cellphone gear be sensitive enough to measure or at least guess at any doppler effect?
I'm reminded of a British comedy that included a poacher being caught after a tagged animal was found to be traveling at 55mph down the m5.
- nikcub 11y agoIn active mode the Stingray will broadcast a consistently strong signal to force targets to connect to it so that it can grab identifiers. Some detection methods rely on this, as well as fingerprinting the Stingray (they negotiate a drop in encryption and ask the phone to max signal strength) Current solutions for Android will point out new base stations that stand out and are likely an IMSI catcher: http://secupwn.github.io/Android-IMSI-Catcher-Detector/ http://secupwn.github.io/Android-IMSI-Catcher-Detector/ The better method, since the devices change and some are stationary, is to authenticate the real cell phone towers. This would involve either updating the GSM protocol, or having the carriers send out additional settings that make the phone aware of their legitimate sites and only connect to them. iOS doesn't make these settings available in official API's, but if they did it would be possible to develop apps or features that could detect/avoid IMSI catchers. The best non-tech solution is to have an anonymous IMSI. The attack relies on linking an IMSI to a real person, or the pattern behavior of a phone to a real person. So - anonymous SIM cards, change them up often, don't have it switched on with any of your real phones or real phones of friends, leave it switched off, etc.
- akerro 11y agoSorry to say, but AIMSICD is a placebo. It does not detect anything. It was proved in their issues page many times, it never detected any threat, but detected dozens of false positives (also see their issues).
- Arnt 11y agoYes, and yes. A recent news report mentioned that a "cell tower" moved along with participants in a demonstration (in London IIRC), and also that it switched networks, so obviously someone noticed that. Time division logic involves keeping track of how far each phone is from the tower. I think GSM uses 50m or 100m bands, ie. phones that are 200m from the tower time their broadcast bursts so as not to conflict with phones that are 100m from the tower. I don't know whether the distance information is available to the phones, or is kept internally in the tower, though. (I'm not an expert on this, I just heard that this need paid for a fair amount of NTP research/development, many years ago.)
- cnvogel 11y agoThe parameter in GSM is called "Timing Advance". [http://www.qtc.jp/3GPP/Specs/GSM_GERAN/0510-8c0.pdf http://www.qtc.jp/3GPP/Specs/GSM_GERAN/0510-8c0.pdf] and it's the length of time by which the mobile advances its transmission to the base station. So with increasing "timing advance", the mobile has to start transmitting earlier. Units are GSM symbol periods, defined to be 48/13 µs = 3.69µs, which, multiplied by the speed of light (3⋅10^8 m/s) is 1108m. As the distance contributes in both ways (from base-station to handset, and back) one timing advance step is half the distance: about 550m. The base station measures the relative phase of received transmissions from the mobile and will send information to the mobile to set or adjust the timing advance. [look for "timing advance" in http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gts/04/0408/05.03.00_60/gsmts_0408v050300p.pdf http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gts/04/0408/05.03.00_60/gsm... which specifies the information elements that are exchanged.] So, yes, it should be possible to get TA for each cell the mobile exchanges data with from the phone.